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This thesis evaluates the applicability of a collective security system to Northeast Asian
states as a means for regional stability in the future. The current bilateral security system will
not fit with the future security environment because of three coming changes in this region:
Korean reunification; a conspicuous reduction of the US security role; a future
confrontational power structure between China and Japan. According to the theoretical
perspectives of realists, institutionalists, and constructivists, there should be five conditions
for the success for collective security: positive identities, shared interests, institutions to
control states' behaviors, information, and interactions between institutions and states. The
case studies of the Locarno Pact and NATO confirms this. For the Northeast Asian states,
it would be very difficult to form positive identities and share common security interests at
present. However, as long as a future balance of power structure is not desirable for regional
stability, the Northeast Asian states should set the goal of collective security for their co-
prosperity in the future. They can establish a collective security system through the following
steps: the settlement of historical and ideological enmities; confidence building; establishment





A BACKGROUND AND ASSUMPTIONS 1
B RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CHAPTER SUMMARY 4
C. METHODOLOGY 6
II THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 9
A. DEFINITIONS 10
1. Collective Security 10
2. Collective Defense .11
3. Collective Security Organization 12
4. Defining the Regional Level of a Collective Security System ... 14
B BALANCE OF POWER VS. COLLECTIVE SECURITY 15
1. Balance ofPower as a System for Stability 15
2. Evaluation of the Balance ofPower 18
3. Collective Security as an Alternative to Balance ofPower .... 21
C. REALISTS' CRITIQUE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 26
1. Trust Problem 27
2. Lack of Institutional Capability 30
3. Difficulty of Consensus for Collective Action 33
D. INSTITUTIONALISE PERSPECTIVES ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY
35
1. Trust Formation: Sharing National Interests and Cooperation
.
. 36
2. Institutional Capability based on Legal Principles 38
3
.
Consensus for Collective Action 41
E. STATES' ACTIONS: CONSTRUCTIVISTS' VIEW 43
F. CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 46
vn
1. Appearance of Nation-States 47
2. Development ofMass Destruction Weapons 47
3
.
Growing Economic Interdependency 49
4. Information 50
5. Wither Cooperation? 51
G. SUMMARY: CONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY 51
III COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN HISTORY 55
A. THE LOCARNO PACT 56
1
.
Background: Formation ofNegative Identity and Conflictive Interests
57
a. Peace Settlement after the First World War 57
b. French entry into Ruhr and the Locarno Pact 61
2. Development and Failure of the Locarno Pact 67
3. Evaluation of the Locarno Pact 70
a. Cooperation without mutual security gains and positive
identity 70
b. Lack of a proper institution 73
c. Lack of collective action 75
B NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 77
1
.
Cooperation Based on Collective Identity and Mutual Interests
78
a. Forming collective identity 79
b. Mutual security gains 83
2. Institutional Capability and Information 87




Nature of Collective Security 98
Vlll
2. Consideration of Another Variable: An Existing External Threat
100
IV. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN NORTHEAST ASIA 103
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN POST-COLD
WAR 105
1. The U.S. Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era 106
2. Conspicuous Reduction of the U.S. Role after Korea Reunification
110
a. Duty and justification 110
b. Military budget problem 112
3. Impact of the U.S. Military Reduction on Regional Security . . 114
B. SECURITY POLICY OF JAPAN 115
1. Review ofPre-Modern Japanese History 116
a. Strong self-identity 116
b. Military dominant society 117
c. The success of the Meiji Restoration 119
2. From the Meiji Restoration to the Second World War 120
a. Security policy in the Meiji era 120
b. The rise of expansionism after World War I 122
3. Japan's Security Policy during the Cold-War Era 125
a. Peace Constitution and "war potential" 126
b. The Yoshda Doctrine and the Japan-US. Security Treaty
128
c. The Japan - U.S. Security Treaty: Its consequences ... 129
d. Capability of military technology 133
4. Japan's Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era 138
a. Japan's threat assessment 138
b. Active security posture 140
IX
c. The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance
143
5. Summary: Prospects for the Future Security Policy 146
C SECURITY POLICY OF CHINA 150
1. Characteristics ofPre-Modern China 151
a. Sinocentrism and response to Western powers 151
b. Chinese nationalism 152
2. Communist Revolutionary Policy under Mao Zedong 153
3
.
Economic Reform and Modernization under Deng Xiaoping . . 1 60
4. The Rise of Chinese Neo-Nationalism 162
5. Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era 164
6. Prospects for Future Chinese Security Policy 166
D. SECURITY POLICY OF KOREA 168
1. Lessons Learned from History 168
2. Korea-U.S. Security Alliance and "National Self Defense" Policy
170
3. Improvement ofForeign Relations 174
a. Relations with Japan 174
b. Northern Diplomacy 175
4. Prospects for Future Security Policy 176
E SUMMARY: PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY 177
1. Conflictive Security Interests 177
2. Future Regional Balance ofPower 179
V. APPLICABILITY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO NORTHEAST ASIA .183
A. ASIAN VIEWS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 184
1. Multilateralism toward Collective Security 185
2. Multilateral Security Approaches of the Northeast Asian States
187
3. Economic Interdependency 192




2. Traditional Asian Beliefs and Culture 200
C STEPS TOWARD A REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM
202
1. Confidence Building: Termination of Historical Enmity 204
2. Confidence Building: Multilateral Approaches 207
3. Institutionalization 209
a. The role of the US: from a balancer to a participant . . 210
b. Establishment of an institution for security cooperation
213
c. Institutionalization of collective security 214
D. SUMMARY 215
VI. CONCLUSION 219
A. NATURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 219
B. APPLICABILITY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 220
C FUTURE POLICY IMPLICATIONS FORNORTHEAST ASIAN STATES
222
BIBLIOGRAPHY 227




1. European Views on the Necessity ofNATO, 1987 81
2. Key Arms Control Treaties and Agreements 95
3. DOD Budget Authority 113
4. Military Budget and Forces in 1994 148
5. Major Activities and Achievements of the Force Improvement Plan 173
6. Trade Volume among Northeast Asian States 193
7. South Korean View on the 21st Century Cooperation 198




This thesis evaluates the applicability of a collective security system to Northeast
Asian states as a means for regional stability in the future. The current bilateral security
system will not fit with the future security environment because of three coming changes in
this region: Korean reunification; the conspicuous reduction of a US security role after
Korean reunification; a future confrontational power structure between China and Japan.
Korean reunification will cause the conspicuous reduction ofUS security role in terms
of mission and justification ofthe U.S. military in Korean peninsula and possibly in Japan. The
U.S. budget problem will also require a larger security role by Japan and a reunified Korea.
Japan will expand its political and security role in this region. Japan already has military
potential based on its economic power and high technology, and its permanent membership
in the U.N. Security Council will make Japan a normal sovereign state with normal military
power. The expanding political and security role of Japan will conflict with Chinese neo-
nationalism which aims at anti-hegemonism and recovering its national status. As a result,
there would be a rivalry between Japan and China. Korea may align with China, or Japan and
the United States. In either case, there will be security instability in Northeast Asia under the
balance of power system. Instead of the current balance of power structure, this thesis
examines and suggests a collective security system as a future security means in Northeast
Asia.
This thesis deals with two main questions; "Under what conditions, can a collective
security system work or not?"; "What might a collective security system in Northeast Asia
look like?"
The first argument is that for the success of collective security there should be five
conditions: positive identities among member states, shared interests, institutions to control
states' behaviors, institutions to facilitate information, and reiteration of interactions between
institution and states. They come from the theoretical perspectives of realists, institutional! st,
and constructivists. For realists, cooperation is impossible because states pursue only their
own self-interests in an anarchic international system. Like a prisoner's dilemma game, they
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do not trust each other. Institutionalists argue that cooperation is possible if states can get
mutual benefits from cooperation. In the prisoner's dilemma, if information is possible, and
the prisoner's dilemma situation occurs repeatedly, the prisoners will cooperate for their
future situation. Also, they suggest the importance of institutions for cooperation in terms of
transaction costs and information. Constructivists argue that cooperation among states
depends on identity. For example, ifthe United States increased its military, the Soviet Union
felt a threat from it while Great Britain did not. This is because the identity of the Soviet
Union toward the United States was different from that of Great Britain. If a state identifies
another state as an enemy, security cooperation will be impossible.
The five variables are examined in case studies of the Locarno Pact and NATO, and
confirmed as conditions for the success of collective security. Of course NATO is not a
collective security system but a collective defense organization. But, in terms of states'
cooperation, collective security and collective defense have the same characteristics. That is
the reason why this thesis chooses NATO as a case study of collective security.
The second argument is that collective security can be applied to Northeast Asia if
those five variables are satisfied. However, the Northeast Asian states have quite negative
identities and their security policies throughout modern history have conflicted with each
other during the Second World War, the Cold War and even in the post-Cold War era. Their
traditional relations were based on bilateralism, not multilateralism, and China's authoritarian
regime can be an obstacle for establishing a collective security system.
This thesis suggests four steps to establish a collective security system in Northeast
Asia. First of all, the Northeast Asian states should terminate historical enmities and recover
trust toward each other. Northeast Asian states have quite negative identities because of their
historical experiences throughout modern history. Japan should make its attitude toward its
history in apparent, and China also should make its ideological lines clear. Without the
settlement of historical and ideological matters, their identities cannot be improved. Second,
CBMs should be reinforced through multilateral security approaches and economic
interactions using current Asia-Pacific institutions such as the ARF and the APEC. Third,
there should be a Northeast Asian institution for security cooperation which facilitates direct
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cooperation among Northeast Asian states. Based on positive identities through the first and
second phase, this will serve to bring about convergence in their diverse and conflictive
security interests into toward a single goal of regional stability. Finally, the Northeast Asian
institution can be expanded to a collective security system like NATO. This will be a
watershed from a balance of power system to a collective security system for regional
stability.
As a current power balancer, the U.S. role will be critical for establishing collective
security and maintaining stability. The United States should not contain China by
strengthening current bilateral alliances after Korean reunification. Also, the United States
should change its role from a protector or a balancer to a participant or a conciliator. As far
as the U.S. national interests are concerned, it would be better for the US not to be an off-
shore balancer or an isolationist. Instead, the United States can undertake a role to guide
regional states to establish a new cooperative security system. Most of all, U.S. participation
in a collective security system will justify the presence of the U.S. military in Northeast Asia.
Consequently, considering a future unstable security environment under a balance of
power structure, the future security system in Northeast Asia should be changed from a
balance of power structure to a collective security system. This is because only a collective
security system will be a desirable security means for regional stability in Northeast Asia after
Korean reunification. Of course, this does not mean that current bilateral security
arrangements are not important for current and future regional security. As long as Northeast
Asian states have negative identities, collective security cannot be applied as a security




I would like to express my deep appreciation to my thesis advisor, Professor Olsen,
and second reader, Professor Eyre, for their thoughtful guidance and teaching. It was a
tremendous honor for me to work on my thesis with them. Professor Olsen was the best of
the best when it comes to Asian political and security matters, and Professor Eyre showed his
invincible skill in dealing with the theoretical part of my thesis. I also would like to thank
Professor Callahan who not only taught me comparative methods in social science, but also
encouraged me with considerate favor. Also, I thank Col. Sung-Jin Kang, Jack and Mary
Evans, Maj. Sung Lee, Maj. Jaeho Cheon and Ltc. Chao for their unconditional help. In
particular, I cannot help feeling sorry to my wife, Misuk Jang, who spent most nights lonely.





A. BACKGROUND AND ASSUMPTIONS
Even if the end of the Cold War has dominated and transformed the security agenda
in Europe and the Atlantic, its effect on the Northeast Asia region has been somewhat
equivocal. 1 The security environment in Northeast Asia remains a remnant of the Cold War
with the military confrontation around the Korean peninsula. Bilateral security arrangements
between the United States and Japan, the United States and South Korea, and the PRC and
North Korea are the nucleus of regional security. Under the balance of power structure,
Northeast Asian states are full of historical enmities and distrust and still face security
uncertainty even in the post-Cold War era. Despite the aggravated economic situation, North
Korea has threatened neighboring states with its nuclear program and intermediate range
ballistic missile (ERBM) development. China has continued its nuclear tests and showed its
hard line policy toward domestic and regional issues such as Taiwan and the Spratly Islands.
Japan's move toward a greater security role in the Asia-Pacific region, especially after the
Japan-US. joint declaration on their security alliance in April 1996, also raised the concerns
of neighboring states about the future possibility of Japan's rearmament. Coupled with
unsolved territorial disputes concerning the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island, Tokto/Takeshima Island,
the Taiwan issue, and the divided Korea, Northeast Asia has a strong possibility of regional
conflicts.
What will the future security environment in Northeast Asia be? So far, the current
balance of power in Northeast Asia has been stable due to the commitment of the U.S.
military. However, the question ofwhether the United States will take the role of balancer of
power continuously even after the Korean reunification lies at the heart of future security
stability in this region. The U.S. military withdrawal from Subic Bay and the suspended three-
phased plan to withdraw its troops from Northeast Asia in 1990 raised doubts over its
!
Colin Mclnnes and Mark G. Rolls, "Post-Cold War Security in the Asia-Pacific Region:
Trends and issues," Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 15, no. 2, August 1994, p. 1.
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ongoing commitment in the nature. Without the U.S. commitment, can the Northeast Asian
states maintain regional stability? There can be several answers to this question according to
different views and interpretations of the current situation. As an answer to these series of
questions about the future security environment in Northeast Asia, this thesis suggests the
following three assumptions:
• Assumption 1: Korean reunification
This thesis begins on the assumption that the two Koreas will be reunified in the (near)
future.
2 Unless the threat ofNorth Korea disappears, the current balance of power structure
based on bilateral security arrangements will continue. As long as animosities around the
Korean peninsula exist, collective security cannot be considered as an alternative to the
current balance of power structure. This does not mean that Korean reunification is the
necessary condition for collective security in Northeast Asia. The current balance of power
system may continue after Korean reunification, or another balance of power order can
appear. Or, another security system, such as collective security, can be established. In this
manner, Korean reunification can raise the possibility of change of security environment in
Northeast Asia.
• Assumption 2: The conspicuous reduction of US security roles
Korean reunification will bring about the conspicuous reduction ofUS security roles
in Northeast Asia. As long as U.S. national interests are concerned, an entire military
withdrawal would be difficult to be come true. However, three factors will influence the
reduction of the U.S. troops in this region: the lack of justification for the U.S. military
presence in this region, the budget problem, and reunified Korea's reluctance to be confronted
with China which may be a result of the U.S. military presence in Korea. As a result, Korea
and Japan will expand their independent security roles more as the U.S. security role
decreases.
2
This thesis does not suggest "how" and "when" Korean reunification will come because
what this thesis aims at is not Korean reunification, but the applicability of collective security in
Northeast Asia.
• Assumption 3: Rivalry between Japan and China
Japan will expand its political and security role in this region, assuming more of the
role ofthe United States. It already has military potential based on economic power and high
technology, and its membership in the U.N. Security Council will make Japan a "normal
sovereign state" with "normal" military power. Such moves by Japan will conflict with
China's national interests. Traditionally, China's security policy has focused on its
nationalism, which has been aimed at anti-hegemonism and recovering national status as a
"great nation" as in its past history. As a result, there will be a rivalry between Japan and
China after Korean reunification in Northeast Asia. If the current balance of power structure
continues, Korea may align with either China or Japan and the United States. In either case,
there will be security instability as a result of another confrontational structure.
With these three assumptions, the current balance of power structure based on
bilateral security arrangements will not fit in with the future security environment. The
conspicuous reduction of the U.S. security role as a balancer of power will cause a "power
vacuum". With negative identities and conflictive security interests, there will be a power
competition among the Northeast Asian states. If Japan rearms, it will be an apparent threat
to neighboring states as a strong military power. Coupled with territorial disputes and
historical enmities, an arms race among the Northeast Asian states is foreseen. Even though
there will appear a new form of a balance of power structure, the balancing will not be
desirable for regional stability because the future balance of power system means another
confrontation between Japan and China.
Instead of the balance of power structure, this thesis examines and suggests a
collective security system as a future security system in Northeast Asia after Korean
reunification. Collective security in this thesis is different from recent multilateral security
cooperation, such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Collective security is an alternative
concept to balance of power, and under a collective security system there is no balance of
power structure, such as an alliance. Multilateral security cooperation is the supplement
concept of balance of power and it is practiced in an existing balance of power structure.
Compared to collective security, a multilateral security framework has a weaker institutional
structure and lacks a legally binding force and institutional capability. As a result, while
collective security can be a system that manages power in international relations, a multilateral
security framework cannot be an ultimate security measure as an alternative to balance of
power. Rather it is a process to cooperate and coordinate their different and conflictive
security interests.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CHAPTER SUMMARY
This thesis is divided into two major parts based on two main research questions. The
first question, "Under what conditions can collective security work or fail?" will be dealt with
in Chapters II and III. The second question, "What might a collective security system in
Northeast Asia look like?" will be dealt with in Chapters IV and V. Also, there are
subquestions as follows:
• What are the theoretical perspectives of balance of power and collective
security?
• What conditions are required for the success of collective security?
• What were the interactions and functions of those conditions in the Locarno
Pact and NATO?
• How have the security policies and relationships been among the Northeast
Asian states, and how will they be after Korean reunification?
• What will the future security environment in Northeast Asia look like after
Korean reunification?
• What are the limitations and possibilities in applying collective security to
Northeast Asia as a future security means?
• How can a collective security system be applied to the Northeast Asian states?
To answer those research questions, the remainder of this thesis is organized as
follows. Chapter II examines theoretical perspectives of balance of power and collective
security and suggests five variables required for the success of collective security. First,
definitions are provided to unify different terminology related to "collective security family"
among scholars. As an alternative to the balance of power concept, collective security has
superb logic to maintain peace based on states' cooperation. However, it has been criticized
because of its ideal concept in a real world. Realists argue that collective security is
impossible because cooperation among states is rare in an anarchic international system.
According to them, states are self-helpers who pursue their own national interests. Like in a
prisoner's dilemma game, states will not cooperate with each other. Institutionalist assert that
cooperation is possible if states can get mutual benefits from their cooperation. If information
is available to the prisoners and they know the game will be repeated again and again in the
future, the prisoners will cooperate with each other for their mutual interests. Moreover,
institutions tend to facilitate cooperation by reducing transaction costs and providing
information to states. Constructivists argue that cooperation among states will depend on
their identities and interests. Identities are critical in defining interests. For example, if the
United States increased its military level, the Soviet Union felt threatened from it while Great
Britain did not. This is because the identity ofthe Soviet Union toward the United States was
different from that of Great Britain. If a state identifies another state as an enemy, security
cooperation will be impossible. From those theoretical perspectives, this thesis will find five
variables for the success of collective security: positive identities among member states,
shared interests, institutions to control states' behaviors, institutions to facilitate information,
and reiteration of interactions between institutions and states.
Chapter IE examines the interactions and functions of five variables in the case studies
ofthe Locarno Pact and NATO. Of course, NATO is not a collective security mechanism, but
a collective defense organization during the Cold War era. However, in terms of states'
cooperation, collective security and collective defense have the same characteristics. That is
the reason why this thesis chooses NATO as a case study. As a failed case, the Locarno Pact
does not satisfy the five variables. As a successful case, NATO will show the importance of
the five variables. Through the case studies, the five variables will be confirmed as the
conditions required for the success of collective security.
Chapter IV reviews security policies of the United States, Japan, China and Korea,
and assesses the prospects for the future regional security environment. This chapter will
argue that the Northeast Asian states have had quite negative identities and conflictive
security interests with each other throughout modern history. Focusing on Japan's expanding
political and security roles and Chinese neo-nationalism, this chapter will also argue that the
future security environment will be more conflictive because of the rising rivalry between
Japan and China under the balance of power system. Finally, this chapter will suggest the
possibility of collective security as a future alternative to the current bilateral security system.
Chapter V examines the applicability of collective security to Northeast Asia in terms
ofthe five conditions for the success of collective security. The current security environment
does not satisfy the five conditions. The Northeast Asian states have quite negative identities
because of historical and ideological reasons, and their security policies have conflicted with
each other during the two world wars, the Cold War era and even in the post-Cold War era.
With traditional international relations based on bilateral relations, they have no experience
with institutional interactions. In fact, those are the reasons why collective security cannot be
applied to Northeast Asia at this time. On the other hand, they imply the importance of
creating positive identities among the Northeast Asian states. Coupled with some of the
benign phenomena such as multilateral approaches to security and economy, if the Northeast
Asian states can improve their political relations with each other and converge their diverse
security interests to a common goal toward regional stability, collective security will become
closer to being a reality.
C. METHODOLOGY
This paper deals with four states as main actors: the United States, Japan, China, and
reunified Korea. These states are current components ofthe balance of power structure in this
region. As the purpose of this paper is to find out the applicability of regional collective
security system in Northeast Asia, not to suggest a specific form of collective security, the
exclusion of Russia and the Southeast Asian states would not influence an outcome of this
paper. Of course, if they satisfy the conditions for collective security, Russia and the
Southeast Asian states can be included in a collective security mechanism at any time. To
estimate the applicability of collective security, however, this thesis will simplify research by
restricting actors to the four states which commit themselves to the current balance of power
structure.
This thesis will use a comparative method to evaluate the historical cases of collective
security mechanisms — the Locarno Pact and NATO ~ and to prospect the future security
policy of the United States, Japan, China, and Korea. In the case studies, the dependent
variable is the success of collective security, and independent variables are positive identities,
shared security interests, institutional capability, information, and interactions between
institutions and states. Because these variables cannot be measured by accurate numbers or
data, this thesis will use a qualitative method, not a quantitative method. For example,
measuring identities among states would be impossible. Instead, we can estimate the variable
by closely reviewing historical background and political relations between them.

H. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Inis Claude states that, "The theory of international relations contains three basic
concepts which may be regarded as relevant to the problem of the management of power:
balance of power, collective security, and world government." 3 As this thesis deals with the
regional level of the management of power, the third one is beyond its concern. While the
balance ofpower concept has many meanings, 4 this thesis will deal with it as a system which
manages power in international relations. Based on the realists' view of the international
system, balance of power can be considered as the most decentralized, but natural and
inevitable system for power management in the real world. By its nature, which necessarily
required power competition and military confrontation among states, however, the balance
ofpower system has the limits to prevent war as in the case of the First World War. In fact,
when anarchy is not controlled, there would be chaos rather than order. Even though order
is possible, there would always exist the peril ofwar when the balance of power is broken.
3
Inis Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), p.
8. His view of the 'problem of power' in international relations is not a problem to be eliminated but
a problem to be managed. "Even if all existing weapons were destroyed and production of
armaments were totally suspended, the capacity to devise instruments of terrible power would
remain; man cannot unlearn what he knows about the means of creating power." See p. 6-8.
4
Because the term "balance of power" has been used in various levels and dimensions, it has
different meanings according to viewpoints. First, the balance ofpower can be mentioned just to
describe a situation: sometimes equilibrium in which the power relationship between states is roughly
or precisely equal; sometimes disequilibrium which results from states' objective toward a margin of
power. For example, journalists are not telling us whether the present pattern of power relationships
is characterized by equilibrium or disequilibrium, but they are merely commenting on issues relating
to the power situation. In this sense, the balance of power as a situation means the distribution of
power, whether it is balanced or unbalanced. Second, the balance of power can be identified as a
policy of promoting the creation or the preservation of equilibrium, or a policy of creating or
maintaining a 'favorable' balance, that is, an imbalance. In this case, the balance of power means a
struggle for power. If a state has two options of balancing against, or bandwagoning with a stronger
state, in this case, the balancing means the balance of power as a policy. Third, in most cases, the
balance of power is used as a system which means a certain kind of arrangement for the operation of
international relations in a world ofmany states. See Inis Claude, Jr., Power and International
Relations, p. 13-25. Also, Martin Wight shows nine different meanings of the balance of power in
his article, "The Balance of Power," ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, Diplomatic
Investigations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).
Whenever human beings were disappointed with the disastrous wars under the balance
of power system, such as the First World War, the Second World War, and even after the
Cold War, the concept of collective security prevailed as an alternative to the defective
system. For the purpose of this thesis, to estimate the adaptability of the collective security
system in Northeast Asia, this chapter will examine the theoretical perspectives of collective
security. In this chapter, some definitions about collective security concepts will be presented.
Firstly, the realists' criticism of the collective security concept will focus on three problems.
They are trust, institutional capability, and consensus for collective action. They provide a
basis to estimate the conditions of collective security. Second, the institutionalise, or
Wilsonian, view will suggest the possibility of a collective security system based on increasing
cooperation among states in the international system, providing the opposite view of the
realists. Third, the constructivists' view of states' actions will explain states' acts in terms of
their identity and interests, and supplement the institutionalist' view of cooperation among
states. Also, changes in the international system in the post-war era will show the increasing
cooperation and mutual understanding among states, thus providing more possibility of
collective security in the real world. Finally, this chapter will conclude by answering the
question, under what conditions would collective security succeed orfaill For that answer,
this thesis will suggest five variables needed for case study analysis in the next chapter.
A. DEFINITIONS
1. Collective Security
Even though there are many definitions of collective security, they all contain the
dominant concept of all for one. Tom Farer defines collective security as "a collective
institutionalized commitment not to balance but to gang up on any state that acts in defiance
of collective judgments about permissible behavior" 5 Seyom Brown asserts that "it [collective
security] comes close to de-legitimizing the unilateral initiation ofwar ..., and backed this up
5Tom J. Farer, "The Role of Regional Collective Security Arrangements," ed. Tomas G.
Weiss, Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p.
154-155.
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by mechanisms to assure that the aggressor will be countered not only by the direct victim and
its political allies but by the combined sanctions of all the countries in the collective security
system."6 Inis Claude insists, "A collective security system involved the establishment and
operation of a complex of national commitments and international organizational
arrangements designed to prevent or suppress aggression by any state against any other state,
by posing the highly reliable threat or producing the actuality of effective collective sanctions,
ranging from diplomatic boycott to military measures." 7 Using these definitions, this thesis
defines the term collective security as a security arrangement in which states make automatic
and legally binding commitments to maintain the security of each member by cooperating in
measures to prevent a member state's aggression or frustrate it wherever and whenever it
occurs.
8
In this concept, there should be neither a dominant power nor an enemy state (threat),
and all members are to accept the rules or norms based on international law. If there is an
enemy or threat, it would be an internal one, not an external one. Also, there would be an
appropriate institution to control and adjust the member states' behaviors. In this context, the
Locarno Pact (1925) and the Organization of African Unity (1963) can be considered as a
collective security arrangement and a collective security system respectively.
2. Collective Defense
As a transformed type, collective defense, like NATO, is a kind of collective security
which is to counter a specific external threat, not an internal threat. In one aspect, it does not
seem to be different from the concept of alliance in a balance of power system. Claude states
that, "NATO is not a collective security system added as an afterthought to the United
6Seyom Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System (San Francisco:
Westview Press, 1992), p. 153-154.
7
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Nations, but a new type of alliance "9 This view focuses on the equality of power distribution
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In other aspects, however, it has more characteristics
of collective security than balance of power: first, it is directed not just against a specific
threat, but also against any aggression10 ; second, it follows the principles of the United
Nations, thus is based on international law; third, as a regional level of security system, it has
the concept ofsomefor some (i.e., a minimized allfor one) 11 Consequently, at a world-wide
level, it cannot help being included in a balance of power system. However, in the regional
level ofEurope, it is also considered to be a kind of collective security. In this context, this
thesis will deal with collective defense as being in the same family of collective security.
On the other hand, NATO was a collective defense system in the cold war era to
counter an attack by the Warsaw pact, and the Warsaw pact was a parallel collective defense
arrangement. But now the former is considered to be collective security rather than collective
defense because ofthe demise of the specific threat. Also, in the Southeast Asian region, the
South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) could be classified as a collective defense
system against the threat of the spread of communism.
3. Collective Security Organization
While collective security concepts were defined earlier, a true collective security
system could not have been established under realpolitik, as shown by the failure of the
League ofNations and the limits ofthe United Nations. In particular, the veto rights of strong
powers in the two organizations are the most problematic defect as a collective security
9
Inis L. Claude, Jr. Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 266.
10
There can be a lot of debate about this, because even alliances rarely name the countries at
which they were aimed. Even though there was no mention of a specific threat in the text of the
treaty, in reality, NATO was to counter the threat of the Soviet Union. Then, what is the difference
between NATO and a normal alliance? Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that, "The
Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them all ..." That is, if there is an aggression of even a member state to
another state, it would be countered by other members. This would be the most different
characteristic as compared to an alliance.
n
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system, because collective action against an aggressor might be impeded by the national
interests of any powerful country. Philip Zelikow mentions that "any system under which the
dominant powers can regularly muster overwhelming power against weaker powers could
come to be defined as a collective organization." 12 To categorize collective security concepts,
this thesis defines collective security and collective defense approaches which use either 'all
for one' or 'all for none' rules (according to the will of powers) as a collective security
organization. In this context, the United Nations and the League ofNations will be considered
in this thesis as collective security organizations, not collective security systems.
Of course, these definitions differ among many scholars, as the terms used regarding
collective security have been neither defined exactly nor used in the same way. For example,
James E. Goodby considers collective defense as a category of collective security, and he
looks at NATO in the Cold War era as a collective security system, not a collective defense
system.
13
Inis Claude considers NATO as selective security, not collective security, from the
viewpoint that NATO is the concept of some for some, not all for all. 14 Also, Nelson's
definition of a collective security organization is different from the one that I previously
defined in that he uses the term generally regardless of the presence or absence of dominant
powers in a system. 15 Among the diversities of definitions, Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford
A. Kupchan suggest a broader concept of collective security, insisting that, "any institution
that is predicated upon the principles of regulated balancing and all against one falls into the
12
Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe," Survival, vol. 34, no. 1, Summer 1992, p.
27-28. Quoted from Richard Russell, "The Chimera of Collective Security in Europe," European
Security, vol. 4, no. 2, Summer 1995, p.249.
13James E. Goodby, "Collective Security in Europe After the Cold War," Journal of
International Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, Winter 1993, p.299.
14
Inis L. Claude, Jr. Swords into Plowshares, p. 266. The term "selective defense" can be
considered to have the same meaning of collective defense.
15
See Daniel N. Nelson, "Great Powers and World Peace," ed. Michael T. Klare and Daniel
C. Thomas, World Security (New York: St. Martin's Press) p. 38.
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collective security family." 16
4. Defining the Regional Level of a Collective Security System
At a regional level, it is difficult to separate the characteristics of a collective security
system from that of a collective defense system. Let's suppose that there is a regional
collective security system, which agreed to limit the level of military power by all member
states so that any member state cannot have aggressive power. Then, each state might have
less military capability only compared to other nonmember states. If a nonmember state
threatens one of the member states, would the other member states act collectively against
the aggressor? If there is no guarantee of collective assistance to the member state, then it
would increase its military level regardless of the restrictions of that system. Then, the state's
military buildup would violate the arrangement in the system, thus decreasing their trust in the
system.
17
Therefore, a regional collective security system should necessarily guarantee mutual
assistance in the case of an external threat or aggression, which includes the characteristics
of a collective defense system. Conversely, in collective defense, it automatically includes the
characteristics of collective security as in the case ofNATO. (See Footnote 10)
Throughout history, there are no cases of a pure regional collective security system
or a pure collective defense system. The two systems have shared each other's characteristics.
For example, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1954) and the Organization
of American States (OAS, 1948) were collective defense to counter an external threat, the
expansion of communism. However, SEATO stipulated mutual assistance in response to
subversive activities, and the OAS suspended and sanctioned Cuba, a member state, in 1962
and intervened in Nicaragua's civil war, also a member state, in 1979. Thus, these two
regional collective defense systems had the characteristics of collective security, responding
to internal threats.
Therefore, my approach to regional collective security in this thesis will include both
16
Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security,"
International Security, vol 20, no. 1, Summer 1995, p. 53.
17Even though there would be no restriction of military level, one state's military buildup
against a nonmember state's threat would produce the same result.
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concepts of collective security as well as collective defense. It will include the collective
security concept because it does not require any specific threat, not only in the document, but
also in real circumstances. It will also include the collective defense concept because when
a member state might face an unexpected external threat, there should be a guarantee of
collective action against it.
The interchangeable characteristics between collective security and collective defense
provide justification for selecting NATO as a case for a regional collective security system.
However, there still may be a problem with NATO as the case study mainly because NATO
apparently had an existing external threat, which might be a major variable for the success of
regional collective security or collective defense. This thesis will deal with this problem in the
latter part of the Chapter III.
B. BALANCE OF POWER VS. COLLECTIVE SECURITY
1. Balance of Power as a System for Stability
As the oldest of all strategic concepts, the balance of power approach has been both
a common practical policy and a major theoretical concept in international relations. The basic
assumptions of balance of power are summarized as follows: states are not to be trusted in
command ofpower which might be used to the detriment of other states; unrestrained power
anywhere in the system is a threat to the security of all its units; the effective antidote to
power is power, and stability in international relations requires equilibrium; the power of some
states is counterbalanced by an approximately equal power of others to deter an aggressive
action. 18 Based on these assumptions, a general principle of states' action in the balance of
power is that, "When any state or bloc becomes, or threatens to become, inordinately
powerful, other states should recognize this as a threat to their security and respond by taking
I8
Inis Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations, p. 42. States may choose
bandwagoning with an ally on the dominant side rather than the weaker side. In fact, however, states
facing an external threat overwhelmingly prefer to balance against the threat rather than bandwagon
with it. This is primarily because an alignment that preserves most of a state's freedom of action is
preferable to accepting subordination under a potential hegemon. See Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance
Formation and the Balance of Power," International Security, vol. 45, no. 1, 1991, p. 6-15.
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equivalent measures, individually or jointly, to enhance their power." 19 The actors can choose
either individual measures focusing on internal efforts such as increasing economic capability,
military strength, and developing clever strategies, or joint measures through external efforts
such as joining an alliance. 20
The balance of power theory reflects the realists' view of international politics as it
applies to anarchic realms which are formally unorganized, and in which units have to worry
about their survival. Kenneth N. Waltz asserts that all the states of the world are in anarchic
orders and the international system is a self-help one, in which each state spends a portion of
its effort in providing the means of protecting itself against others. 21 Morgenthau and other
members of the realists' school of international relations see the pursuit of power by states
as the defining characteristic of the international system. 22 That is, "because international
politics is anarchic, there is no superior governing authority, then the independent sovereign
states basically have to struggle to secure their own interests." 23 As a unitary actor, all the
states basically seek their own preservation avoiding other's domination, and further, they
drive for universal domination to achieve their ends. These views of realists on international
politics can be summarized as follows: first, the international system is a self-help one, and
both central authority and collective security are absent24 ; second, therefore, international
19
Inis Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations, p. 43.
20
Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balance of Power," ed. Robert O. Keohane,
Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Guildford, 1986), p. 1 17.
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Ibid., p. 99-100. Waltz explains the difference between a national system and international
system in terms of the legitimate use of force. In effective government in a national system, public
agents are organized to prevent and to counter the private use of force, and the legitimate use of force
is possible. In international system, it is impossible. Therefore, the international system is self-help,
while a national system is not.
22
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relations are competitive and conflictive; third, then, force is a means of achieving national
interests because "there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of
interests that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy."25
The balance ofpower which is based on competitive relationships under the anarchic
international environment, however, contributes to stability and order, instead of chaos.
Power competitions are natural and lead states to deter the appearance of a dominant power
which becomes a threat to other states, thus "allowing them to preserve their identity,
integrity and independence, perhaps deterring aggression or war."26 Faced with a dominant
power, states, in a common method, ally with each other to balance against it. Without a
dominant threat, they would try to become predominant. Even in the latter case, equilibrium
would be an outcome because they have to prevent any other nation from accomplishing that
objective, thus producing stability.
Naturally, there can never be trust. One's neighbor might become one's enemy, so the
'power' in one's enemy's rear might become one's natural ally. Even the relationship between
allies is not bound to one another in a sincere friendship; they watch each other's movements
assiduously. 27 However, as a result of that vigilance, the balance of power enables natural
stability in international relations. The alternative to a stable and ordered balance would be
a condition of unbalance and disorder with general insecurity and danger, and a universal
empire with general loss of freedom. 28
In summary, the balance of power in principle is directed toward equilibrium in a
less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, and will suffer.
See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balance of Power," p. 117.
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system, which is evenly distributed power among nations. 29 Under the anarchic international
system, states exist as self-helpers and compete for dominance of power. The outcome of
power struggles is not disorder, but a natural order based on balancing through states'
policies, such as alliances which aim to prevent any state's predomination. Any alternative to
the balance of power, such as collective security or world government, would be universal
anarchy, because international politics have never revealed a habitual recognition among
states of a community of interest overriding their separate interests, comparable to that which
normally binds individuals within the state. 30
2. Evaluation of the Balance of Power
As "a fundamental law of politics," the balance of power has prevailed through
European history. Ferrero indicates that, "During the century between 1815 and 1914,
Europe suffered less than in any other period of its history from the fears which cause
mankind to tremble and become frantic, and had more confidence than ever before..."31
Organski asserts two beneficial results from the successful maintenance of the balance of
power. First, under an equilibrium, the balance ofpower "preserves the independence of small
nations that would probably be swallowed up if one ambitious state were allowed to achieve
a tremendous preponderance of power."32 Second, "it produces peace, for when power is
equally distributed among various nations and coalitions of states, no one side can achieve a
great enough superiority to be sure that aggressive action would be crowned with success."33
Despite the merits of the balance of power, however, it could not have become an
ultimate solution for international security. Even Morgenthau indicates the limits of the
balance of power system. First, the uncertainty of power calculation would lead states to a
29
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misjudgement. 34 If a state which has a will to fight fails to estimate the status quo and thus
considers it to be favorable to the state, the balance of power cannot work even though it
maintains equilibrium. How can we calculate the power of a state or an alliance exactly, or
even approximately? Germany made a mistake in estimating the opposing power before the
First World War by assuming that Great Britain would remain neutral and would not come
into the war. Also, Germany could not predict the possibility of U.S. participation in the war,
and failed to estimate the balance of power situation. Such unclear, sometimes secret, power
relations among states, which seems to be inevitable under an anarchic international
environment, makes the power calculation more difficult.
Second, the balance ofpower cannot maintain equality of power, despite the fact that
the principle of equilibrium has central importance as an operational rule within a balance of
power system. 35 A balance of power system can be considered as a mechanism for the
limitation of excessive power. However, because of the problem of calculation of power,
states would try to have at least a margin of safety which will allow it to make erroneous
calculations and still maintain the balance of power. 36 Then, "all nations actively engaged in
the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance — that is, equality — of power, but
at superiority of power in their own behalf."37 History shows instances of this. France's
security policy toward Germany after the First World War was not for equilibrium, but for
preponderance. Great Britain, the traditional balancer in Europe, directed its efforts toward
predomination which was unassailable. Organski indicates the tendency of preponderance
rather than balance ofpower by mentioning, "Those nations that industrialized first gained a
34Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 203-
207. Also, Inis Claude asserts, "The elements constituting national power should be simple enough
to permit reasonable accurate estimates of the relative strength of states ..." and accentuates the
importance of effective power diffusion among a substantial number of major states. Also see Inis








tremendous power advantage over other nations, and although it might be possible to arrange
these giants and their smaller friends in such combinations that groups of nations would
balance off each other in equal strength, this is not the kind of arrangement that nations
actually formed." 38
Third, with only the balance of power itself, the system cannot work. Morgenthau
accentuates "the consensus of states based on moral and intellectual elements"39 for the
success of the balance of power system, which means the will of states to maintain a stable
power relationship. Like the case of the Concert of Europe, there should be a consensus that
"whatever changes nations might seek in the status quo, they all had at least to recognize as
unchangeable one factor, the existence of a pair of scales, the 'status quo' of the balance of
power itself"40 The consensus would keep in check the limitless desire for power in all
imperialists.
With those limits that Morgenthau indicates, the balance of power does not seem to
be the only and finest system for power management as much as the realists believe. Herz
considers the balance of power in Europe to be a "limited success" indicating that the
European system remained undisturbed for centuries, but only with the prevention of the
threat of hegemony, not with the prevention of war and injustice, exploitation and
imperialism. 41 Even during the Concert of Europe, which seems to have been the most
successful period of the balance of power, the portion that the balance of power system
contributed to European peace would be reduced when we consider the fact that European
38
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states could not concentrate their efforts on regional matters because of their imperial
expansion toward the rest of the world. Also, Henry Kissinger indicates:
The balance of power system did not purport to avoid crises or even wars. When
working properly, it was meant to limit both the ability of states to dominate others and
the scope of conflicts. Its goal was not peace so much as stability and moderation. By
definition, a balance of power arrangement cannot satisfy every member of the
international system completely; it works best when it keeps dissatisfaction below the
level at which the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order. ... In
fact, balance of power systems have existed only rarely in human history.42
Actually, the balance of power cannot necessarily work anywhere and anytime
because it is a system, not a solution. Even though realists insist on the inevitability of the
balance of power in world politics, its better outcome might count on cooperation of states
for peace rather than competition for power. Morton Kaplan indicates some changes in
conditions that may make the balance ofpower system unstable: the existence of an actor who
does not play by the rules of the game; failures of information; and inflexibility of the
'balancing' mechanism. 43 These conditions require some "manipulation" of states' policies
among skillful diplomats with a degree of cooperation, other than natural order formed in an
anarchic international system. As Morgenthau mentioned earlier, morality is an important
factor for the workability of the balance of power. Conforming to the rules of the game,
making information available, and appealing to states' morals seem to be more possible under
cooperation than under competition. The imperfection of the balance of power concept, then,
suggests collective security as an alternative to balance of power.
3. Collective Security as an Alternative to Balance of Power
If the outbreak of the First World War resulted from the failure of the balance of
power system in Europe, the end of the war resulted in the birth of the collective security
concept. Woodrow Wilson thought that the international system should be based not on a
balance ofpowers but on ethnic self-determination and that their security should depend not
42Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). P. 21.
43
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on military alliances but on collective security. 44 He addressed the United States Senate in
1917:
The question upon which the whole peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is
the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of
power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can
guarantee the stable equilibrium ofthe new arrangement? There must be, not a balance
ofpower, but a community ofpower; not organized rivalries, but an organized common
peace.
45
Then, he stressed the need for a new system in which states would cooperate in the common
cause of guaranteeing security, rather than engaging in competitive alliance, and in which
coercion would serve the common peace and order, rather than functioning in the interest of
political ambition and selfish hostility. 46 As a result of Wilson's endeavor, the League of
Nations became the first collective security mechanism, even though imperfect, after the First
World War.
While the collective security system has characteristics similar to the balance of power
in terms of power management for the prevention of war and international peace, it has its
own intrinsic nature which can be differentiated from the latter. Most of all, the essence of
collective security lies in the preponderance which represents a deterrence to any aggression. 47
"Collective security postulates that the use of violence or other threats to the peace would
result in the mobilization of force so great that no reasonable policymaker would undertake
such threats"48 Here, for further argument, it is necessary to examine some differences
44Morton A. Kaplan, "Balance of Power and Other International System," p. 19.
45Woodrow Wilson, Address to the United States Senate, January 22, 1917. From Hans J.
Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Principles and Problems ofInternational Politics (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 51.
46
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48Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, "The Collective Security Idea and Changing World
Politics," ed. Thomas G. Weiss, Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
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between balance of power and collective security.
First, "The balance of power system involves alliances which are essentially
externally-oriented groupings, designed to organize cooperative action among their members
for the purpose of dealing with conflict situations posed by states or groups of states on the
outside. By contrast the collective security system looks inward, seeking to provide security
for all its members against any of their number who might contemplate aggression"49 That
is to say, whereas balance of power is characterized by the maintenance of equilibrium
through competitive alliances, collective security pursues preponderance over a future
aggressor through 'universal' alliance. A different view of the world system between them
makes this difference. Inis Claude mentions that, "Balance of power postulates two or more
worlds in jealous confrontation, while collective security postulates one world, organized for
the cooperative maintenance of order within its bounds. . . . Collective security decrees a set
response in support of any victim of aggression; balance of power confirms the freedom of
the state to pick and choose." 50 For example, the League of Nations was not an alliance
against other specific nations but against any aggressor, not a pattern of competition for
power but that of cooperation to hold conflict in check.
Second, contrasted with the principle ofpower competition in balance of power, "the
organizing principle of collective security is the respect for the moral and legal obligation to
consider an attack by any nation upon any member of the alliance as an attack upon all
members "51 A collective security system calls for a moral transformation: "it offends the most
pacific and the most bellicose of men; it challenges neutralism and isolationism as well as
militarism and imperialism; ... it demands alike the dissolution of ancient national hatreds and
Publishers, 1993), p. 6.
49
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the willingness to abandon traditional national friendships." 52 Moral transformation for
collective security is based on the norm that states must subordinate their own immediate
interests to general or remote ones'. 53 Without each state's cooperation and conformity with
the norm, the system would not work because there is no 'government' to control the
behaviors of the unitary actor. On the other hand, collective security envisages the
enforcement of the rules of international law by all the members of the community of
nations. 54 "Without a legal structure, it would constitute "hardly more than an idealized
balance of power." 55 Actually, Morgenthau indicates that one of the critical factors in the
failure of the League ofNations was the lack of legal obligation within that system. 56
Third, while balance ofpower is by no means systemic because of the reflection of an
anarchic realm in international relations, collective security represents the urge for
systematization, the institutionalization of international relations. 57 Institutionalist insist that
52
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as a regulated and institutionalized form of balancing, the collective security system can
provide more stability than unregulated, self-help balancing predicated on the notion of each
for its own.
58
This contrast makes another difference: more predictability of states' policies
in the collective security system than in the balance of power system in which diverse
calculations dominate.
With those characteristics, this thesis summarizes the logic of collective security as
follows. First, there is no present and direct enemy or threat in a group of states, even though
there might be a future or potential threat. A collective security system does not specify any
specific threat. Also, in terms of the fact that collective security absolutely requires trust
among states, a collective security system should not include any current enemy or threat.
Second, there is a consensus from each state to renounce the use of military force for
aggression against other participating states. 59 The system depends on nonmilitary measures
such as economic sanctions, and military sanctions will be the last measure. Third, an
institution can be established under the agreement based on international law or a similar
level of norms. 60 The institution can not only force the states not to use their military forces
for aggression other than for self defense, but also create some forces to be used when needed
for collective security purposes. Fourth, a preponderance of collective power deters any
violation of their arrangement, forcing each state to try to avoid military action for aggression.
Fifth, if there is a country which would break the peace, then other states punish it
automatically by the principle of all against one, thus contributing to the peace and order in
international relations.
Despite the superb logic, however, the collective security concept has been criticized
as too ideal, coupled with the failure of the League of Nations. The problems of moral
factors, applicability of international law, and realpolitik in a real world have made the
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concept difficult to bring into operation. First of all, the realists' critique of the collective
security concept should be examined.
C. REALISTS' CRITIQUE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
To understand the realists' critique of collective security, their view of international
politics should be examined more specifically. John Mearsheimer summarizes realism's five
assumptions. 61 First, the international system is anarchic, which does not mean chaos or
disorder, but security competition and war. Second, states inherently possess some offensive
military capability. Third, states can never be certain about the intentions of other states,
especially in terms of the latter' s offensive military capability. Fourth, the most basic motive
driving states is survival. Fifth, states, which are rational but may openly miscalculate because
of imperfect information, think strategically about how to survive in the international system.
With these assumptions, he indicates three main patterns of states' behavior: first, fearing
other's offensive capability, states regard each other with suspicion and there is little room
for trust among them; second, states aim to guarantee their own survival because there is no
rescuer in a self-help system; third, states aim to maximize their relative power position
because ofthe fact that the greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the
more security there is. 62
Realists' pessimistic view of international relations is portrayed as a brutal arena in
which states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other with little reason to trust
61
John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 10. Joseph
Grieco mentions five propositions that realism encompasses. "First, states are the major actors in
world affairs. Second, the international environment severely penalizes states if they fail to protect
their vital interests, or if they pursue objectives beyond their means; hence, states are 'sensitive to
costs' and behave as unitary-rational agents. Third, international anarchy is the principle force
shaping the motives actions of states. Fourth, states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and
security, are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the
face ofcommon interests. Finally, international institutions affect the prospects for cooperation only
marginally." See Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of
the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, p.
488.
62John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 1 1-12.
26
each other. 63 Each state pursues its own interest under competition, and does not consider
others' interests. There exists always the possibility of war resulting from the conflict of
interests among nations. Sometimes states cooperate with each other, but this has its limits
because cooperation is possible only when their interests are foreseen. Even if an agreement
for cooperation is established, each state will break it whenever its benefit is over.
Consequently, cooperation among states is only a passing phenomenon in the permanent
competition for national interests, ultimately for dominant power. Under such an international
system, states naturally tend to balance their powers.
For realists, therefore, the idea of collective security is deceptive if not delusional
because the imperative of survival in a competitive political system without central authority
induces among states an obsession with power and hence with the interstate allocation of its
constituents. 64 Even though collective security assumes "the self-help world of realism," its
approach to "the management of power" is quite opposite to the realists; not with natural
competition for power but with more rational cooperation among states and even with
morality. Realists indicate that the most difficult problem for collective security is forming
trust among states. As long as fear of others' military capability exists and even cooperation
cannot last beyond narrow national interest, there cannot be formed such a thing as trust. If
trust does not exist, then the logic of collective security which is mentioned earlier is
contradicted. The arrangement becomes meaningless and the institution will not work. It
would be impossible to implement their promise of collective action against an aggressor.
Consequently, a collective security system will become less than a balance of power system.
1. Trust Problem
The trust problem can be examined from two aspects: trust between individual states
and among a collective security system. As for trust toward other member states, the problem
comes from concern about cheating. 65 Even though collective security assumes that states
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must renounce the use of military force to alter the status quo, according to realists, they
cannot overcome the fears of other's military capabilities and the distrust of others'
intentions.
66
States have to reject power-maximizing behavior that might weaken their relative
power position, believing others' promise not to use force. This is not the case, however, as
the prisoner's dilemma game shows. There are two options for states: cooperation and
cheating. A state knows well that mutual cooperation would be the best. But because ofthe
other's threat of cheating, it chooses cheating instead of cooperation, hoping other states
pursue cooperation. As a result, the outcome becomes not the best, but the third best for a
state, which results from mutual defection not mutual cooperation. 67 Especially if there exists
historical enmity between states, the room for cheating becomes larger. 68 Thus, it is
impossible for an actor to trust others' intention under an anarchic international order which
is dominated by states' calculations of self-interest based primarily on concerns about relative
power. 69 Without trust, states cannot follow the rule or norm of collective security such as
the reduction of military levels or renouncing the use of force; rather they would continue to
act on their own.
On the other hand, while a collective security system fails to form trust among nations,
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a balance of power system can make it through an alliance. Trust in an alliance is a result of
thorough calculations ofpower and national interests. It is not a vague and unconditional trust
such as renouncing war in a collective security system. Even though an alliance represents a
"temporary marriage of convenience" and "transient instrumental adjustments to a changing
international environment,"70 it is directed toward equilibrium against an apparent dominant
power. States know well that they are bound together with the same national interests,
especially survival, and believe that an aggression toward an ally is the same as toward the
entire alliance. Thus, in a balance of power system, states can have trust to others as well as
the system which is a calculated one based on self-interest. As a result, the trust in a balance
of power system is more realistic and safe than that in a collective security system.
Even though states establish a collective security system with high expectations about
its workability, still many problems impede states from forming trust in the system. The most
critical factor for a system, as well as for states, would be the guarantee of collective action
in the case of an aggression toward them. Members are to participate in the counter-action
to equate their national interest with the broader interests of the international community,
rejecting narrow self-interest. Their beliefs in the guarantee, however, do not rely on the
system, but on trust in other states, because there cannot exist any authority that can control
each soverign state in the real world. In the worst case, in a collective security system, a
state's destiny will be decided not by its own capability, but by the system which would not
provide an absolute guarantee, but just a possibility. Therefore, states cannot trust the system.
Even though the system works, the difficulty of a rapid response to aggression becomes more
problematic as the speed of ultra-modern warfare is likely to be such that a victim of
aggression may be utterly destroyed before a collective security system can deal with it. 71
Therefore, states will have to maintain their military capabilities needed for their survival, and
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they will count more on their power than the collective security system.
Consequently, a collective security system cannot be established with trust because
of the fear of others' cheating and the limits of the system. The lack of trust makes it difficult
for states to cooperate with each other. Cooperation is just an outcome of the calculation of
narrow national interests and is transient. The national interests in a collective security system,
unlike a balance of power system, are too vague to give states incentives. Coupled with no
guarantee, states would not believe in the system. After the First World War, France's distrust
of the League of Nations as well as of Germany and Russia resulted in not only other
arrangements such as the Locarno Pact and the Pact of Paris, thus weakening the workability
of the League, but also the exclusion of those states from the League, thus reducing the
effectiveness ofthe system. As a result, when the collective security system was demolished,
another disastrous war broke out.
2. Lack of Institutional Capability
A collective security system requires a proper institution to control and adjust its
member states' behaviors effectively, and all the states should recognize the legitimacy of the
institution which has the legal power based on international law. 72 In the viewpoint of realists,
however, even if an institution is established under the agreement of all states, it has limited
effect in terms of the lack of law enforcement. Each state has its own regime of governance
whose supreme authority over what happened in its jurisdiction would be recognized and
72
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respected by other states. 73 International law is, however, relatively weak compared to its
domestic counterpart. "If there are rules, therefore, they develop from explicit or implicit
individual consent and usage, not from deliberate legislation." 74 Without a legal structure and,
therefore, the lack oflaw enforcement, "a collective security system would have to be based
on the vague assumption that every government is committed to repressing disturbers."75
Coupled with the importance of sovereignty of states, no institution can intervene or influence
others' jurisdiction and behavior.
Without an authority like government in a state, it is difficult for an international
institution to get power to punish or take sanctions against a sovereign state. "Obedience to
the law in any situation is a voluntary act on the part of the state."76 Voluntary membership
makes it possible for a state to leave the institution anytime it feels 'no more gain' from its
participation. If a state withdraws itself from a collective security system, it becomes free
from the legal obligations that are agreed upon within that system. As the collective security
system is to counter an internal aggressor, then it cannot control or punish the secessionist.
If the state is a strong power, its withdrawal may influence the workability of the system, as
in the case of the U.S. withdrawal from NATO or the United Nations. Thus, the institution
does not have any power. Instead, it is empowered by the agreement of sovereign states. As
the agreement is fragile, however, the institution in a collective security system lacks law
enforcement of its member states. Even though a small state is coerced by a larger one into
obeying the law, the former's obedience is not to the law, but to the pressure of the latter.
The lack oflaw enforcement becomes more serious with strong powers. Even though
collective security postulates preponderance against an aggressor, a strong power can
73Seyom Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System, p. 116.
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challenge it. As in the case of Germany in the Second World War, one powerful state can
come close to success in aggression, while maximizing others' costs to resist it. 77 Can a
collective security system have absolute predominance over a strong power? When a weak
state faces the threat or aggression of a strong power, such as the United States or Russia,
can the victim expect any sanction or collective action of member states against it? Is it
desirable that the small or regional conflict, should be expanded to world wide conflict? Yet,
there has never existed such a system which can dare to take sanctions against the behavior
of such strong powers. To speak more precisely, it cannot. Thus, the institutional capability
in a collective security system lacks law enforcement of all its members.
As Inis Claude mentions, "While the League organization was dedicated to the
principle of collective security, its legal and organizational arrangements for giving effect to
that principle were exceedingly meager. Neither in theory nor in practice did the League
possess a reliable means for bringing coercive power to bear upon an aggressor"78 The
withdrawal ofthe United States from the establishment of the League ofNations proved the
proposition, "no national interest, no participation." There was no measure other than
nonrecognition of the territorial changes that had occurred, when the Japanese invaded
Manchuria in 1931. The lack of collective action, except inefficient economic sanctions for
the Italian attack on Ethiopia, showed the limits of law enforcement by the international
institution. Also, the United Nations failed to get institutional capability to control all its
members, because it acknowledged the veto rights of strong powers, thus revealing its limits
as a collective security system.
An institution or an organization is just a coordinator, not a governmental instrument.
It can have law, but it cannot use the law fully to restrict and control states' national interests.
For example, although states agree to reduce their military level and renounce the use of
force, ifthere are more security requirements, then the state will increase its military level or
use its force. Consequently, without legal binding force, an institution in a collective security
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system cannot control member states' behaviors except when there exists overlapping national
interests among them.
3. Difficulty of Consensus for Collective Action
For realists, there are many reasons why states cannot keep the promise of collective
action. First of all, it is difficult to determine who the guilty and innocent parties are in
international conflicts, as Organski explains:
Unfortunately for the operation of collective security, there is rarely unanimous
agreement on which nation is the aggressor in an international squabble. The accused
nation, itself, almost invariably denies the charge, claiming that it was provoked by the
aggressive action of others. Friends of the aggressor agree. Friends of the victim
protest. The final verdict of history is liable to depend upon who writes the account of
the event.
79
For example, in Israel's attack on Egypt in 1956, even though the former was certainly the
first to launch a major attack, before that attack there had been almost nightly raids across the
Israeli border by Egyptian commandos and a series of retaliatory raids by the Israelis. 80 Then,
what was aggression, Egyptian raids by small force or Israel's attack by large army?
When the self-interest of each state differs, consensus would be difficult. Some states
may want stability by joining a collective security system, but others may want to just enjoy
free-riding, economic benefits, political initiatives or bandwagoning. In the case of the
aggression of a state, the former would like to punish it by the collective action, but the latter
would decide their behavior by counting their different national interests. The fact that many
acts of aggression in history threaten no one but the immediate victim81 may lead states to be
more flexible in calculating their diverse national interests. "A small nation bordering on a
potential aggressor will think twice before joining any move against its more powerful
neighbor, for battles "to stop the aggressor" are quite likely to be fought upon its territory,
79






destroying its industries and its homes as well as those of the aggressor."82 Especially if the
aggressor has had a friendly state that shares the same ideology or the economic benefits, then
the friend is probably reluctant to participate in the collective action. 83 Coupled with the
development ofthe most modernized weapons including the atomic bomb, "the ultimate issue
ofnational life or death cannot be left to the decision of any international organ." 84 Therefore,
the consensus for collective action against an aggressor depends not on the arrangement of
collective security, but on the matters of self-interest including national survival.
As a factor that influences the estimation of self-interest, imperfect information in the
process of decision-making may impede the collective action because it can cause
miscalculation of states' interests. Even when information is available and reliable,
misconception also may lead them to miscalculation. As Robert Jervis indicates, people tend
to "ignore information that does not fit, twist it so that it confirms, or at least does not
contradict, our beliefs, and deny its validity." 85 States have different experiences, culture,
beliefs and ideology, and historical background. The same information can result in quite
different results in the calculation of their self-interests. Then, the diverse interpretation and
expectation of a situation that requires a collective action makes the consensus difficult.
In summary, the realists' critique of collective security culminates in the trust problem.
The concerns about others' cheating in an anarchic international environment raises the
difficulty of trust among states. With the lack of a guarantee, just a possibility, of collective
action, states do not trust the system. Cooperation for collective security is just an outcome
of the calculation of self-interest and not based on such trust. On the other hand, the
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collective security system cannot have any legal binding force to control its members'
behaviors. Due to the lack of central authority, the international institution is merely a
"fragile" coordinator. Even though a collective security system can be established, it will face
the difficulty of achieving consensus for collective action because of ambiguity about the
definition of aggression, divergent self-interests, and imperfect information and
misperceptions. As a result, collective security is too ideal to implement its goal of peace in
a real world. "That would constitute hardly more than an idealized balance of power." 86
D. mSTITUTIONALIST' PERSPECTIVES ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY
As proponents of collective security, institutionalist share some views of international
relations with realists: states are rational egoists operating in a world in which agreements
cannot be hierarchically enforced; interstate cooperation occurs only if states have significant
common interests. 87 They differ, however, from each other in the view of institutional function
based on states' cooperation. Realists see cooperation as to be unusual, fleeting, and
temporary, and thus insisting that international institutions do not exist or are irrelevant. 88 For
them, cooperation might be possible, but it is rare and merely transient. Institutionalist assert
that even though international actors are selfish, there is room for cooperation as long as
mutual benefits exist, and that the interactions between an institution and its outcomes make
commitments more credible and facilitate the operation of reciprocity. 89 Institutionalist are
different from Wilsonians in that while the latter is somewhat idealistic, the former is more
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"utilitarian and rationalistic."90 In this section, institutionalise perspectives on collective
security will provide the opposite view of realists, but a more realistic one than Wilsonians'
.
1. Trust Formation: Sharing National Interests and Cooperation
Even though institutionalist admit some of the realists' view of the anarchic and self-
help nature of international relations, they go further than realists: despite such characteristics
of an international system, cooperation is possible. Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin
mention that "when state elites do not foresee self-interested benefits from cooperation, we
do not expect cooperation to occur, nor the institutions that facilitate cooperation to develop.
When states can jointly benefit from cooperation, on the other hand, we expect governments
to attempt to construct such institutions "91 As rational actors, institutionalist assume, states
are centralized organizations that have certain policy goals and act to implement them in
response to particular external conditions or events.92 Unless states see any conflict with
common interests in their policies, and if they expect benefits from their interactions, states
cooperate. In the process of cooperation, "Institutions can provide information, reduce
transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination,
and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity."93 That is the reason why states have
made and concentrated their efforts on so many institutions, such as the UN, NATO, EU, and
GATT, not only for their own benefit, but also for the common interests. Consequently,
cooperation in an international system is available, and when the cooperation becomes
reinforced by the interactions of mutual benefits through 'proper' institutions, trust among
states can be formed.
Institutionalist reject the cheating problem in cooperation among states, in terms of
institutional functions which facilitate information to states and give them more opportunities
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to contact and coordinate each other's interests. In the prisoner's dilemma game, if
coordination between the two people is available, the outcome might become the most
favorable one to both. By the same token, if information is available among states in a group
of states, or in a collective security system, there is a much stronger possibility of states
choosing cooperation rather than cheating, thus resulting in better outcomes. In the case of
a disagreement among states which would be a principle barrier to cooperation, states may
fail to capture the potential gains from cooperation unless some coordinating mechanism
exists.
94 Even in complex situations involving many states, though international institutions
do not provide the only possible coordinating mechanism, institutions can step in to provide
"constructed focal points" that make particular cooperative outcomes prominent. 95 Therefore,
cheating is not the only option of states. Rather, according to circumstances, cooperation
especially through institutions can be more beneficial.
As cooperation among states is possible, institutionalist insist, the collective security
system can be a regulated and institutionalized form of a balancing mechanism, and provide
more stability than unregulated, self-help balancing predicated on the notion of each for its
own.
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In the balance of power system, there exists no consensus of security cooperation.
Instead, a hostile international environment is formed as all the states seek their own survival
from others. However, because states are rational actors who do not want to be co-
destructive, they would promote security cooperation if it is possible to share mutual benefits
within the boundary of collective security. At least, "institutions are better than no institutions
and offer an improvement upon the self-help world of balancing under anarchy." 5
While the premise of a collective security system is trust among states, the system
would contribute to building trust among states because the institution can provide
52.
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information, which is needed to overcome an uncertain and anarchic world environment.
Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan assert that "institutions can facilitate
cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are
evenly divided over time, for example by disclosing information about the military
expenditures and capacities of alliance members."98 Every state wants its own benefit even
when it joins a collective security system. If states think that the distribution of benefits is
uncertain or unequal, then they would not trust other states and, of course, the system as well.
However, the collective security system can have information which would confirm the equal
distribution and the mutual benefits in the system, such as others' military level and capability.
Then it would be conducive to building trust among states. As a result, "It promotes a more
benign international environment in which states can devote less attention and fewer resources
to ensuring their survival and more to improving their welfare ~ unless and until an aggressor
"99
emerges.
2. Institutional Capability based on Legal Principles
An international institution has legal principles, not laws, which are comprised of
treaties, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. As states make it for the sake of their
self-interest, the institution does not have any legal binding force unless there exists a
common national interest. Even though it does not have law enforcement, states' commitment
to cooperation enables the institution to have the capability to control and adjust their
behaviors. It can reduce transaction costs, disseminate information, create transparent
98
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situations, and thus increase cooperation among participants. 100 For example, in the case that
the members ofNATO shared a mutual interest in limiting flow of militarily useful goods and
technology to the Soviet Union, the Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group of
NATO (CoCom) facilitated their agreement on defining the scope of defection or the
necessity of retaliation against defectors. 101 As long as their self-interests converged within
the institution, it provided payoffs to member states, by reducing transaction costs. Therefore,
as long as the participants require it, the institution can have the capability based on legal
principles.
While the need of cooperation among states results in the establishment of an
institution, conversely, the institution strengthens their cooperation rather than defection.
Transparency is another element for cooperation that the institution endows, as Duncan
Snidal indicates that:
Cooperation is made more likely not only by changes in payoffs, but also by increases
in the states' ability to recognize what others are doing - called "transparency" in the
literature on regimes. Coupled with the ability to act on the information, transparency
can produce a situation in which, in effect, the choices of CD and DC are effectively
ruled out. Short periods of defection or exploitation may occur; but if they can be
detected and countered, the only real alternatives are CC and DD. 102
Iftransparency is guaranteed, the probability of cheating — that is, defection or exploitation —
becomes lower because states expect the current cheating to impede the future gains. Kenneth
Oye explains the relations between "the shadow of the future" and cooperation using the
prisoner's dilemma: "Ifthe prisoners expect to be placed in similar situations in the future, the
prospects for cooperation improve." 103 In a single-play game, states defect from each other.
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If they anticipate other games in the future, however, a potential defector compares the
immediate gain from squealing with the possible sacrifice of future gains that may result from
squealing. 104 "The more future payoffs are valued relative to current payoffs, the less the
incentive to defect today ~ since the other side is likely to retaliate tomorrow." 105 As
defection in the present decreases a reputation for reliability in the future, states will more
likely cooperate than defect. Consequently, the institution strengthens cooperation among
states by making their expectation of the future gains more clear.
By the same token, for institutionalist, even though it is not at the level of domestic
law, an institution in a collective security system can have legal binding force. Within the
norm and rule that members promise to follow, the institution has the power to control and
adjust member states' behaviors. Its capability based on legal principles results from the
interactions of two factors: states' cooperation and benefits from the institution. While the
former based on common interests endows authority to the institution, the latter facilitates and
strengthens the former by bestowing mutual interests and giving more incentives for the future
gains. As states expect the future gains, cooperation is more likely. Then, the more
cooperation among states there is, the more legal binding force the institution has.
In the real world, many cases exist showing institutional capability. The stable norms
and rules ofNATO contributed to the peace in Europe in the post-war era by making its
members credible and facilitating the augmentation of allies' military capabilities. 106 In the
Falklands War, the institution, the European Community, facilitated the cooperation of states
to impose multilateral economic sanctions; states supported the sanction in the name of the
EC, not of each country, thus reducing fears of the other's cheating in the future. 107 Actually,
the sanction problem in a collective security system depends on "maturity" of the system, not
on the lack of central authority in an international system. On the other hand, the inability of
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the League ofNations to function was not due to the nature of collective security, but to the
defects of the system — it had no teeth. The League Covenant did not express as a legal
commitment the promise of armed assistance against aggression, thus leaving the members
free to determine for themselves whether they should contribute to military action. 108
3. Consensus for Collective Action
Collective security assumes that any war can be prevented by predominance of the
future non-aggressor members. This assumption premises a collective security system to be
well organized and works effectively, which can solve the problems that it may encounter:
how to provide incentives for cooperation; how to monitor behavior so that cooperators and
defectors could be identified; how to focus rewards on cooperators and retaliation on
defectors; how to link issues with one another in productive rather than self-defeating ways. 109
Under such a system, defection would be difficult. If there are minor problems, the institution
can solve them with the capability based on legal principle and states' cooperation, as
mentioned earlier, to take sanctions against violators. Even if there is an aggression, the
consensus for collective action against it would be possible as long as members have
conviction that the consensus provides mutual benefits in the long term.
Collective action necessarily depends on trust among states and institutional capability.
As reviewed in the previous subsection, the future expectation of long term self-interests for
states will lead them to cooperation, rather than defection. Not to participate in the collective
action may be a favorable choice for states, but the incentives for future gains forces them to
make collective action despite the current losses. For future deals, states have to get a
reputation for reliability. Even strong powers in this context cannot help obeying the rules of
the game to a degree. Even though the United Nations is not considered as a collective
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security system here, it has proven the possibility of the application of a collective security
concept to the real world by responding to the Korean War, the GulfWar, and peacekeeping
operations. Especially, the Korean War showed that "collective enforcement of some sort
might be organized even against aggressors supported by a great power."110
The problem of"who is the aggressor," which realists indicated earlier, can be solved
more easily when a system monitors and conciliates the issues between the aggressor and the
victim. Even in the case ofthe Israel-Egypt conflict, for institutionalist, if there was a proper
institution, other than the United Nations, which could monitor and control their self-interest,
the conflict might have been prevented. Or, at least, the institution could have contributed to
setting up a new order between them after the outbreak of the conflict. Actually, an
aggression is not a starting point of a new conflicting issue, but a continuation of a previous
issue. Monitoring states' behaviors is required to estimate an aggressor and a victim. Coupled
with the development of information, a technological monitoring system, and communication
system, it would never be a difficult job for an institution to find out who is the aggressor.
Friendly relationships cannot be a factor that impedes the consensus for collective
action. As realists and institutionalist assume, international order is anarchy with no central
authority. There is no friend, nor enemy, in the long run. States follow their self-interests, not
injustice. To support an aggressor to help a friend will also hurt their reputation for reliability
in international society. Therefore, though there might be a difference of assistance to a
degree, states will tend to agree with the collective action against even a friendly state.
In summary, institutionalist' perspectives of collective security focus on cooperation
and institutional capability. Contrary to the realists' critique of the cheating problem, they
insist, states can cooperate with each other because ofthe expectation of the future gains in
the "repeated games " An institution cannot only provide information and reduce transaction
costs, but also provide transparency of the situation, thus facilitating cooperation among
states. As states have more confidence in the institution, the latter can get more capability to
control states' behaviors, such as economic sanctions or even collective military action.
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Realists' critique of the consensus for collective action, such as the difficulty of identification
of an aggressor, divergent self-interests, and the case of friendly aggressor, will fall into the
realm of cooperation and institutional capability. If states cooperate for the same security
interests in a collective security system, and they empower the system, collective security can
be real. Coupled with the changes in international environment for cooperation, hopes for
collective security are rising.
E. STATES' ACTIONS: CONSTRUCTIVISTS' VIEW
As long as cooperation among states is being considered, it would be worthwhile to
review the constructivists view of states' actions, not only because it will supplement the
previous theoretical perspectives of realists and institutionalists, but because it will suggest
other variables for the conditions of collective security.
As the constructivists' view of international relations is based on social theory, it
seems to be practical rather than "theoretical." A fundamental principle of their theory is that
"people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the
objects have for them." 111 While realists and institutionalists seek the answer to the question
about "states' behaviors" in the view of anarchy and self-help system, and in the view of
institution and cooperation respectively, constructivists are focusing their view on "the
intersubjective understanding and expectations." 112 For example, let's suppose that North
Korea is developing a nuclear weapon. Realists will explain it in terms of anarchy, and
institutionalists the lack of institutional function and that of cooperation. Constructivists,
however, do not use any fixed frame. Instead, their framework of international relations is
"social construction" based on "the intersubjective understanding and expectations," which
is much more flexible than that of realists and institutionalists. That is, they will consider
another factor that influenced the behavior ofNorth Korea, such as the U.S. military increase
on the Korean peninsula. Then, by their view, it is the perception of the threat of the U.S.
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military increase that causes the action ofNorth Korea. On the other hand, Japan, a U.S. ally,
does not respond to the U.S. behavior because its understanding and expectation of the U.S.
action is not a threat, but a kind of protection for Japan. Thus, states' acts depend on their
understanding and expectation of others' behaviors.
It is identity and interest that form those understanding and expectations. As a person
has many identities in a society such as a father, a teacher and a citizen, a state can have
identities, such as "a state in confrontation," "a small state," and "a member of the UN." Once
identification is formed in a certain situation, it becomes the basis of interests. As the
commitment to and salience of particular identities differ, each interest that states define
varies. However, "actors do not have a 'portfolio' of interests that they carry around
independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining
situation."
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Again, in the supposition ofNorth Korea's nuclear development, the identity of
North Korea is as an enemy of the United States and South Korea. Before the U.S. military
buildup on the Korean peninsula, its security interests were to counter them with conventional
weapons. As the situation changes by the U.S. military increase, North Korea defines its
interests as the development of a nuclear weapon.
The constructivists' view of states' behaviors is based on the principle of relativity.
For them, anarchy is not the necessary condition for a self-help international system full of
"power conflicts " Even though states' identities under anarchy necessarily cause them to be
concerned about their survival, the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with
others is different: "An anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies." 114 That is the reason
why there exist various kinds of security systems: the competitive security system like in the
Hobbesian war of all against all; the individualistic security system in which states are
indifferent to the relationship between their own and others' security; the cooperative security
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system like concert or collective security arrangements. 115 Therefore, realists' logic that uses
anarchy to explain states' behavior, such as power competition or the lack of cooperation,
does not seem to be appropriate. Rather, identification and interest influence states' behaviors
as well as the characteristics of a system. That is, if a state identifies its relations with another
state as a friend, and if it expects more interests through cooperation with the friend, then
their relations will not be a competitive one even under anarchy.
Constructivists are favorable to institutional functions. By their view, "An institution
is a relatively stable set or 'structure' of identity and interests," and "institutionalization is a
process of internalizing new identities and interests." 116 Coupled with the growing importance
of the sovereignty of states, which depends on mutual recognition, "they can afford to rely
more on the institutional fabric of international society and less on individual national means —
especially military power ~ to protect their territory " 117 An institution has rules and norms,
and it facilitates states' ability to define identity and interests. However, this does not
necessarily mean that an institution enables cooperation. It may be cooperative or conflictual
according to the identity and interests that actors define.
For constructivists, cooperation is iteration of identification and interest. In order to
transform competitive identities to cooperative ones, there should be "rewards" for the
change. The "rewards" makes states define a new identity and interests, and, once they
change, there is formed a collective identity. Over time, as long as interests continue, the
collective identity becomes reinforced. Alexander Wendt asserts:
... the process by which egoists learn to cooperate is at the same time a process of
reconstructing their interests in terms of shared commitments to social norms. Over
time, this will tend to transform a positive interdependence of outcomes into a positive












For example, a collective European identity was an outcome of reconstituting identities and
interests through the continuously repeated intersubjective understanding and commitments.
Consequently, the constructivists' view of states' behaviors ~ here, concerning
collective security ~ focuses on identity and interests. Then, the workability of collective
security will depend on the two questions, "how do states define and understand their
identities in a certain security environment?" and "what are the expectations of interests
through a collective security?" If states see the necessity of collective security in such security
environments as the needs of security cooperation, no current enemy state, and no reason to
buildup the military, and if states expect their security interests to benefit from their
cooperation, then collective security will meet the requirements for its workability. While
institutionalists consider cooperation and institutional functions to be the nucleus of the
system, constructivists focus on identification and interests for cooperation. Both concede
that iteration of cooperative behavior would ultimately be conducive to form trust among
states by, for institutionalists, strengthening institutional capability, and, for constructivists,
forming collective identity.
F. CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Theory develops along with the change in world politics. At the end ofthe First World
War, Wilsonians prevailed. When the League ofNations failed, realism gained predominance
among international theories. The end of the Cold War brought about many critiques of
realism and empowered the theory of liberal institutionalist. In this context, the review of
changes in the international system in the post-war era will give the clues to conclude this
chapter.
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As, so far, the condition ofcooperation among states was the focus of arguments,
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this section will examine the relationship between changes in the international system and the
condition of cooperation. However, all the changes in the international system in the post-war
era seem to converge to facilitate cooperation, rather than strengthen the anarchic
international environment.
1. Appearance of Nation-States
One of the most conspicuous phenomena in twentieth century international politics
is characterized by the appearance of nation-states, especially since the end of the First World
War. Influenced by European colonial rule, colonial nations formed a feeling of common
identity. Having learned from Europeans, they formed a national economy, modern political
structure, and their ideals such as freedom, democracy and plenty. Nationalism was in flamed
to get independence, and the two World Wars which made the European colonial rules weak
enabled the appearance of many new nation-states. As a result, the contemporary world can
be characterized by the following: "a great standardization and unification of the people
within the nation; a sharpening of dividing lines between nations; and a new kind of total
involvement in the nation on the part of the entire population." 120
The appearance of nation states made "conquest" or "colonialization" of a weaker
state meaningless. Acknowledgment of the sovereignty of a nation state causes censure for
such behavior in international society. Even if that succeeds, the conqueror cannot legitimize
its rule over the people ofa victim's country. Even though there exists a big disparity in terms
of political, economic, and military power, at least under international law (even though
weak) all states become equal as unitary actors in international affairs. Even in East Asia,
where the Chinese empire had dominantly maintained a "Sino-centric" idea far more than a
thousand years, the traditional relations such as suzerainty would never happen again.
2. Development of Mass Destruction Weapons
Weapons proliferation is closely related to the development of the modern nation
state. Ifwe define the term 'state building' as the process of "the creation of a governmental
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monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory," 121 a nation-state
should have military force which is required for not only domestic prestige but also sovereign
status in the modern world system. 122
With rapidly improving technology, however, the development ofmass destruction
weapons, especially a nuclear arsenal, made new conditions for the use of force. 123 The
dominant powers cannot use force indiscriminately for fear of the disastrous results of nuclear
war which would lead to mutual destruction. Since any war can escalate into a nuclear
holocaust, war itself has become too risky as a solution for international conflicts. 124 One
problem is that "the acquisition of nuclear weapons has become an important objective for
an increasing numbers of contemporary states." 125 Even the lesser powers, if they get a
nuclear bomb, can have a "punch" against the superpowers. Even though the former does not
get it, if they use the "situation" well, they can get the initiative in the negotiation table over
the latter, as in the case ofthe long nuclear negotiation between the United States and North
121
James W. White, "State Growth and Popular Protest in Tokugawa Japan," The Journal of
Japanese Studies, vol. 14, p. 1.
122Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of
Conventional Weapons. An Institutional Theory Approach," ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, Culture and
Security (New York: Columbia University Press, Forthcoming), p. 81. They insist, "Nation-states do
not buy particular weapons exclusively to enhance their prestige. Rather, the creation of a military
and the acquisition of the basic 'tool of the trade' both confer and confirm the central cultural
construct of 'statehood' within the modern world system. The more a nation interacts with this larger
cultural environment, the more it tends to assert and authenticate its sovereign status with the
ultimate symbol of nationhood, a military." p. 113.
123
Stanley Hoffmann, "International Organization and the International System,"ed.
Goodrich, Leland M. & Kay, David A., International Organization: Politics & Process (Madison:
The University ofWisconsin Press, 1973) p. 55. Also, Gilpin indicates three general effects of mass
destruction weapons on international relations: first, the primary purpose of military power has
become the deterrence of another great war; second, nuclear weapons provide the nuclear state with
an infrangible guarantee of its independence and physical integrity; third, the possession of nuclear
weapons largely determines a nation's rank in the hierarchy of international prestige. See Robert
Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 215.
124
Dietrich Fischer, Wilhelm Nolte and Jan Oberg, Winning Peace (New York: Crane
Russak, 1989), p. 15.
125
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 216.
48
Korea in the early 1990s. Strong powers, then, cannot help being concerned about the
proliferation ofnuclear weapons among non-nuclear states and being cooperative with weaker
powers.
With the development of mass destruction weapons, growing concerns are: "well-
equipped 'state of the art' militaries are no longer restricted to a few industrialized 'core'
powers; military development and economic development, it seems, have become
decoupled " 126 Many third world countries have developed and procured long-range missiles,
some of which can be used for delivering nuclear bombs, and chemical and biological
weapons. The destructiveness of those weapons results in the abhorrence of war among
people. Coupled with the growing democratization of world politics, "it is becoming
increasingly difficult to develop and sustain a substantial majority of the voting public that will
support a war, except for cases when the adversary is viewed as evil and the opposing elites
as very different from themselves." 127 Then, states have tended to become increasingly
cooperative in bargaining and compromising with each other in international affairs.
3. Growing Economic Interdependency
Growing economic relations in the post-war era have caused states to become
interdependent with each other. Most scholars view this as a benign phenomenon rather than
pessimistic one. 128 Klaus Knorr argues that, "The new world economic order was also
126Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Convential
Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," p. 80.
127
Charles F. Hermann, "Democracies and War: One ofMany Security Issues," American
Defense Annual (New York: Lexington Books, 1994), p. 4.
128
Gilpin indicates the three factors which might negatively affect the political consequences
of trade; the existence or absence of a dominant liberal power, the inequality of economic growth in a
system, and the degree of homogeneity of industrial structure. In each case, political conflict will
occur from the economic interdependency respectively when a dominant economic power is waned or
challenged by a new rising power, when the slowdown of a country in the rate of economic growth
such as unequal trade makes adjustment difficult, or when there is extreme homogeneity of industrial
structure. Coupled with growing economic interdependency and cooperation, this thesis considers
that those factors can be solved, because current economic order seems to converge to free trade
based on mutual benefits. See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy ofInternational Relations, p.
57.
49
perceived as a potent source of political benefit. ... a system producing continuous, massive,
and pervasive improvements in the material foundations ofhuman life would make possible
a politically peaceful and stable world in which nations would be capable of solving disputes
by judicious bargaining and compromise " 129 In addition to its basic contribution to economic
mutual benefits based on the principle of"comparative advantage," economic interdependency
results in increasingly close people-to-people contacts.
Coupled with mutually beneficial economic relations, close people-to-people contacts
can remove much ofthe fear and the danger of war. 130 Dietrich Fischer shows the case ofthe
improved relations between the United States and China. 131 After "ping pong diplomacy," the
interaction of businessmen as well as common people — "Today about 27,000 Chinese
students are in the United States, and about a quarter-million Americans visit China each
year" ~ has made them closer than ever before. China is interested in buying U.S. technology,
and American consumers benefit from low-priced products made in China. Even though there
have been political constraints such as the Taiwan issue and the human rights issue, at least
economic relations between the two countries have contributed to improving their overall
relations, increasing mutual understanding.
4. Information
The development ofmodern high technology has enabled states to obtain more varied
and accurate information through multiple channels. Advances in communications and
transportation can bring people anywhere directly or indirectly, thus increasing their contacts
and mutual understanding beyond nationalities. The development ofmass media, coupled with
the spreading "freedom of speech" based on globalizing democratization, supplies all kind of
fresh news and information. Various international institutions provide information and data
about other countries, thus contributing to the transparency of their relations. States can
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collect information using ultramodern intelligence satellites. They also can use more accurate
information from domestic institutions that analyzes outer information. Compared to the pre-
war era, far more political, economic, security, and even non-governmental international
organizations facilitate the flow of information.
5. Wither Cooperation?
The appearance of nation-states and the development of mass destruction weapons
not only strengthened the sovereignty of states, even small ones, but also contributed to
cooperation among them. Coupled with the realization of the disastrous results of the two
great wars, at least indiscriminate total war aimed at conquest was rejected. The growing
economic interdependency and information have certainly brought about more international
contacts and mutual understanding. At least economic cooperation seems to be real, when we
consider so many economic cooperative organizations and activities. Even though economic
relations cannot solve security conflicts between states, it can improve political relations to
a degree.
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Thus, those changes in the international system after the two world wars can be
considered to be auspicious for international cooperation, rather than conflicts. 133
G. SUMMARY: CONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY
Both theory, balance ofpower and collective security, have their own limits not only
with regard to logic, but also in practice. No perfect theory can exist in the real world, rather
it has been, and will be, corrected and evolved continuously. 134 Arthur Stein asserts
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"international relations involve both cooperation and conflict, evincing more cooperation
than realists admit and more conflict than liberals [institutionalists] recognized." 135 In the
previous sections, however, we could see the possibility of cooperation among states even
in an anarchic international environment, rather than power conflicts. Coupled with the benign
changes in the post war era, international relations have evolved on the basis of cooperation
through numerous political, economic, and security institutions and arrangements. Then, as
long as cooperation is possible beyond just "calculation of power," it would be worth while
to examine the workability of collective security in the real world.
Whereas the balance of power system is formed naturally under an "uncontrolled
anarchy," the collective security system is artificial under a "controlled anarchy" which
requires cooperation among members. Without cooperation ~ that is, negative identities and
conflictive security interests among states ~ the balance of power system will naturally be
formed. Without cooperation, collective security will only cause a disaster as in the case of
the League ofNations. However, only if such cooperation among nations is possible, and if
a collective security system is established successfully, will the system provide the benefits of
security stability with less costs to its member states. If so, the collective security system
would be the best option for achieving peace in the international system, as well as an
alternative to balance of power approaches.
However, it is questionable whether to believe the institutionalists' perspectives on
collective security, because their view is more or less unilateral. Constructivists' view of the
international system, which seems to correspond with the institutionalists' view to a degree,
does not provide an explicit explanation ofwhether collective security can work in practice,
by arguing that its success depends on identity and interests of states. The fact that there has
been no real collective security system in the real world increases the doubt about the
workability ofthat system. Growing cooperation in international relations, however, provides
a clue for the realization of collective security. Even though they are transformed collective
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security systems, the United Nations and NATO have been operated since the end of the
Second World War, with "general" success in dealing with international security affairs.
Coupled with the increasing opportunities for security cooperation and multilateral security
talks, especially in Asia, the possibility for collective security tends to be intensified, not
weakened.
The question is not "whether the collective security system can work?" but of "under
what conditions can the collective security system work?" A system is not a solution, but a
possibility which depends on the interactions between actors and security environments in the
system. To summarize the conditions for workability of collective security that are reviewed
in this chapter, five factors need to be mentioned.
Shared security interests. States' behaviors ~ that is, whether they cooperate or
not — absolutely depend on their national interests. As the most important factor, there should
be overlapping security interests in the collective security system. Without national interests,
states would not cooperate, as realists, institutionalists, and constructivists assert. Also, if
their security interests are not shared, but conflictive, a collective security system cannot work
properly. This case will be examined in the Locarno Pact in Chapter III.
Identity. States should identify and understand themselves as a member of the
collective group. Like people in a society or a nation, they should have a will to follow the
rules and norms given to them, believing that others will obey. This identification is similar
to "the shadow of the future" in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Both expedite
cooperation under the assumption that current cooperation is necessary for future interests.
Of course, as the system develops, their identities will evolve as a collective identity. For the
purpose of further description of identity in next chapters, this thesis will use the terms
"positive identity" and "negative identity." The positive identity is the situation in which a
state defines another as a friend or an ally, and the negative one means the identification of
another as an enemy or a threat.
Institutional capability to control states' behaviors. According to institutionalists
and constructivists, proper institutions can strengthen cooperation by facilitating mutual gains
and promoting the formation of positive identity and further collective identity among member
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states. Even though the rules and norms in a collective security system are weaker than
domestic laws in a state, states would respect and observe them as long as they have the will
to cooperate. Therefore, institutional capability inevitably depends on states' cooperation in
a system. Institutional capability does not mean an authority to govern its member states, but
the capability to control and adjust states' behaviors through making contacts and conciliation
of their policies. If the institutional function promotes states' interests, states will be more
cooperative, thus reinforcing institutional capability.
Institutions to provide information. As realists, institutionalists, and possibly even
constructivists concede, information provides transparency of each state's policy and prevents
any miscalculation of others' intention or power in the system. It helps a state to define its
identity to others positively, and facilitates cooperation among states. Coupled with global
democratization and the development of technology, information to the public became more
available and important for states to make their national policies. Therefore, a collective
security system can not only get more support from its member states as well as their people
by providing information, but also strengthen its institutional capability from the support.
Reiteration of interaction between actors and the system. Actors' cooperation
with the collective security system contributes to the reinforcement of institutional capability.
Thus, they will be rewarded with less transaction costs, security stability, favorable economic
environment, and so on. Ifthe interaction between actors and the system proceeds positively,
and reiterates, the identity ofeach state would be developed into a collective identity and the
collective security system will be more stable.
These five factors provide the clues for the workability of collective security. This
thesis considers them as variables for the success or failure of collective security, and assumes
that if a collective security system is satisfied with these factors, then it can be a successful
system to maintain security stability. Most of all, shared security interests and positive
identities, which are the factors for cooperation, would be foremost for the best results of
collective security, because institutional capability depends on them. To verify the functions
and interactions ofthose variables in real collective security systems, the next chapter will deal
with the two cases of the Locarno Pact and NATO.
54
ffl. COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN HISTORY
This chapter comparatively studies two cases of collective security in history: the
Locarno Pact and NATO. The case studies will show the functions and interactions of the five
variables — mutual security gains, identity, institutional capability to control states' behaviors,
institutions to provide information, and reiteration of interaction between actors and the
system ~ in a collective security system. Then, it will illustrate the conditions under which
collective security can work.
The cases were selected under the following three considerations. First, by selecting
those cases in the same region, it would be possible to prevent the variation of the difference
of regional culture. For example, even though we may apply a security system to both the
Middle East and Europe at the same time, the outcome may be different because of their
different cultures and historical background. Second, to compare the conditions that would
influence the workability of a collective security system, both a failed and a successful case
were chosen. Third, the backgrounds of those cases are matched with the future security
environment of Northeast Asia which would seek a new security measure for regional
stability. Of course, for this thesis I would rather select them from Asian history, but there has
been no successful case in this region's history. Also, other regional collective security
systems such as the OAU (Organization of African Union) or the AL (Arab League) were
based on pan-nationalism which would have no relation to Northeast Asian states. On the
other hand, by considering the different problems of Asian culture in applying the system, in
Chapter V, this thesis will be able to overcome the gap between the European cases and the
applicability to the Northeast Asian states.
Examining all the details of the cases is not what this Chapter intends to do because
of its inefficiency and the restricted volume of this thesis. Rather, this Chapter will focus on
the functions and interactions of those five variables to ensure the relations between the
variables and the success or failure of collective security. In addition to those five variables,
the existing external threat, as another variable which might influence the outcome of the
collective security system, will be examined at the end of the Chapter.
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A. THE LOCARNO PACT
"The Locarno agreements consisted of five related treaties: the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee, restricted to western German borders and guaranteed by Britain and Italy; and
four arbitration treaties between Germany on the one side, and France, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland on the other." 136 As the latter cannot be considered to be
collective security, however, this chapter will deal with only the Treaty ofMutual Guarantee
and mainly focus on the interactions among France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium,
and the United States.
As a failed case, the Locarno Pact could not satisfy the five variables required for the
success of collective security. In fact, its failure seems to have been destined from the
beginning. Most of all, cooperation among participants was impossible without positive
identity and shared security interests. Before the Pact, the Treaty of Versailles was aimed at
the creation of a new world order through the adjustment ofeach state's claim about territory,
reparations, and disarmament after the First World War. The result was not a conciliation, but
hostility full of distrust and resentment among the people of each state. Then, the participants
of the Locarno Pact could not form a positive identity regarding each other, even at the
moment ofthe conclusion ofthe Pact. As far as the Rhineland was concerned, which was the
focus of the Pact, France and Germany could never share any interests from the Pact.
Coupled with the lack of proper institutions which could adjust and conciliate each state's
policy, the Locarno system showed no effectiveness or workability in maintaining the status
quo around the Rhineland.
The failure of the Locarno Pact was mainly due to the lack of cooperation among
participants ~ that is, the negative identity of each state and the conflictive self-interest. As
the negative identity and the conflictive interests around the Rhineland were closely related
to the Versailles Treaty and the political relations among France, Germany, Great Britain, and
the United States, this section will first examine the background of the Locarno Pact. Then,
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after reviewing the development of the Pact, which will illustrate the lack of institutional
function, this section will evaluate the functions of the five variables in the Locarno system.
1. Background: Formation of Negative Identity and Conflict ive Interests
cl Peace Settlement after the First World War
The background ofthe Locarno Pact is linked to the "failed peace settlement"
after the First World War. Woodrow Wilson's "new diplomacy" in the Paris Peace
Conference, which "aimed at overcoming old conflicts and tensions by building a
supranational organization and strengthening international law," could not work because of
"the variety of views and approaches" to the Conference. 137 Far from "the spirit of
conciliation," the "new diplomacy" was merely a compromise based on power politics and
national interests. The principle of equality among sovereign states dissolved in the decision-
making process such as the "Council of Ten," or the "Council of Four," and in the Covenant
of the League of Nations. 138 Even though Wilson believed that the practice of secret
diplomacy should give way to free and open discussion, 'the Council of Four' conducted its
deliberations in the utmost secrecy. 139 When it comes to the right of national self-
determination, non-European populations of the colonial world were beyond their concerns.
Thus, the principles for world peace through the "new diplomacy" crashed on the shoals of
political reality in Paris.
There were basic discrepancies in each state's national interests throughout the Paris
Peace Conference. Great Britain was chiefly concerned with the reestablishment of a balance
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of power. France's main concern was to make a resumption of the Franco-German
compatibility impossible. Italy demanded the South Tirol and the Dalmatian coast which were
promised by the Treaty of London as a reward for its participation in the war. Also, new
nations which had emerged from the war, such as Greece and Serbia, were full of nationalism,
and made demands for their own national goals. The problem was that the European powers
could not find any solution to solve their conflictive interests without violating the principles
that Wilson suggested, settlement by conciliation. Most of all, the policies of Great Britain
and France, and the impact of the peace settlement on Germany should be mentioned.
For Great Britain, Wilson's Fourteen Points prescribed a moderate settlement of
reparation claims, which confined Germany's obligation to the reparation of civilian damages.
This was not acceptable. "Since the damage to civilian property in Great Britain had been
minimal, Lloyd George persuaded Wilson to include the cost of veterans' pensions and
separation allowances in the total bill to be submitted to Germany in order to maximize
Britain's share of reparation payments." 140 When it came to territorial settlement, however,
Great Britain opposed harsh territorial penalties for Germany that had been sought by France,
which included the independence ofthe Rhineland and the small and medium-sized states in
the eastern frontier. Even though its opposition was on the grounds that Germany was likely
to incite perpetual dissatisfaction with the peace settlement, Great Britain had a clear reason
for the moderate policy toward territorial matters: to revert to "its traditional policy of
promoting continental equilibrium in order to free her to play a global role." 141 That is, under
the condition of Germany having lost its naval power, Great Britain considered it as a
counterweight to French power on the continent, not necessarily as an enemy — like in the
late nineteenth century and during the First World War.
France had two critical national goals: first, the definitive removal of the menace of
German military aggression in Europe; second, the acquisition of financial assistance to defray
140
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the costs of restoring the territory in northeastern France that had been devastated by the
German army during the war. 142 Coupled with the loss of Russia as an eastern counterweight
to German power, French sense of vulnerability was high. Without natural impediments,
France was susceptible to German attack. By comparative statistics at that time, France was
inferior to Germany in terms of population and industry. For its future security, France
wanted either a weakening of Germany or an assurance of the two strong powers' support
in case of war. 143 As the latter was rejected because of the two powers' abhorrence to get
involved in a Continental war, the other option for France was to weaken Germany by
territorial amputation and disarmament. On the other hand, France hoped that its national
reconstruction would be financed not by the defeated enemy, but rather by France's two
English-speaking associates. 144 It hoped the participation of the United States in the inter-
Allied economic machinery in the last year ofthe war to be extended for the Allies' economic
recovery. Moreover, the restriction of supplies to Germany within the inter-Allied economic
structure would limit German potential for aggression. However, France's expectation was
ill-founded. Once the war was over, the United States did not see any interests in economic
aid to its Allies and returned to economic nationalism. Then France had to seek relief from
its economic distress in the form of reparation payments from Germany. 145
As far as the security from the threat ofGermany was concerned, the Rhineland could
not be overlooked by France. As the historian Aulard acknowledged that "Either we annex
the left bank of the Rhine and violate principle, or we do not annex it and France remains in
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perpetual danger of invasion," 146 the Rhineland lay in the heart of France's security.
Strategically, "it was only on the Rhine that an offensive from the east could be stopped
without too great risks and excessive sacrifices." 147 Coupled with the independent movement
of the separatist group in the Rhineland, then, France's policy was to form one or several
independent states there. As the movement failed, there was a confrontation between France
and Great Britain on the matter of the forcible separation. "The forcible separation of the
Rhineland from Germany would not only violate the principle of national self-determination;
it would also, particularly in the eyes of British Prime Minister Lloyd George, have created
another Alsace-Lorraine, that is a perpetual source of friction between Germany and the
victorious powers responsible for depriving her of her 'lost province.'" 148 After severe
debates, with a reluctant guarantee of the United States and Great Britain that they would
commit themselves to defend France in the event ofunprovoked German aggression, there
was a compromise arrangement on the Rhine as follows:
The Allies would occupy the left bank and the appropriate bridgeheads for 15 years,
but their troops would be withdrawn in three stages. Subject to satisfactory Germany
treaty execution, the first zone would be evacuated after five years and the second after
ten. If the Germans executed the entire treaty before 15 years were up, then the
occupation would cease at once. On the other hand, if the Germans did not fulfil their
reparations obligations, then all, or part of the area could be reoccupied. The left bank,
and a 50 kilometer strip paralleling the river on its right bank, were to be permanently
demilitarized. Any German infraction would be deemed a 'hostile act', but would not
automatically trigger the Anglo-American guarantee. 149
This was an outcome of Wilson's offer to give France an American guarantee, followed by
a British offer that an American guarantee would be accompanied by a British one. However,
the U.S. isolation from European security matters brought about the invalidity of its
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guarantee, therefore it became Great Britain's problem.
For Germany, its people resented the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles: they lost
all colonies; Alsace-Lorraine was yielded to France, Eupen-Malmedy to Belgium, Posen and
West Prussia to Poland; the Saar with its coal field was to be under international
administration for 15 years; the Rhineland was to be demilitarized and occupied by the Allies
for 1 5 years at German cost; heavy reparations were imposed; and they had to reduce the
army to 100,000. The last two issues were the most problematic to implement. "Public
opinion within Germany fulminated against the 'blank check' that the Allies had issued on that
country's capacity to resume its prewar prosperity." 150 Career officers vehemently opposed
the disarmament and army reduction. German public opinion was divided into two groups,
obstruction of the rightist parties and fulfillment of republican parties. The assassination of
Walter Rathenau, the leading figure of the latter, however, showed the radical flow of the
atmosphere in German society toward resistance of the Treaty.
b. French entry into Ruhr and the Locarno Pact
"On 14 November 1922 Germany claimed a complete moratorium of three or
four years, with the exception of deliveries in kind intended for the reconstruction of the
devastated regions." 151 While Great Britain showed generosity in suggesting the
postponement for two years, 152 France rejected Germany's request because it "would lose any
real guarantee of being even partially paid by Germany, while its debt to the United States
would still stand in full." 153 Actually, unlike Great Britain, France's interests lay on the
weakened Germany for its security. "In December 1922 the majority of the Reparations
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Commission, led by France and opposed by Britain, declared Germany in default in her
deliveries in kind," 154 and insisted on sanctions. On January 1 1, 1923, without consulting with
the other Allies, France and Belgium sent the "Interallied Mission of Control ofFactories and
Mines" into Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland, which consisted of a group of engineers
protected by troops. It was designed to guarantee the fulfilment of the pledges of production,
but in fact the operation very quickly resulted in an extension of the military occupation of
this region of the right bank of the Rhine. 155
France's occupation of the Ruhr brought about not only disastrous results in the
German economy and politics, but also a massive French failure. Germany responded with
"passive resistance": it suspended all payments to France and Belgium; it forbade railway
officials and employees to obey the orders of the occupying authorities. 156 The passive
resistance bankrupted the German government which issued currency with accelerated speed
to pay the workers, and sparked hyperinflation, which resulted in overall economic inability.
A separatist movement in the Rhineland and the radical leftist and rightist organizations drove
Germany into political instability. Chancellor Cuno resigned and was replaced by Gustav
Stresemann on August 1923. France could not achieve its economic goal in such a chaotic
situation. Moreover, France's sole unilateral military action made her thoroughly isolated. The
United States expressed its displeasure by withdrawing its own army of occupation from the
Rhineland. With doubts over the legality of the French action, 157 Great Britain broke away
from the operation in Rhineland. There was a diplomatic split between France and the other
two countries.
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It was Gustav Stresemann, the new German Foreign Minister, who saw an
opportunity to strengthen his country in this delicate situation. His policy was "fulfillment,"
which amounted to a total reversal ofthe previous German policy of "resistance." He believed
that Germany could get more political and economic gain through cooperation rather than
intransigence. He proposed international arbitration for a new schedule of reparations,
expecting an international forum to prove less exacting than France alone was likely to be. As
a result, the Dawes Plan which was a reduced schedule of payments accepted in April 1924
helped to rebuild Germany's economic and, ultimately, its military power. 158 In this manner,
in return for a German effort to fulfill its obligation of reparation and disarmament, even
though it was a kind of 'political show' without practical implications, "Stresemann strove
to be released from the most onerous political and military provisions of Versailles by the
Allies themselves." 159
While the policy of "fulfillment" was welcomed by the Western states, it produced an
insoluble quandary for both France and the entire European order, as Kissinger describes:
French security required a certain amount of discrimination against Germany in the
military field; otherwise, Germany's superior potential in manpower and resources
would prevail. But without equality - the right to build armaments like any other
European country - Germany would never accept the Versailles system, and fulfillment
would come to a halt. Fulfillment placed British diplomats in a difficult position as
well. If Great Britain did not grant Germany military equality as a quidpro quo for
Germany's meeting its reparations payments, Germany could well revert to its earlier
intransigence. But military equality for Germany would imperil France. Great Britain
might have made an alliance with France to counterbalance Germany, but it did not
wish to become entangled in France's alliances in Eastern Europe or to find itself at war
with Germany over some piece of Polish or Czech territory. 160
On February 9, 1925, Stresemann made one of the boldest and most imaginative
moves: a security pact confirming the status quo on the Franco-German borders, entailing
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a promise on the part of both states not to wage war against each other, and submitting all
common disputes to arbitration or conciliation. 161 There were two reasons for Stresemann to
make such a proposal: first, the Allied determination to link German disarmament with
evacuation of the Rhineland had to be broken; second, French security needs seemed to be
met by an Anglo-French military alliance in a manner unfavorable to Germany. 162 Even
though, by accepting the Dawes Plan, France and Great Britain promised the withdrawal of
their troops from the Rhineland, the inspection of German disarmament in Autumn 1924
revealed numerous problems and prevented the withdrawal. Coupled with the growing
separatism in the Rhineland, Germany desperately required the evacuation of foreign troops
in that region for its economic and political stability. Also, the protraction of their military
occupation seemed to be developing into an Anglo-Franco military alliance. Actually, "Austen
Chamberlain in 1925 developed an idea for a limited alliance among Great Britain, France,
and Belgium which would guarantee only their borders with Germany - in essence a military
alliance to resist German aggression in the West." 163 By utilizing the security pact, then, he
expected not only to eliminate those concerns, but also to rebuild the German economy,
rearm and resume her place among the great powers, without western intervention. 164
For Great Britain, the proposal of Stresemann was quite acceptable in terms of
German-Russian relations and Franco-British relations. First, Great Britain worried about
German-Russian ties since the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 which was suspected as a partial
military alliance. If Germany became pro-Britain by Stresemann' s proposal, then it could be
detached from the Soviet Union. Second, with the rejection of the Geneva Protocol, Great
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Britain was considering a certain type of security guarantee for France. Chamberlain's idea,
however, which was a security agreement among Great Britain, France, and Belgium, did not
seem to be desirable. Instead, Stresemann's idea was more acceptable. More importantly, it
would make Britain a dominant factor in European politics by arbitrating between France and
Germany. 165
France was hesitant between the opposition of its eastern allies and its national
interests. France wanted to include eastern allies, especially Poland, but it was non-sense in
terms of the security of Germany. At the beginning, its stance was that German initiative
could be examined only in close accord with its allies. Coupled with British pressure,
however, France felt that acceptance would be more profitable for its security. The security
pact with Germany would prevent "a German-Russian combination with which France and
her eastern allies could not cope without British support." 166 Most of all, France could obtain
what it wanted: "from Germany, freely tendered assurances that the Franco-German frontier
as well as the demilitarized condition of the Rhineland were inviolate; from Great Britain (as
well as Italy), the precious guarantee that had eluded French statesmen ever since the end of
the Paris Peace Conference." 167
The Locarno Pact was signed at Locarno, Switzerland on 1 Dec. 1925. 168 With this
Pact, first, the borders between France, Belgium, and Germany were guaranteed against any
aggression. 169 Second, the five countries ~ France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Belgium
165
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- agreed with the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland. And, third, Great Britain and
Italy guaranteed this agreement, pledging assistance to repel invasions across the frontiers or
into the demilitarized Rhineland from any direction. "True to the principle of collective
security, the draft presumed neither aggressor nor victim but promised resistance against
aggression from whatever quarter in either direction." 170
Though the Locarno Pact was hailed as a "victory for peace and security," in fact, it
was only a tool for pursuing each state's different national goal. For France, it was a tool for
gaining the guarantee of Britain's commitment against German's aggression toward her.
"Ever since the end of the First World War, France had been insisting that its security
demanded a firm alliance with the United States and Great Britain against Germany." 171 Now
it could get assurances of aid from Great Britain. For Germany, it was a new tool for the
revision of the Versailles Treaty to strengthen her political and military power. 172 Germany
could be recognized as an equal of other nations with the acquisition of a permanent seat on
the Council. Also, she could escape from the fear ofan incipient Franco-English Alliance. For
Great Britain, it was a tool for maintaining her political position as a traditional balancer of
power. The Locarno Pact gave Great Britain the position of arbiter between France and
Germany, as a dominating factor in European politics. As for Italy, she could enjoy her
political initiative with Britain. Only Belgium could be considered as a true participant for
collective security because she could have nothing from the Pact except her territorial
security. Under these differing motivations of participants, the Locarno Pact was not a
of the League (Art. 2). All disputes were to be submitted to arbitration or conciliation (Art. 3). In
case of an alleged violation of Article 2 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, the injured party would
appeal to the Council of the League and to the remaining signatories of the Treaty who engaged
themselves to come promptly to its assistance (Art. 4). The other six articles dealt with procedure in
case of a refusal to arbitrate, with the relationship of the Treaty to the Covenant, and other technical
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purpose, but a tool for their uses: not a means for security, but a tool for other works.
2. Development and Failure of the Locarno Pact
The post-Locarno period was characterized by France's step-by-step decline in her
foreign policy, Germany's skillful resurrection, especially in terms of its military, and then
German violation ofthe Pact. The mismanagement of the system was mainly due to the lack
of institutional function and, of course the lack of cooperation. Without proper institutions,
the Locarno system could not have any function in monitoring and controlling the states'
behaviors. Also, the lack ofinformation of others' military levels led them to a miscalculation
of power, and thus to no military preparedness for the counter-action against a violation of
the Pact.
France was gradually losing her military power by the Locarno Pact itself.
Disarmament was a critical issue in this period. Before the Locarno Pact, France could have
maintained its military superiority to Germany on the pretext of Germany's then existing
military threat. However, the fact that the Locarno Pact pursued conciliation, and that
Germany requested the same level of her military as others after its joining the League of
Nations, pushed France to disarm respectively. Facing this unstable pressure, Briand
suggested to Kellogg, the American Secretary of State, a draft treaty for the purpose of
consolidating the relationship between the two countries. 173 But Kellogg expanded the draft
treaty to the Pact of Paris in August 1928, which included fifteen countries. Then, contrary
to Briand' s idea, this pact became a new means of putting pressure on France because "it was
widely argued that, with war outlawed, France had an obligation to accelerate its own
disarmament "m In addition, her attempts at Franco-Italian agreement and the Franco-Soviet
negotiation in 1935 came from the same motivation: "the weakening of the French position,
a more and more definite threat presented by Hitler's Germany." 175
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For Germany, as Stresemann expected, the Locarno Pact contributed to strengthening
German political and military power. The membership in the League of Nations made
Germany equal to others, thus providing a basis for a German claim to maintain the disparity
of military level with others, especially with France. Also, partially with its inefficiency and
partially with the "spirit ofthe Locarno", the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission, which
had been created to supervise German disarmament, was abolished in 1927, and its functions
were turned over to the League ofNations, which had no means of verifying compliance. 176
Without any interference, it was a matter of time for Germany to propel her rearmament.
Being in sympathy with Germany's fulfillment policy, moreover, the United States gave
Germany loans, which was efficiently used to both pay reparations and modernize her
industry. Needless to say, the loans contributed to accelerating her military buildup.
Before Locarno, while France considered Germany as a potential threat in the near
future and so eagerly tried to get a security guarantee from Great Britain, Great Britain
thought France was more dangerous than a destroyed Germany and rejected any guarantee,
partly for balancing purposes and partly not to be involved in any disastrous war again. After
Locarno, while France tried to weaken Germany and maintain military disparity, Great Britain
pursued a conciliation policy and pressured France to reduce her military. In fact, Great
Britain had no idea of the impact of Germany's fulfillment policy. She simply considered it
as a peaceful settlement measure for stability and dealt with Germany's demands for military
parity and the revision ofthe Versailles Treaty based on conciliation, without the assessment
ofa balance of power. She declared that only disarmament could prevent another war, and,
hoping France would conciliate Germany, she relentlessly pressed France to accede to
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German parity in armaments. 177 This conciliatory atmosphere ultimately facilitated Hitler, who
came to power in January 1933, to go on to frantic Nazism without any trouble. Even when
Hitler decided to leave the Disarmament Conference forever and announced German
rearmament in 1934, Great Britain had an illusion that disarmament had become more
important than ever and continued her unilateral disarmament in the belief that Germany
would have to negotiate disarmament in the end. Thus, the effectiveness of the Locarno Pact
as collective security was lost as France and Great Britain differed in their opinions in
assessing German military power.
In the end, the Locarno Pact was violated by Germany's reoccupation ofRhineland.
On March 7, 1936, Hitler ordered his army into the demilitarized Rhineland. According to the
Versailles Treaty, German military forces were barred from the Rhineland and a zone of fifty
kilometers to the east of it. The absence of any collective action against the violation meant
the failure of the Locarno Pact. France was not able to take action against it by herself,
because the overwhelming psychological dependence on Great Britain allowed her no military
preparation, even when the French Ambassador in Berlin warned a month earlier that a
German move on the Rhineland was imminent. 178 Faced with the pressure for disarmament,
France already had committed herself to a defensive strategy. The Maginot Line, which
France had constructed at huge cost over a period often years, was a sign of her mentality.
Great Britain hesitated because of "its desire to avoid at all costs the European war that it
believed would inevitably result from a French or Anglo-French advance into Rhineland." 179
Then, the British government did not view the remilitarization of the Rhineland as a "flagrant"
violation of the treaty of Locarno in the pretext that it was not accompanied by menacing
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German moves toward the French frontier. 180 Consequently, the response of France and Great
Britain was confined to the issuance of stern protests, the sponsorship of a pro forma
condemnation ofthe action by the League ofNations, and meaningless military conversations.
3. Evaluation of the Locarno Pact
The Locarno Pact was a regional collective security system for securing the border
line between France and Germany, under the guarantee of three other nations. At the same
time, it was a compromise for peace settlement in the western front submitting all disputes
to arbitration and conciliation. Ifmanaged well, it might have contributed to the improvement
of relations among member states and possibly prevented another disastrous war. However,
it was too deficient and imperfect to make the arrangement successful for the peace
settlement.
a. Cooperation without mutual security gains andpositive identity
Even though the Locarno Pact was agreed upon by all participants, it was
characterized by the absence of a collective identity and by the lack of mutual security gains
among member states. A series of agreements, such as the withdrawal from the Rhineland,
the demilitarization of it, the assurance ofthe Franco-German frontier, and the guarantee of
Great Britain for its commitment to any violation, seemed to be a perfect settlement for peace
among them. However, those arrangements were only a means to achieve individual states'
own national interests, and the participants failed to make their conflictive goals converge to
common security interests. Mainly, it was due to the lack of each state's identity as a member
ofthe collective security arrangement. Coupled with the hatred formed during the First World
War, each state understood that others' security meant its insecurity. Then, cooperation
among states in the Locarno Pact was only a deception wearing "the mask of cooperation."
Most of all, the interests from the Pact among France, Germany, and Great Britain
were totally conflictive. First, between France and Germany, their security relations were a
zero-sum game. French withdrawal from the Rhineland conflicted with the German
disarmament: Germany insisted on the same level of its military maintenance as others,
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pressing the disarmament of France. 181 After the long debates over the problem, it was on
November 1 929 that the French Army of the Rhine eventually evacuated Coblenz ~ four
years after the Locarno Pact — which showed the lack of common interests in the Pact. In
fact, their main security gain lay outside the Pact: for France, it was a British guarantee; for
Germany, it was an opportunity to escape from the restraints of the Versailles Treaty. Then,
the nucleus of the Pact, the withdrawal and the disarmament, was contradictory to their
interests, and was not be implemented.
The failure of the Thoiry talks between Briand and Stresemann on September 27,
1 926 showed that the Locarno Pact was not agreed upon at the national level, but just among
the statesmen. In the quaint village of Thoiry, the two men met and agreed to settle the
problems including the returning of the Saar to Germany, the withdrawal of French troops
from the Rhineland, and Germany's prompt reparation payment to France - a package deal.
However, this agreement was criticized by their people in both countries. "German
nationalists violently opposed any form of cooperation with Versailles, however advantageous
the specific terms, and Briand was accused ofthrowing away the Rhineland buffer." 182 Then,
Briand broke off the talks, and their attempt was failed. Actually, unless trust was based on
the Locarno system, it was impossible to share any security interests between the two nations.
Second, while France absolutely required the British guarantee and support in dealing
with Germany, the British interests were to give "not too much" to France to maintain the
balance ofpower between France and Germany. In fact, their alliance relations changed into
'checkmate relations' after the First World War: "France, by insisting on weakening Germany
by unilateral action and thereby forfeiting British support; Great Britain, by insisting on
conciliation without considering its impact on the balance of power, thereby forfeiting French
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security." 183 Contrary to France's intention to maintain military superiority to Germany, she,
as an impartial guarantor, forced France into more disarmament after the Locarno Pact.
Actually, British interests did not lie on the Locarno Pact itself, rather they were Continental
~ balancing France and Germany, separating the Soviet Union from them.
Ultimately, their different interests were based on their negative identity to each other
in the collective security system, which originated from the bitter experiences during the First
World War. The failure of the Thoiry talks showed this. Even though the two leading
statesmen agreed to the package deal, the lack of trust and negative identity between French
and German people led the agreement to be broken off. Let's examine their identities more
specifically. First of all, French understanding of Germany was as a potential threat even after
the Pact. She could not give up the Rhineland because the occupation of it afforded her an
essential measure of military security against a German attack. France had made alliances with
eastern allies and agreed to conclude the Locarno Pact only after the estimation that the Pact
would be more efficient to deter Germany. Faced with the reduction of its army and the
pending termination of the occupation, France started to construct the Maginot Line. 184 As
long as her identity toward Germany was so negative, France had to be wary of German
rearmament and could not share any of her security interests with Germany.
Second, Germany had been full of hatred toward the Allies, especially France, after
the Treaty of Versailles. She had to escape the status quo, and for that purpose it tried to
achieve dominance over France by the Pact. As a letter of Stresemann to Ambassador von
Maltzan showed, German identity toward the Allies was hostile. Stresemann gave the
following reasons for making the security offer to France: "it would secure the Rhineland,
split the Allies, and open new possibilities in the east" 185 In fact, Germany was interested in
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Britain saw an opportunity to return to old diplomacy of the balance of power and wanted to
maintain the status quo. Within the Locarno system, France and Germany were neither allies
nor enemy, but objectives for balancing. Then, French military had to be reduced while
Germany was not to be too weakened.
Consequently, even though the Locarno Pact was aimed at peace in the border area
between France and Germany, it could not make a common achievement for regional stability.
Each state's negative understanding and expectations of others impeded forming a collective
identity within the Pact. Full of hatred and distrust, then, the participants could not share any
security interests. Without common security gains and collective identity, cooperation among
member states was impossible. The Locarno Pact was not an arrangement for regional
stability but a means for each country's own self-interest.
b. Lack ofa proper institution
According to institutionalise view, the Locarno Pact was an imperfect
collective security system without a proper institution to provide information and to control
states' behavior. Information through the Locarno period was totally unavailable. States'
behaviors were not controlled by the Treaty, but driven by their self-interests. Without
cooperation, which should have been directed toward common security gains, the Locarno
system could not have any institutional capability. The lack of interaction between states'
cooperation and benefits from the strengthened institutional capability weakened the system.
The Locarno system did not have any institution that facilitated the flow of
information among the member states, most critically about German disarmament. With the
withdrawal ofthe Inter-Allied Military Control Commission, the only institution for inspecting
German disarmament, "the Allies had effectively entrusted to Germany itself the responsibility
of self-supervision without requiring even an innocuous verbal commitment to the principle
of unilateral disarmament." 187 Therefore, "The clandestine rearmament initiated in the early
twenties proceeded thereafter without even the threat of detection by Allied military
187
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observers." 188 Great Britain could not see the opportunity to form extensive Anglo-French
military preparation to assist France against unprovoked German aggression, mainly because
of the lack of information. 189 Also, facing Hitler's decision to leave the Disarmament
Conference in 1934 and German introduction of conscription which meant public rearmament,
Great Britain still had an illusion that Germany would have to negotiate disarmament in the
end. Thus, the lack of information resulted in weakening the system, leading the member
states to miscalculation and misunderstanding of the security environment.
As examined in Chapter II, the efficiency of a collective security system — in terms of
institutional capability ~ depends on states' cooperation based on common security gains and
identity. Due to the lack of cooperation as well as information, the member states could not
count their security on the Locarno system. The case of France showed this. Despite the
Franco-German rapprochement through the Locarno Pact, France could not help taking steps
to enhance her diplomatic and military position vis-a-vis Germany. 190 In addition to the
conclusion of mutual assistance pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia before the Locarno
Pact, she made a treaty of friendship with Romania in 1926 and Yugoslavia in 1927. Even
though it failed, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was aimed at getting the U.S. commitment to bolster
her security. In the League Assembly on September 1929, she issued an appeal for the
creation of some kind of supranational confederation linking the sovereign states ofEurope,
mainly for the purpose of the containment of Germany. She also tried to reinforce her
diplomatic and security position with the Stresa Front, the Franco-Italian rapprochement, and
the Franco-Soviet Treaty from 1933 to 193 5.Needless to say, such bids for her security which
were sought outside the system, not within the Locarno Pact, resulted from the inability of
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the system, and also they resulted in more inefficiency of the system.
The lack of a proper institution made Great Britain an "honest broker" to conciliate
states' behaviors, thus taking on the role of an institution in a system. However, the role of
Great Britain in the Locarno system had two important shortcomings compared to the
function of a normal institution in a collective security system. First, the former had limits in
collecting and analyzing information. While an institution can probe and collect any necessary
information such as military level or military expenditure "in the name of the institution," a
state, even though it is an honest broker, cannot do it because "in the name of the state"
means the violation of sovereignty of the objective states. Second, an institution in a system
better facilitates the interaction among states to form new identities than when there is no
institution. Various levels of institutions from inter-governmental ones to civilian ones enable
states to "meet often," and, if not, promote cooperation to be more stable and get it going. 191
When one state conciliates a system, like Great Britain in the Locarno system, it tends to be
partial toward its self-interest. Of course those two benign functions of an institution premise
the cooperation of the participants. Even if there had been an institution in the Locarno
system, without cooperation of states, the system would have failed. Actually, proper
institutions are not a necessary condition, but a sufficient condition for the success of
collective security.
c. Lack of collective action
The failure of collective action against German remilitarization of the
Rhineland seemed to have already been scheduled. Great Britain already concluded a bilateral
naval agreement with Germany secretly, which would acknowledge a further violation by
Germany of its treaty obligations. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia, which was an apparent
violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations, detracted the authority of collective
action against German violation. 192 Without cooperation among member states as well as
191
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proper institutions, states became disunited and out of control. The different self-interests
between France and Great Britain made their military preparation inefficient. Facing German
reoccupation ofRhineland, they could not make a decision to take military sanctions, because
of not only the reluctance to commit themselves to the risk of total war, but also the poor
military preparation. Coupled with the lack of interaction between the actors and the Locarno
system, they could not see the future gain: prevention ofgreater war. Instead, they just feared
the development of collective action into armed conflict and refused to implement their duty
to counter German violation of the Pact.
Most of all, while collective security premises the preponderance of power against an
aggressor, the Locarno system failed to get its teeth to bite the violator. When France
examined the possibility of naval operations, such as seizure of the German island of
Heligoland, blockade of a German port, or seizure of German ships, to force Germany to
negotiate, the navy hastened to prevent these demonstrations because they were reckless and
ineffectual without the support of the British fleet. 193 Ground operation was out of the
question too, because "France did not have an expeditionary force available which would be
ready at any time to act." 194 For Great Britain, without any urgent self-interest, she had no
intention of providing military support against Germany: she already concluded a bilateral
naval agreement with Germany, which weakened the punishment power as a guarantor. "Even
the advent of British rearmament in the aftermath of the Rhineland crisis gave little comfort
to France since it concentrated on upgrading naval and air forces for home and imperial
defense instead of on establishing a land army that could be dispatched to the continent." 195
Also, Italy lost her justification for participating in collective sanction against a violator, due
to her invasion ofEthiopia. Thus, the lack of capability to take counter-action in the Locarno
system could not prevent the advent of German remilitarization of the Rhineland, and it also
failed to take military sanction against the violation, thus making future security more
193
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doomed.
In summary, the Locarno Pact did not satisfy the five conditions for collective
security. First, the member states could not form mutual security gains. Self-interest in the
Rhineland between France and Germany conflicted with each other. Great Britain's interest
did not lie on the Pact itself; rather it was her position of balancing the powers. As long as the
balance of power was maintained, the German militarization of the Rhineland was not a
matter of consequence and she rejected collective action against German violation of the
Treaty. Second, historical enmity and hatred among states impeded efforts to form a
collective identity. Their negative identities resulted in the difficulty of cooperation and more
conflictive security interests among members. Even Franco-British alliance relations changed
into checkmate relations by the British balance of power politics. Third, with the lack of
proper institutions, information was not available. Even though Great Britain pursued the
balancing between France and Germany, her miscalculation of power caused seriously
unbalanced power between them. Fourth, without cooperation of its member states, the
Locarno system could not have any capability to control states' behaviors. Ultimately, without
mutual security gains and collective identity, the system could not have incentives to stimulate
states' cooperation. Finally, the absence of interaction between states' cooperation and
rewards, that is, actors and system, failed to make the Locarno system stable.
B. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 under the
provisions of Article 5 1 of the United Nations Charter, which permitted members to
participate in collective measures of self-defense whenever assistance from the United Nations
itself would be inadequate. 196 According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, "The
Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more ofthem in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an
196The first member states were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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armed attack occurs, each of them, ..., will assist the Party or Parties so attacked..." 197 In
terms of its characteristics, even though there was no mention about an enemy state, NATO
was a collective defense system to counter the threat of the Soviet Union: at the same time,
however, it was also a collective security system, which could counter any internal enemy
there may be.
As a regional collective defense system during the Cold War era countering the threat
of the former Soviet Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) succeeded in
achieving that goal. Even after the disappearance of the threat, it has been maintained with
the strong support of its member states seeking a new role fitting in the new world order as
a collective security mechanism rather than collective defense. Only with its long age of nearly
fifty years, can NATO be considered to have been a successful regional security system in
spite of some disputes.
The case ofNATO satisfies the five variables for collective security in terms of both
the background of its establishment and its development process. Mainly due to the
cooperation of member states, which was based on their collective identities and mutual
security gains, its well-organized institutions functioned properly. Institutions from the NATO
Council to the many subcommittees had information available and had the institutional
capability to control the behavior ofmember states. Reiterated interactions between states'
needs for security and their interests from the system have made NATO a more efficient
system by strengthening collective identities as time passed.
1. Cooperation Based on Collective Identity and Mutual Interests
The nucleus ofNATO's success rests with the cooperation among the member states.
First of all, NATO was established by a stronger collective identity than any other security
system throughout history. Because ofthe desperate needs of economic development and the
growing threat of communism after the Second World War, the Western European states
could be unified and developed into a regional economic and security community within
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NATO. As long as those states identified themselves as members of the community and also
perceived the other members positively ~ that is, not as enemies — they could expect security
interests from the system.
a. Forming collective identity
One of the most distinctive characteristics ofNATO was that the member
states already succeeded in forming a collective identity, even before the establishment of
NATO. In fact, right after the Second World War, Western European states were faced with
two problems that would have threatened their survival: economic disruption, and political
and military insecurity from the threat ofcommunism. Economic disruption was far more than
that ofthe end ofthe First World War. With the human destruction of 35 million, or possibly
60 million people, and industrial damage, "The years following the war witnessed no revival
or rebirth of spirit but rather a continuing, even deepening, despair over the future of
Europe." 198 Even Britain was in a state of crisis in the Winter of 1948: industries could not
get fuel, gas and enough electricity, and factories were closed. Before the economy could
recover, the hope for economic reconstruction had to be recovered.
On the other hand, in such a desperate economic situation, the Soviet Union was
succeeding in reviving the expansionist policy that Russia had pursued on and off for over a
century and a half. Unlike Great Britain and Western European countries, "the Soviet Union
had the resources to absorb its losses and the dynamic ideology to celebrate its survival as
proof ofthe inevitability ofcommunism." 199 As a suzerain state of communism, she suggested
communism as a solution to the failure of democratic capitalism, and stimulated and
supported nationalistic movements in Eastern European countries. Huston describes the
process of communizing those countries:
In a series of swift seizures of total authority, the Communists moved to consolidate
their control. On 3 1 May 1947 Communists ousted Premier Ferenc Nagy of Hungary,
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whose Smallholders party had won an absolute majority in the election of 1945; .... In
October Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, vice premier of Poland and the leader of the Peasant
Party, had to flee for his life when the Communists moved in to take complete control
... In November Ana Pauker became a foreign minister ofRomania, and her Communist
regime dissolved the National Peasant Party and imprisoned its leader, Iuliu Maniu; ...
In Bulgaria, the Agrarian Union Party was broken up and its leader, Nikola Petkov, was
hanged. ... in February 1948 this country [Czechoslovakia] too came under full Soviet
sway. 200
Needless to say, these moves ofEastern European states supported by the expansionism of
the Soviet Union came closer to the Western European states as the most dangerous threat
to their military as well as political stability.
The two urgent tasks that the Western European countries had to solve made them
feel the needs ofunified Europe more than ever before. European union was required not only
to revive their economy. But also, it was required to pool the military strengths of the West
like an alliance from the recognition that "there could be no economic recovery without the
political confidence that military security could offer."201 In January 1948, escaping from its
traditional sense of separation from the continent, the British proposed a political community
in concert with the French, Dutch, Belgians, and Luxemburgers, which eventually would be
open to other Europeans in time. 202 It was another "Concert ofEurope" in European history,
but it was different from the previous concert: while the previous one was based mainly on
morality among states, the British proposal was based on converging the national interests of
each state ~ that is, economic reconstruction and containment of communism.
The Brussels Pact, or Western Union (WU), was an outcome of the necessity of
economic and political unity in Europe. Just before the Berlin Blockade by the Soviet Union,
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the pact was developed under "the Treaty ofEconomic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration
and Collective Self-Defense," and was signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948 by Belgium,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 203 The pact declared that "in
the event of an armed attack in Europe against one party, all the others would give all military
and other assistance in their power in accordance with the provisions for collective self-
defense of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter."204 Coupled with the Soviet's blockade
ofWest Berlin, more close military cooperation among members was required. Recognizing
the necessity for U.S. support, the Western European states welcomed the participation of
the United States (the only strong power that could counter the threat of the Soviet Union),
as well as Canada, as observers to the conferences of the Permanent Military Committee in
London in July 1948. As a result, the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO) was
created as a military body under the Brussels Pact in September 1948.
Table 1. European Views on the Necessity of NATO, 1987205 (unit: %)
State Denmark Norway France F.R.G. G. Britain Italy
Still necessary 61 71 49 70 72 65
Not necessary 22 14 19 15 16 23
Don't know 16 15 32 15 12 12
Thus, even before the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty, Western European
countries formed a collective identity. When France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Italy
agreed on the establishment of Western Union, it was the threat of communism that made
them so unified. Economic urgency, which required political stability, also increased their
need for more unity. In fact, unity was necessary not only for economic development, but
203
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also to deter the expansionism of the Soviet Union. The collective identity among NATO
member states can be illustrated by the public opinion about the necessity of the system as
Table 1 shows. After nearly forty years after the birth ofNATO, an absolute majority of
people in each country, even in France, still felt the need for NATO.
Most of all, NATO has developed and strengthened the collective identities among
member states. The Franco-German identities, one of the most difficult relationships to be
improved in NATO, is one case. Similar to the situation after the First World War, their
relationship after the Second World War started with the French concerns about the
possibility of German rearmament, especially when the United States hoped for German
membership in NATO. Truly, Germany's joining NATO was one problem that members had
to solve by any possible means. Faced with the Korean War in 1950, the United States felt
the need for German rearmament to prepare for a possible attack by East Germany, and it
supported the creation of an integrated European army under a centralized command with
West Germany, under the condition that it did not entail the creation of an independent
German army. However, the French soon became reluctant to countenance any form of
German rearmament and the French National Assembly rejected the European Defense
Community (EDU) Treaty in August 1954. 206 The demise of the EDC strengthened the
conviction of the U.S. and the British Governments that West Germany should join NATO
to strengthen their military power as well as to protect West Germany from the threat of the
Soviet Union and East Germany. Ifthere was an attack from the east, Germany would be the
front line. Then, there was a compromise: instead ofthe U.S. guarantee to station and commit
its troops permanently to the defense of Europe, France conceded on German rearmament
and NATO membership under the condition of a prohibition on West German production of
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nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and of certain equipment restrictions. 207
Thereafter, despite those incipient problems of distrust of Germany by France, the
growing political, economic and military rapprochement in Franco-German relations made by
the interrelations between them in the system has been one of the major successes of
NATO. 208 Also, the widespread support for a reunified Germany's right to NATO
membership demonstrated the remarkable progress that Europe had made in overcoming the
divisions and suspicions engendered by the Second World War. 209 The formation and
reinforcement of a collective identity in NATO contrasts with the background of the Locarno
Pact whose members' identities were full of hatred and enmity. Even though France,
Germany, and Great Britain were the member states of the Locarno system and NATO, their
identities in NATO were quite different. In the former case, they considered each other a
potential threat to be contained and balanced for their security; in NATO, they considered the
others allies that were absolutely needed for their security. The different perception of others
in NATO compared to the Locarno system thereby also produced quite different expectations
of their interests, as will be examined in the next subsubsection.
b. Mutual security gains
Member states' interests within NATO were converging to a single goal:
European security. As the case of the Western Union showed, European states realized that
it was impossible to counter the Soviet Union individually. When they decided to organize
the Western Union, they were already sharing the common security goal with each other.
Even Great Britain, a traditional off-shore balancer, casted off her isolationism from the
continent and led the European states to the Western Union and the North Atlantic Treaty.
Unlike before the Second World War, Great Britain could not expect her security interests
to be served by the traditional balancing role. Coupled with the changes in her identity to
207Mark Stenhouse, "Historical Overview; NATO's Evolving Role From Cold War to the









Great Britain sought her security interests from the participation in NATO, not from
a politically dominant position like in the case of the Locarno system. For France, it was
apparent that at least she did not intend to use NATO as a tool for securing a guarantee of
involvement by Great Britain and the United States in European security. Because the
participation of Great Britain and the United States in NATO was not "reluctant" but
"voluntary", which resulted from changes in their identities, NATO was not a tool for them,
but a shared arena for their security interests. For the United States, also a traditional isolator
from the continent, the security of Europe was related to her own national interests of the
protection of democracy and free trade. In fact, it was not surprising that she gave military
aid to the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO) and NATO, in addition to
economic assistance.
Actually, the involvement of the United States in European security matters resulted
mainly from her national interests rather than collective identity. To contain the Soviet Union,
her main interest, there were two measures: economically, the Marshall Plan; and militarily,
alliance with Western European states. The Marshall Plan was formed to alleviate immediate
economic distress throughout the world after the two Great Wars. Of course, economic
stability in Europe had important implications for the long-term economic well-being of the
United States. However, strategically, the purpose of the Marshall Plan was to deter
communism which tended to penetrate into economic weakness and instability. 211 Alliance
with Western Europe was initiated by joining the WU and developed into NATO after the
Vandenberg resolution. 212
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France's withdrawal of her military from NATO in 1966 showed the importance of
shared interests as a factor to maintain a system. France was discontent with two facts from
her participation in NATO: "the apparent replacement of France with Anglo-Saxon
superiority"
213
in the continent and the question of liability of the U.S. nuclear protection after
the Soviet development of Sputnik. To overcome those discontents, in September 1958, de
Gaulle proposed that the United States establish within NATO "a triumvirate of Britain,
France, and the United States to consult on the use of the American nuclear deterrent during
war in western Europe"214 As the proposal was turned down, France accelerated its own way
"to assert its independence from America and a base from which to claim leadership of the
Continent."215 She already initiated the force defrappe, an independent nuclear deterrent,
under Guy Mollet. When the Kennedy Administration weakened a joint NATO nuclear
force,
216
and when Kennedy and Macmillan made a decision on Skybolt,217 France felt nuclear
vulnerability as well as Anglo-Saxon dominance. Then, when Brezhnev showed, at least in
of shortage of parts and technicians. This problem among Western European states and the United
States resulted in "the idea of a single mutual defense system, including and superseding the Brussels
Treaty." Among debates over the involvement of the U.S. military into European matters, the idea
was rearranged and specified by Vandenberg resolution, which became the principle of a defensive
pact for the North Atlantic area.
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the eyes ofFrance, no aggressive designs against Western Europe, 218 France got a chance to
go its own path.
When her interests were confronted within the system in terms of its national pride and
the reliability of NATO, France gave up her membership. When a state feels that other
interests have priority over its security interests in a system, it cannot cooperate with the
system any more. In fact, as the security environment became favorable after the Soviet's
policy of "peaceful coexistance," France considered her national pride to be more important
than security interests derived from participation in NATO.
On the other hand, it was other members' shared interests within NATO that allowed
the system to continue to work. France's decision for military withdrawal from NATO was
critical because it could have increased not only the credibility of nuclear deterrence, but also
the distrust of states toward the NATO system. The demise of NATO also could have
influenced Germany's individual military rearmament reviving her nationalism. 219 Moreover,
French territory was an alliance heartland, available for the unloading and deploying of
reinforcements or for a logistical rear base. 220 Other member states, however, reaffirmed the
effectiveness ofNATO as an instrument of defense and deterrence, and declared that no
system of bilateral arrangements can be a substitute for it. Even though the action of France
considerably deranged the working and operations ofNATO, the 14 full members showed
a firm determination to carry on and a readiness to adapt to changed situations and
218Due to excessive military expenditure, the Soviet economy depressed in the 1960s: the
growth rate of national income reduced 10.2% in 1950s to 5% in 1960s; the growth rate of industrial
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conditions. In addition, faced with the dilemma of assured nuclear protection, the Defense
Planning Committee established the Nuclear Planning Group and the Nuclear Defense Affairs
in March 1966 as a means for an effective political executive authority and fuller participation
of the Allies in nuclear planning.
For France, despite the assumption of an autonomous defense posture within the
Alliance, her military withdrawal from NATO was only partial because she remained a
signatory member of the Alliance and has her own ambassador on the North Atlantic
Council. 221 Also, though her involvement in multilateral training activities with the Allies has
been deliberately low profile since France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military
structure, the frequency and scope ofFrench participation has gradually expanded over the
years with the easing ofFrench domestic political opposition to greater military cooperation
with NATO forces. 222
In summary, the member states' interests converged to one common goal of security
of the North Atlantic area. The threat of the Soviet Union was a decisive factor for setting
up their collective identities as well as unifying their main interests into a single goal. With the
identities and for their interests, states could have cooperated with each other within the
system as long as they expected mutual security gains. As in the case of the French military
withdrawal, however, when a member could not expect any gains or feel any necessity of the
system for its interests, the member state would reject its cooperation with the system.
2. Institutional Capability and Information
Another important factor for the success ofNATO rests with its properly functioning
institutions. Even though NATO could not be an authority to govern its members states,
institutions within NATO have had institutional capability to control and adjust states'
behaviors and to facilitate information to make each state's policy transparent. First of all,
institutions in NATO have been conspicuous in view ofthe fact that they have adapted NATO
to the changing security environment since 1949. Unlike a simple alliance between states, it
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was those institutions that helped NATO to continue overcoming conflicts over changing
national interests among members. Also, unlike a traditional alliance, the NATO members
have activated research and discussions about security policy options and their roles for
regional stability. Due to restriction on the volume of this thesis, this subsection will focus on
NATO's general structure, some of the most representative functions of its institutions, and
the role of information.
Institutions ofNATO consist of the three main bodies of the North Atlantic Council
(NAC), the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).
Under the main bodies, there are 28 principal subcommittees including the political
committee, economic committee, defense review committee, and the like. The NAC,
established as a supreme political decision-making body ofNATO by Article 9 of the Treaty,
meets at Ministerial level twice each year, or sometimes more frequently, when each nation
is represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. 223 The DPC meets at the level of Defense
Ministers at least twice a year, and deals with most defense matters and subjects related to
collective defense planning. 224 The NPG is the principal forum for consultation on all matters
relating to the role of nuclear forces in NATO's security and defense policies. 225 The NAC
and DPC, as NATO's highest political structures, provide a unique forum for confidential,
constant and timely intergovernmental consultation, and have been called a "standing
committee ofgovernments, or a diplomatic workshop."226 The institutions have the authority
and powers of decision-making at each level, which is possible because of its members'
cooperation.
Above all, NATO's institutional capability was the result of sincere endeavors by its
member states to strengthen the institutional functions. The establishment of the "Committee
223Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "France," p. 41-42.
224NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook (Brussels, 1995), p. 96. All
member states except France participate.
225
Ibid., p. 96. All member states except France participate.
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Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "France," p. 42.
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of Three on Non-Military Co-operation" and the Harmel Report are examples. Firstly, "In
1956 a 'Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation' was established to study the
ways in which NATO could improve methods of more effective collaboration on policy
formulation."227 The Committee suggested the future direction of NATO to counter the
increasing Soviet challenge from Europe to the entire world in the Report of the "Three Wise
Men." The Report stated that: "member governments were to inform the North Atlantic
Council of any development significantly affecting the Alliance in order that effective political
consultation could be held on the action to be taken; each Spring the Foreign Ministers were
to make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance, based on a review prepared by
the Secretary General; disputes among members not capable of direct settlement as called for
in Article 1 of the Treaty should be submitted to good offices procedures within NATO and
the Secretary General was empowered, with the consent of the parties to initiate procedures
to settle such disputes."228 Most conspicuously, the Report of the Committee of Three
accentuated the necessity of close contact and cooperation among member states within
NATO, and strengthened the function of the North Atlantic Council. As a result of the
Report, in the ministerial meeting in 1957 in Bonn, NATO's defense policy was discussed and
there was acceptance of a general disarmament agreement. The latter was approved by a
considerable majority of the General Assembly of the United Nations, but the USSR
announced it would boycott.
Secondly, the Harmel Report in 1967 was another endeavor to accentuate the
functions of the institutions within NATO. The relaxation of tension in Europe after the
Soviet doctrine of "peaceful coexistence," which has changed the nature of the confrontation
between East and West, 229 allowed the Council to adopt the Harmel Report, which examined
22 Mark Stenhouse, "Historical Overview," p. 5.
28NATO Information Service, NATO Facts and Figures, p. 38.
!29
Ibid., p. 402. "Peaceful co-existence" came from the meeting of 8 1 Communist Parties in
Moscow in 1961, which ended with the publication of a voluminous document from which it was
clear that Mr. Khrushchev's view on peaceful co-existence had finally been approved unanimously
by the delegates.
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the future tasks of the Alliance. In this report, Harmel suggested the Allies maintain as
necessary a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces for creating stability,
security and confidence, and at the same time to promote an improvement in relations with
the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states. Also, he urged the study of disarmament
and practical armaments control measures. In fact, the adoption of "Ostpolitik" by the Federal
Republic ofGermany was an outcome ofthe Harmel Report. Through a series of negotiations
and treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland, the German Democratic Republic and, later,
Czechoslovakia, "Ostpolitik" contributed to relaxation of tensions between East and West.
In 1973, there were talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Vienna. In
1975, the Helsinki Final Agreement was a kind of "declaration of coexistence on the part of
East and West, a mutual recognition of the lines of demarcation settled at Yalta."230
On the other hand, NATO's "dual track" policy and, at the same time, negotiations
for arms control showed its adaptability to the changing security environment. When
"detente" faded since the mid-1970s by a series of events ~ that is, the East's unwillingness
to honor its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act; Soviet activities in southern Africa and
the Horn; an accelerated build-up and deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles; Soviet invasion
and occupation ofAfghanistan; and the imposition of martial law in Poland — NATO adopted
a "dual track" policy as Harmel doctrine suggested deterrence and dialogue at the same time.
"The first track was a call for negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union
to achieve a balance in intermediate-range nuclear forces at the lowest possible level. The
second track — in the absence of such an agreement ~ was the decision to modernize
NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces by deploying ground-launched Cruise and
Pershing II missiles in Western Europe."231 Then, coupled with the INF Treaty ofDecember
1987 and its subsequent ratification, "the United States and its partners in the Alliance
succeeded in achieving the first arms control agreement to remove globally an entire category
230
Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States, p. 109.
231NATO Information Service, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, p. 33.
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of nuclear weapons."232 Needless to say, NATO's policy contributed to confidence building
between East and West.
As one of the most distinctive functions, NATO has made information available to its
member states and the people of each state. There were two functional dimensions of
information within NATO: to facilitate the procedure of political cooperation and to inform
the public. First, information through the institutions ofNATO was quite effective and critical
for their procedure of political cooperation. After the resolution was approved in April 1954,
which urged member countries to submit to the Council all political information likely to be
of interest to other members, there were actual outcomes. Under the authority of the Council,
there were discussions and negotiations about the German problem, the Paris and London
agreements, and the preparatory work for the Geneva Summit Conference. Coupled with the
establishment of the Committee on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, the Council made
it the duty of its members to inform the Council ofany development significantly affecting the
system not as a formality, but as a preliminary to effective political consultation. 233 With the
information that members provided, NATO has facilitated the process of political
consultations and decision-making.
As a second dimension, NATO has made its information available to the public. The
Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, which meets with representatives of
Cooperation Partners annually to discuss the implementation of information activities, was
an outcome of the Committee of Three described as follows (Chapter V, 81);
The people ofthe member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it.
Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its
achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme
and resources to carry it out. The public should be informed to the greatest possible
extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation. 234
Based on the principle of democracy, it was an unprecedented institutional function to make
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information available to the public compared to the secret diplomacy before the Second
World War. Since the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in
1991, 235 the Office of Information and Press has worked with each country to disseminate
information on national defense and security policy, thus making each state's objectives and
policy more transparent. Actually, NATO recognized the importance of public recognition
of the achievements of the alliance and of its continuing role in maintaining the ability of the
alliance to carry out its basic tasks, and, currently, to expand and deepen its relations with
former adversaries for a new partnership based on cooperation and common security
interests.
236
In summary, NATO's institutional capability resulted from its member states'
endeavors to seek new roles and policy of NATO to meet a new security environment.
Research and political consultations were activated and produced the most constructive
options for them. Benefits that NATO enabled were apparent, from the stability ofWestern
European security to the easing of tensions between East and West. Even though NATO
could not have the authority to enforce its member states as much as the institutionalists
asserted, it succeeded in facilitating political consultations and cooperation among the
members, and unifying their behaviors within the resolutions that were agreed to through the
consultations and negotiations.
3. Reiteration of Interaction between Actors and System
As reviewed in the previous subsections, the positive identities and shared security
interests among NATO members have enabled their cooperation with the system, reinforcing
institutional capability. Also, the system has endowed security benefits to its member states,
thus strengthening their cooperation. Reiteration of that interaction between the member
states and NATO, then, has made the system more stable.
I35
Facing the fundamental changes which were taking place in Central and Eastern European
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The reiteration can be examined by the four development phases ofNATO. The first
phase, from 1949 to 1956, is characterized by the expansion ofNATO. In 1952 the twelve
original signatories were joined by Greece and Turkey and in 1955 by the Federal Republic
of Germany. In this phase, the interaction between actors and system strengthened NATO
militarily, thus providing more stability to them. In addition to Greece and Turkey joining,
German membership inNATO resulted from the cooperation among other members through
the guarantee of the United States and Great Britain. Due to the impact of the Korean War,
on the other hand, NATO military power was expanded: military organization in the WEU,
the Brussels Treaty Organization, and its principal responsibilities in the defense field were
transferred to NATO in 1951; the United States militarized NATO with more troops and
equipment, especially since the breakout of the Korean War. 237 As a result, NATO was more
reinforced militarily and became more stabilized.
The second phase was the period from 1956 to 1967, which was characterized by the
adoption of the Report of the Committee of Three. During this period, by overcoming the
doubts and conflicts over the relevance ofNATO related to the Soviet nuclear capability and
Sputnik, and her deceptive peaceful co-existence, NATO members could make their alliance
more unified again. When the Soviet Union launched the first space satellite, Sputnik, in
October 1957, NATO members questioned the U.S. technological capability which had been
assumed to be superior to the former. Sputnik not only implied the Soviets' superiority in the
area of intercontinental ballistic missiles, but it also raised doubts about the reliability of the
U.S. nuclear protection, especially after a Soviet direct nuclear strike at the heart of America.
Coupled with the higher growth rate ofthe Soviets' gross national product and Khrushchev's
offer of "peaceful coexistence"in the late 1950s, it made the alliance shaky rather than
hardened. "The allies wondered about the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella and
!37
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about NATO's usefulness in assuring them security." B8 This circumstance might have led the
allies to the end ofNATO, which was an aim that the Soviets had intended.
However, member states were unified again by solving the conflicts by consultation
and cooperation, as the Committee of the Three suggested. It was the Soviets' harshness
toward disarmament and the Berlin question that made the allies unified again. Their refusal
to accept a thorough disarmament inspection was contradictory to their "peaceful
coexistance." Also, the Soviet's intention to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany
would unilaterally have nullified the Yalta agreements. It would jeopardize the right of the
three Western powers to remain there; it would not assure freedom of access and
communication between Berlin and the free world. 239 Then, there was a Ministerial Meeting
in Paris in December 1958, and in the same month, the allies rejected the Soviet plan for
Berlin with some resolutions such as continuous installation of intermediate range ballistic
missiles and the approval ofthe use of nuclear weapons in case of aggression. Consequently,
states' cooperation in the system enabled them to solve the doubts and conflicts over the
relevance ofNATO, thus increasing trust in the system. As a result of this confidence in the
system, faced with the French military withdrawal from NATO, other members could commit
themselves to NATO continuously.
In the third phase, from the adoption of the Harmel Report in 1967 to the end of the
Cold War, there were tangible benefits from the interactions between actors and system. By
accepting the Harmel Report, as mentioned earlier, the German Ostpolitik was conducive to
the relaxation oftensions between East and West. Also, partly starting from the second phase,
disarmament talks became more active and productive in this phase. As Table 2 shows, even
though main arms control treaties and agreements were achieved by the two superpowers,
^Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States, p. 74.
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See NATO Information Service, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, p. 54. On
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1945 agreements, as well as the control of communications between the Federal Republic of
Germany and Berlin."
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it was NATO that provided the background and support for those agreements. Even though
there were some tensions which had resulted from the Soviet's hostile actions toward
Czechoslovakia, the disarmament issue, and the force reduction issue, NATO continued to
explore the possibility of such issues through Ministerial meetings, Defense Planning
Committee meetings, and the Rome Declaration. "In view of the new developments in East-
West relations, it was obvious that efforts to reduce the level of armed confrontation in
Europe must be given priority."240 As a result, arms control treaties and agreements were
achieved. Of course, these contributions to easing of tensions in Europe were another
outcome of the interaction between the member states and NATO.
Table 2. Key Arms Control Treaties and Agreements241
Treaty Key Contents
Non-Proliferation Treaty Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons (1968)
Biological Weapons Convention Not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire those kinds
of weapons (1972)
SALT I Interim Agreement Limitation of strategic offensive arms (1972)
ABM Treaty Limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (1972)
PNET Limits any individual nuclear explosion carried out by the
parties outside U.S. and Soviet weapon test sites (1976)
SALT II Treaty Replaces the SALT I (1979)
Inhumane Weapons Convention Prohibition or restriction on the use of certain weapons
(1981)
Stockholm Document Security-building measures and disarmament (1986)
START I, II Reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms
between U.S. and USSR (1991, 1993)
The fourth phase ofNATO is associated with the demise of the former Soviet Union,
240NATO Information Service, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, p. 79.
241NATO Information Service, NATO Facts and Figures (1989), p. 277-281.
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which fundamentally changed the security perceptions of the members of the Alliance.
Contrary to many predictions of the demolishment ofNATO without the threat, NATO can
still exist as a main security mechanism in Europe. It has been possible mainly because of the
cumulated interactions between the members and NATO, and subsequently because of their
trust in the system. Different from an alliance system in a balance of power structure, which
would be weakened or would end if the common threat disappears, NATO is characterized
by its durability even after the disappearance of the threat. In fact, as long as they have a
positive identity with each other, and as long as they can see their interests from their
participation in the system, NATO will continue as a collective security mechanism in Europe
despite the disappearance of the threat.
In the post-Cold War era, the member states have tried to improve security relations
with former adversaries within the structure ofNATO, by allowing them to join. Also, even
though size and preparedness of the NATO military were reduced, the member states
reaffirmed the continuity of NATO and its adherence to its fundamental tasks with their
cooperation, through the establishment ofthe North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),
the Rome Declaration, and the establishment ofthe Partnership for Peace (PFP). In particular,
the Strategic Concept adopted by Heads of State and Government in Rome in 1991 was
based on dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defense capability,
reduced dependence on nuclear weapons, and improvement of military forces in terms of
mobility and flexibility. 242 Also, PFP was to "expand and intensify political and military
cooperation through Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build
strengthened relationships."243 For a new role of NATO and for a contribution to world
peace, attention was directed increasingly toward NATO's potential role in the field of crisis
management and peacekeeping activities. From July 1992, NATO started to participate in the
UN peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia by monitoring operations in the
Adriatic.




Thus, the interactions between the NATO members and the system have been
reiterated and strengthened the bonds between the members and the system throughout
history. This has also influenced the development of a collective identity and reinforced the
institutional capability ofNATO to control the members' behavior. Some of the conflicts or
tensions even among member states were inevitable. By overcoming them, however, and by
facilitating their security interests through the system, they have developed NATO beyond the
level of a collective security system. It would not be wrong to say that the establishment of
the European Community in 1 992 and economic integration was partly the result of the
stability and unity that NATO has provided.
In summary, during the nearly fifty years ofNATO's presence, nobody can deny its
role in maintaining peace in Europe, summarized by these three major achievements: the
prevention ofwar, arms control, and peacekeeping operations. Even though there have been
some disputes over minor problems, such as the U.S. monopolistic role or the failure to
prevent the Bosnia Civil War, the most superb achievement has been the prevention ofwar
in this region. It has been possible because of the proper structure that has enabled the goals
of the Alliance to be implemented, and because of the member states' common commitment
and mutual cooperation centered on that structure.
As a successful case of the collective security mechanism, NATO satisfies the five
variables. First, the member states have formed a collective identity and share common
security interests within the system. The changed attitudes of the two traditional isolators,
Great Britain and the United States, show their changed identities as well as shared security
interests in NATO. Further, the system enabled the member states to strengthen the collective
identities such as the case ofFranco-German relations. Most of all, these collective identities
and the shared security interests were important because they facilitated cooperation among
states. Second, NATO had proper institutions which have controlled its member states. Also,
the institutions have provided the states the opportunities to conciliate and consult over the
policies and strategy ofNATO. Faced with a new security environment, NATO has adjusted
itself to it with the agreement of the member states. In fact, as long as states cooperate, the
system has its capability to control them. By providing information on the policy of each state
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to the public, NATO has also had the support of the people in the member countries. Finally,
the interactions between the member states' cooperation and the benefits from the system
have been reiterated. They have strengthened the collective identities and cooperation in
NATO, and therefore the institutions have had more capability based on the states'
cooperation.
C. SUMMARY
1. Nature of Collective Security
Collective security necessarily requires cooperation among states. In the Locarno
case, realists were right in that states cooperated with each other transiently only for their
own self-interests. Also, in the case of NATO, the basic motivation of NATO was the
member states' own self-interests for security, not any benevolence for others. As
institutionalists insisted, however, cooperation, beyond the transient type, was possible if
there were mutual gains like in the case ofNATO. Attention should be paid to the fact that
even though both the Locarno Pact and NATO cases were based on the self-interest of each
state, there was a basic distinction between the presence or absence of shared interests. Even
though the Locarno Pact was welcomed as a solution for "peace settlement" among peoples,
they could not cooperate with each other because of their conflictive national interests. When
we consider the fact that a state's behavior is dependent on its self-interest, the more shared
interests there are, the more cooperation there will be, therefore, there will be a greater
possibility for a collective security system to be successful.
The shared self-interests among states are influenced by the identity that each state
builds in a system. As far as security matters are concerned, the definition of others as a friend
or enemy, or as "positive" or "negative," is important for sharing their security interests. Even
though security interests are shared in a system, if a state distrusts others or it defines others
as enemies, its self-interest can no longer be shared. Compared to NATO, the Locarno system
failed to recover from the distrust of others and to form a positive identity among states. In
fact, mainly due to the faults of the Versailles Treaty and the bitter memories of German
aggression during the First World War, it was impossible for France and Germany to form
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such identities up to the level required for collective security.
Collective security requires proper institutions to control states' behavior, adjust their
self-interests, and facilitate their cooperation. As realists assert, an institution cannot be an
authority to govern its member states. Even in the case ofNATO, institutions cannot be an
international government standing beyond the sovereignties of the member states. Rather,
institutions can provide the opportunities for states to adjust and conciliate with each other's
different interests, policies, and strategies. Therefore, institutional capability depends on its
incentives to attract states' cooperation. As Kenneth Oye asserts about the asset of an
institution that "conventions provide rules of thumb that can diminish transaction and
information costs,"244 NATO has had effective incentives to the member states by providing
them the opportunity to consult about common security policy, thus reducing their transaction
and information costs. Also, the institutions within NATO have shown their capabilities by
facilitating contacts and conciliation among states, and by readjusting NATO's new strategy
to the changing international security environment. As long as the system was beneficial, it
was not surprising that the members followed the resolutions and agreements that were
concluded by the Council and subcommittees. Actually, institutional capability is possible
when member states cooperate to achieve their shared self-interests. If the Locarno system
had had such proper institutions, of course with the members' willingness to cooperate, it
might have been a more productive security mechanism than it was.
As one of the most important functions, institutions should have information to
provide transparency to the public. Information in this case does not mean top secrets in a
state, but the policy and strategy that each state pursues. By the dissemination of information,
NATO not only could get much stronger public support, but also made the policy of each
state more transparent than in the Locarno system. Needless to say, this strengthened trust
in the system among the states. In the Locarno system, the lack of information about the level
of German rearmament and of French disarmament led France and Great Britain to the
244
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miscalculation of military power, resulting in distrust of each other.
Collective security requires the reiteration of interaction between actors and the
system. As the purpose of the system for each state is self-interest in terms of security, a
collective security system should reward its members with less transaction costs, security
stability and, if possible, economic benefits. The more gains that the system provides, the
more cooperation the member states will commit. Such interactions between the cooperation
of actors and benefits from the system will make the collective security system more stable
as they are reiterated.
2. Consideration of Another Variable: An Existing External Threat
In addition to those five variables, an existing external threat might have been another
factor that influenced the outcome of the two cases of collective security. The fact that the
collective identity and shared mutual security interests in NATO was due to the existing
apparent enemy raises the question: without an external threat, could the member states form
a collective identity or share any common security interest within NATO? This question also
raises another question: can collective security and collective defense share the same
characteristics? That is, collective defense can succeed because there is an existing threat, but
collective security cannot because there is no threat. Actually, it was the threat of the Soviet
Union that made the NATO members so unified, and without the threat they could not have
formed such a level of collective identity, nor shared the common security interests.
However, the presence or absence of the external threat cannot be a necessary
condition for the formation of collective identity. That is, even though the external threat can
facilitate the formation of a positive identity for collective security, it is not the only factor for
the formation of a positive identity. Like the Concert of Europe or the Organization of
African Unity, even without any existing external threat, a positive identity can be formed by
other factors such as the abhorrence of war or pan-nationalism. Then, the threat of any
external threat would be a sufficient condition for the formation of a positive identity and
shared interests for collective security. Therefore, collective security and collective defense
can share the same characteristics for the success ofthose systems. This also justifies the case
study ofNATO in this chapter. Consequently, what should be focused on for the condition
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of collective security is ultimately cooperation based on identity and shared interests, not on
the existence of external threat.
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IV. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN NORTHEAST ASIA
This chapter reviews the security policies245 of the United States and the Northeast
Asian states, and assesses the prospects for the future regional security environment based
on the premise that the remnants of the Cold War will end by the demolishment of North
Korea and the advent of Korean reunification. Then, this chapter will suggest the necessity
of a new security system in Northeast Asia. It will provide a basis to estimate in Chapter V
the applicability of a collective security system to this region after Korean reunification.
Korean reunification, in any form, will considerably reduce the military influence of
the United States in this region. As a result, there may be two factors that would make the
security environment instable: Japan's expanding security role and rising Chinese neo-
nationalism. Japan's military buildup, seemingly having already started, may be a natural
action not only to fill the power vacuum, but also to balance with China as a sovereign state.
At the same time, however, the lack oftrust among regional states has also increased security
concerns about the recurrence ofJapan's militarism. Also, Chinese nationalism, which works
toward recovering its national status as a "great nation" in history, has been rising. When
China feels the inferiority of its nation to other powers including Japan, its neo-nationalism
will strengthen the "anti-hegemonism" and claim its national status as a regional dominant
power with a hard-line policy. Thus, without the U.S. role as a balancer of power, the future
24 The concepts of national security policy have been used too variously to define
specifically. Freedman defines the term security as "the extent of a state's confidence in its capacity
to withstand another's power."According to Wolfers, "security, in an objective sense, measures the
absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such value will be
attacked." Also, Morton Berkowitz and P. G. Bock define it as a nation's capability to protect
internal values from outer threats. However, even though there are some differences of viewpoints to
a degree, most views tend to converge to "a sovereign state's behaviors and capabilities to prevent
and minimize any internal, external threat and aggression, using all kinds of political, economic,
social and military measures." Then, the definition of national security policy in this paper will be a
state's policy to pursue its behaviors and capabilities for that purpose. This is differentiated from the
definition of defense policy in that the latter focuses mainly on political and military measures. In this
paper, the terms such as 'security policy,' 'foreign policy,' 'economic policy' will be considered
types of security policy. See Lawrence Freedman, "The Concept of Security," ed. Mary Hawkesworth
and Maurice Kogan, Encyclopedia ofGovernment and Politics (1992), p. 731-732. Also, see Baek,
Jong-Chun, National Defense Affairs (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1985), p. 6-7.
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security environment in Northeast Asia will be instable because of rivalry between Japan and
China.
This chapter argues three main points. First, the Northeast Asian states have had
negative identities and conflictive security interests with each other throughout modern
history. Even though the Northeast Asian states shared the same culture in pre-modern
history, which originated from ancient China, they had to confront each other in their
struggles for hegemony, survival, and sovereignty in the process of modernization and
development. From the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the Second World War,
Japan's invasion of Korea and China left the unforgettable bitterness of past history to the
victim countries. During the Cold War era, and even today, there has been an invisible war
between the democratic side and the communist side around the Korean peninsula. Despite
the increasing economic relations among the Northeast Asian states, the incompatible
ideological confrontation and the unpleasant historical background has still caused their
security policies to be conflictive.
Second, the current regional balance of power system will not fit in with the future
security environment as the U.S. security role in this region would be reduced. While the
security environment in this region has been confrontational during the Cold War era, it
seemed to be more predictable and manageable than in the post-Cold War era in terms of
"calculation" of power. This was mainly due to the distinct identity and national interests of
each state, which were decided by the different ideologies. When the remnants of the Cold
War end in this region, unfortunately there will be an increasing security instability by the
power vacuum that will rise due to the withdrawal or reduction of U.S. military commitment
in this region. Moreover, the conflictive security policy among the Northeast Asian states will
make the calculation of power more complicated than ever before and lead them to power
competition for regional dominance. Should the balance of power be maintained, it will not
be as a stable system but a fragile one.
Finally, a new security environment after the end of the remnants of the Cold War in
this region will suggest the possibility ofthe collective security system rather than the current
balance of power structure, which would be based on cooperation rather than power
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competition. With the current negative identity and conflictive interests, it seems to be
difficult to establish a regional collective security system. However, as long as the balance of
power does not fit in with the future security environment, collective security can be
considered as an alternative for a future security system. Moreover, if those regional states
can build confidence before Korean reunification and form a positive identity to a degree, the
institutional functions that collective security provides will contribute to improvement of their
security relations and thus promote regional stability.
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section will argue that the end of the
remnants of the Cold War will necessarily reduce the U.S. security role in Northeast Asia. The
second section will examine the security policy of Japan and will suggest that Japan will
expand its security and political role in this region. The third section will examine the security
policy of China based on its nationalism and will suggest that Chinese neo-nationalism may
inflame their traditional aspiration to be a regional hegemonic power. The fourth section will
review the security policy ofKorea and its future security role after its reunification. Finally,
the fifth section will argue that the current balance of power system in this region would not
fit in with the future security environment and will suggest a collective security system as a
means for future regional stability in Northeast Asia.
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN POST-COLD WAR
This section examines the implications of U.S. security policy on the security
environment in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era and assesses the prospects for the
future trends ofthe U.S. military in this region. As a current balancer of power in Northeast
Asia, changes in U.S. policy in the post-Cold War era would be the nucleus of a future
security structure in this region. Whereas the security environment in Northeast Asia has not
changed so much, the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union has inevitably caused
the U.S. security strategy to be changed "from a global containment strategy primarily
directed to the Cold War era Soviet threat to a focus on selective engagement in critical
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regions of the world."246 As a result, the lack of threat perception has constrained the U.S.
military commitment to this region in terms of its military size and budget.
The question, "Can the United States take the role of balancer of power continuously
even after the Korea reunification?" lies at the heart of future security stability in Northeast
Asia. There are basically two options for the United States: strengthening its current bilateral
alliances or becoming an off-shore balancer. 247 The former will necessarily be a containment
policy against China and may lead them to another confrontational structure. Without any
distinct threat, the U.S. deployment in this region will naturally create a hostile environment
against China whose nationalism is directed toward anti-hegemonism. The latter will produce
a power vacuum, 248 and lead the regional states to power competition, especially between
Japan and China. Even though currently the United States focuses on strengthening bilateral
alliances,
249
the future end ofthe remnants ofthe Cold War in this region will force the United
States to choose its role as an off-shore balancer rather than strengthening current bilateral
alliances mainly because of two factors: the lack of duty and justification, and budgetary
constraints.
1. The U.S. Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era
While the current security environment in Northeast Asia can be considered more or
246
Department of Defense, A Strategic Frameworkfor the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to
Congress, 1992.
247The United States can also be an isolationist, looking away from all security matters in
Northeast Asia. However, because it would be less probable as long as her national interests are
closely related to the stability of that region, this thesis does not consider such U.S. policy.
248The power vacuum seems to be simply minimized if Japan takes the security role of the
United States equivalent to the level of China. However, due to the conflictive security interests
between Japan and China, and even Japan and Korea, remilitarizing Japan will not acceptable to
Japan and Korea. Also, when we consider the fact that the United States has pursued deterrence
based on preponderance, not simple balancing with enemies, it will be more difficult for Japan to fill
the vacuum completely. Thus, the power vacuum seems to be inevitable in the future security
environment in Northeast Asia.
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less stable under the commitment of U.S. forces, a series of U.S. moves toward a new world
order made the states feel uncomfortable about the regional stability. As the former Soviet
Union was demolished, the United States withdrew its military from Subic Bay and has
reduced the level of its military in Northeast Asia. This increased the doubts over the future
U.S. military commitment in this region, thus amplifying the security concerns of a power
vacuum. In June 1993 Secretary of Defense Aspin's military and civilian advisers
recommended that the United States adopt a 'win-hold-win' strategy, 250 which was
considered as another reduction program by the South Korean Government. Although the
strategy was replaced by the 'win-win' doctrine, 251 what the Northeast Asia states realized
was the changeability ofU.S. policy in any circumstances, such as budget problems or policy
changes by decision makers. Actually, the guarantee of U.S. commitment is the key to
stabilize the security environment in this region, as the guarantee of Great Britain for France
was critical in European security after the First World War.
However, even though Northeast Asia still faces a Cold War security environment,
the post-Cold War order requires a new strategy for the United States. During the Cold War,
resisting the spread of international communism, coupled with Soviet expansionism, had
priority over other interests. Then, the U.S. strategy toward this region was the containment
against the expansion of the Soviet communism, which would harm U.S. economic interests
as well as political initiatives. In fact, the end of the Cold War can be considered as a
watershed that changed U.S. security strategy, from containment to selective engagement.
The selective engagement policy is based on the uncertainty and the flexibility of the world
security environment, prompt engagement in conflict areas, not a military presence
250
This change anticipated that if the United States were confronted with two major regional
conflicts simultaneously it would 'hold' the second conflict's adversary by employing air power and
a limited number of ground forces. After prevailing in the first conflict, the United States forces
would be redeployed to reinforce the ally under siege in the second theater until the conflict was
terminated on favorable terms. See William T. Tow, "Changing U.S. Force Levels and Regional
Security," Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 15, no. 2, August 1994, p. 17.
251The win-win doctrine does not mean that the United States fights two regional conflicts at
the same time, but it means nearly simultaneously.
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everywhere in peace time, and is focused on regional levels of conflict, not global levels. The
U.S. plan for the three-phased reduction of its forces in the Asia Pacific region in 1990 and
the revised plan, even though Phase II was postponed in 1992, showed the changed U.S.
security strategy in the post-Cold War era.
The U.S. economic recession became a major factor that restricted the level of military
maintenance, and that forced the U.S. security policy to depend on international cooperation
with its allies. In September 1993, the Clinton Administration completed the Bottom Up
Review (BUR), a full-scale assessment ofwhat defense forces and systems the United States
needs for this new security era. 252 By the BUR, there was a cut of the defense budget by $88
billion from 1994 to 1997, and the number of active duty personnel would shrink from 1.8 to
1.4 million by 1997. 253 While the BUR focused on the effectiveness of military operations in
terms of costs and benefits, the continuing reduction of the U.S. military budget has required
more burden sharing with its allies, Japan and Korea in Northeast Asia. For example, Japan's
share ofthe non-salary costs for U.S. forces deployed in Japan rose to 73 % in 1995. 254 This
means a more independent defense capability of Japan in the future, which will substitute for
the security role of the United States in the end.
Despite the change of U.S. security policy, the United States assured the ongoing
military commitment to the Asia-Pacific region at the summit meeting in Tokyo in April 1996.
Actually, the United States has vital national interests in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of
economy and security. By strengthening the bilateral security alliance with Japan, the United
States can not only secure its sea lines of communication, but also continuously use the
252The White House, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement,
February 1995, p. 3.
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military base in Japan for "forward military presence"255 to deploy its military to the Asia-
Pacific region and up to the Middle East. Moreover, it is less expensive for the United States
to station its forces in Japan than in any other place in the world, including the United
States.
256 However, the U.S. promise to maintain an approximate level of 100,000 troops in
this region seems to be "symbolic" rather than realistic, because the promise seems to be an
"assurance" to stabilize the current instable situation about the U.S. ongoing military
commitment in this region, which resulted from the inconsistency ofU.S. policy after the Cold
War.
U.S. policy toward Japan and China seems to be quite contradictory. The United
States wants to strengthen the bilateral partnership with Japan which serves as the basic
mechanism through which they work together to promote regional and global security. 257 The
Japan-US. joint declaration on security alliance in Tokyo in 1996 can be understood by the
same context. At the same, the United States tries to "engage China and support its
constructive integration into the international community, including participation in global
efforts to limit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and foster transparency in its
defense policy and military activities". 258 However, the more the United States strengthens
its alliance, the less its security relation with China improves. In fact, China considered the
outcomes of the summit meeting in Tokyo as nothing more than a containment policy toward
China.
5
"Forward military presence" is a security concept of U.S. security policy in the post-Cold
War era. It is broader term than the concept of "forward deployed forces" during the Cold War era.
While the latter has a specific mission of deterrence and defense against an identified enemy, the
former may have more ambiguous military missions designed to achieve the political objective of
providing assurance of a stable regional order for friends and allies. See Thomas L. Wilborn,
International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China-Japan-United States Strategic Triangle,
Strategic Studies Institute, March 21, 1996, p. 32.
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In summary, even though the U.S. security policy toward Northeast Asia in the post-
Cold War has lost its coherence and caused increased security concern in this region, the U.S.
military commitment seems to continue for the time being. The current security environment
in Northeast Asia absolutely requires the U.S. military presence as a deterrence force. After
the GulfWar, the United States realized the possibility of regional conflicts and the necessity
of prompt power projection to the unpredictable theaters. Therefore, it is sharing interests
between the Northeast Asian states and the United States that has enabled the U.S. military
presence in this region. As long as the current hostile security environment continues, mainly
due to North Korea's nuclear and conventional threat, the United States will remain in this
region assuming the role of a balancer of power.
However, the end of the remnants of the Cold War which would result from the
demolishment of North Korea suggests the possibility that the U.S. security role would be
conspicuously reduced in this region. The loss of duty for the U.S. military in Korea, and even
Japan, will decrease the justification of its stationing in this region. The U.S. budgetary
constraints will force Japan and Korea to assume more security roles that the United States
has taken in this region. Above all, the Northeast Asian states will not want the same level of
U.S. military commitment mainly because it might result in another confrontation with China.
Thus, the United States will have to choose its future role as an off-shore balancer, instead
of strengthening the current bilateral security alliance, and decrease its security role in this
region.
2. Conspicuous Reduction of the U.S. Role after Korea Reunification
a. Duty andjustification
During the Cold War era, the U.S. security role in Northeast Asia was to
contain the expansionism of communism, and it was justified for the regional stability that
secures the freedom of economic trade and sea lines of communication, preventing any
hegemonic power to rise. After the Cold War, when Russia gave up the hegemonic aspiration
in this region and "appears to be in full retreat from previous alliance and forward
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deployments,"259 the U.S. military role in this region has been justified by the continuing
hostile security environment under the remnants of the Cold War around the Korean
peninsula. As long as the threat ofNorth Korea exists and thus impedes the regional stability,
the U.S. military commitment will be critical as a deterrence force and welcomed by its allies.
However, if the threat disappears when North Korea becomes enervated especially
in terms of its military as her economy is weakened, then the U.S. duty and justification, at
least in the Korean peninsula, will be significantly reduced. The U.S. claim of a military base
to deploy its forces to other theaters may not be able to be accepted by reunified Korea unless
there exists an apparent threat of China. When we consider the improving economic and
political relations between Korea and China, it would be difficult for the U.S. military to
continue its stationing in reunified Korea, which will not want any confrontation with its
northern power.
The disappearance of the threat ofNorth Korea will also influence the U.S. military
presence in Japan. Even though the United States requires military bases in Japan for power
projection, its size will be restricted by maintenance costs. For Japan, the incentives to pay
most of the stationing costs will decrease. Of course, Japan may need the U.S. nuclear
umbrella against China's nuclear threat. However, unless there exists any tangible threat, the
presence of the U.S. forces will be adjusted to the minimum level.
The lack of duty and justification may cause public opinions of Japan, Korea, and the
United States to oppose the U.S. military stationing in Northeast Asia. Even in the United
States, the withdrawal or reduction of U.S. military commitment in this region has not been
a new agenda. Nixon withdrew about 320,000 troops from Asia from 1970 to 1971, and
Carter tried to withdraw all U.S. forces from South Korea until 198 1 . In a report to Congress
in 1990, "A Strategic Framework for Asia Pacific Rim Looking for the 21st Century," the
United States planned the three-phased reduction of U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific region.
When the justification loses its color, the U.S. public may call for the withdrawal or reduction
t59
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of U.S. forces in this region. The public opinion in Japan and Korea will be a more critical
factor in deciding the level of future presence of the U.S. forces. People in those countries
may consider the U.S. presence in their territories as a violation of their sovereignties. Crimes
by the U.S. soldiers, which have been settled secretly so as not to cause any trouble in military
relations between them and the United States, can be a big issue like in the case of the
Okinawa incident in 1995. As Japan and Korea become more democratized, those issues will
affect their policies toward the U.S. presence in their territories.
b. Military budgetproblem
William Tow mentions that the U.S. ability to fulfill the role of an "honest
broker" is impeded by domestic budgetary constraints, which will lead to substantial
reductions in the U.S. defense forces by the end of this century unless a new global or
regional adversary emerges to take the place of the now defunct Soviet military threat. 260 In
the Cold War era, U.S. security strategy to contain the former Soviet Union had priority over
a domestic budget problem. For example, between 1980 and 1987, the defense budget
increased its share of outlays (from 23 to 28%) and of GNP (from 5 to 6.3 %), while
nondefense spending fell from 68 to 58% and 15.1 to 13.2 % respectively. 261 Without a major
threat, however, even though the budget cannot control the U.S. security strategy, it can
influence the overall framework of the latter. Coupled with the demise of the Soviet Union
and the trade deficit in her current economy, the Department's FY 1996-2001 Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) was another option for the Clinton Administration, which will
continue the restructuring ofAmerica's defense posture to reflect the end of the Cold War. 262
Under this plan, as Table 3 shows, by FY 1997 the cumulative real decline since FY 1985 will
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reach 41 percent. 263
Table 3. DOD Budget Authority (Current $ Billions)264
FY FY1995 FY 1996 FY1997 FY 1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001
DOD military 252.6 246.0 242.8 249.7 256.3 266.2 276.6
DOE and other 10.9 11.8 10.6 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9
Total 263.5 257.8 253.4 259.6 266.3 276.0 286.5
Real change (%) -1.9 -5.3 -4.1 -0.1 -0.2 +1.1 +1.2
The FYDP is premised on cooperation with allies by sharing the burdens of military
presence in overseas. In 1995, Japan paid roughly three-quarters of the costs of stationing
U.S. forces in her country, and Korea also assumed about one-third of costs. Their burden
sharing has been increased as their economic growth went up and will continue to increase
as long as the threat ofNorth Korea exists.
However, the cooperation with its allies means that the U.S. security role is decreasing
respectively. According to a report to Congress in 1992, "Japan will continue to develop its
capability to provide for its own territorial defense, as well as continue to develop its air
defense capabilities and the capability to conduct sea lane defense out to 1,000 nautical
miles."265 Coupled with Japan's FS-X program which is a co-development program based on
the F-16 airframe, "the Japan-US. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st
Century" in 1996 opened a new way for Japan to increase its military power. The declaration
not only strengthened Japan's logistic role in case of U.S. military operations in the Asia-
Pacific region, but also activated cooperation between the countries in the fields of military
263py 1935.95 real change was -39 %. See Report ofthe Secretary ofDefense to the
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technology and equipment, research and development of equipment, and interoperability
between the U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces. Also, South Korea has increased its
security role on the Korean peninsula. A DOD report states, "The transition of the Republic
of Korea to the leading role in its own defense is a long-standing policy goal of the United
States and reflects the growing maturity and capabilities of the Republic of Korea's armed
forces as well as the desires of the Korean people and government."266 Actually, for the
purpose of shifting the primary responsibility for the ROK's defense to South Korea, "the
combined ground component commander is now a South Korean four-star general rather than
an American, and the transfer ofpeacetime operational control ofROK forces to South Korea
took place in 1994."267 Now, the South Korean Government is pursuing the Korean Fighter
Program (KFP) which will acquire 120 F-16's from the United States and is considering
procuring the next generation fighter among F-15 and SU-35. In the long term, such moves
of Japan and South Korea toward their self defense and a more active military role will
replace a portion of U.S. military commitments. Then, it seems to be inevitable that the
security role of the U.S. military in this region will be changed from a leading role to a
supporting role in the relatively near future.
3. Impact of the U.S. Military Reduction on Regional Security
Coupled with the budgetary constraints, the lack of duty and justification after the
Korea reunification will force the U.S. security role and its military presence to be reduced
conspicuously. Like in the case of the Philippines whose Senate rejected the U.S. use of
military bases, the Korean people may refuse the U.S. stationing in her territory. Even if not,
the disappearance ofthe current threat will force the U.S. military in the Korean peninsula to
be reduced significantly. Also, it will be questionable whether Japan will permit the U.S.
forces to use a part of its territory as a military base without any apparent theat. Even though
Japan requires the U.S. military for nuclear protection, the size ofU.S. conventional forces
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will be at best the minimum required for power projection to other theaters.
The U.S. military reduction will cause a power vacuum and regional rivalry in
Northeast Asia. Considering the lack of trust among those states, the future security
environment after Korean reunification will be more conflictive rather than cooperative. Japan
will increase its political and security role in international society. Based on its economic
power, Japan is trying to be a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council with the
support of the United States and is expanding its security role in this region. Also, new
Chinese nationalism in the post-Cold War era will necessarily be aimed at the recovery of their
status as a regional dominant power. These two rising regional powers will be the nucleus of
the Northeast Asian security environment. On the other hand, reunified Korea will have to
strengthen its military capability, because it will have doubts about the intention of the two
states.
Under the U.S. influence, the changes of a regional state's policy could not impact the
overall regional balance of power so much. If the U.S. influence is reduced, the current
balance of power system will be susceptible to even a minor change of power. The lack of
flexibility will cause conflicts in adopting the future security policies of China and Japan to
the new security environment after the reunification of Korea.
B. SECURITY POLICY OF JAPAN
Japan's security policy from the Meiji Restoration to the end of the First World War
has been the major reason for the current negative identity between Japan and other regional
states. During the Cold War era, while the Japan-US. security alliance provided the security
of Japan from the threat of neighboring powers, Japan gradually increased its potential
military capability based on high technology and economic power. Currently, Japan has
opened the way to expand its security role in the Asia-Pacific region with the Japan-U.S. joint
declaration on security alliance in April 1996. If and when the U.S. military is reduced
significantly in this region after the Korea reunification, Japan will rearm its military to fill the
gap of the U.S. military withdrawal. While it seems to be inevitable that Japan will expand its
political and security role, unfortunately, such a move by Japan will conflict with the security
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policies of the other regional states and cause security instability in this region.
1. Review of Pre-Modern Japanese History
Pre-modern Japanese history suggests some of the nature and characteristics of
Japanese people and society. First, due to the geopolitical reasons, the Japanese formed their
own peculiar self-identity, mixing other cultures with their traditional one. Second, Japan had
been a military dominant society from the twelfth century to the end of the Second World
War. As a result, there had been formed a military based mind in the Japanese people, such
as collectivism and importance of status. Third, Japan could achieve the Meiji Restoration
successfully without bloodshed because of their adaptiveness.
a. Strong self-identity
The Japanese people have had a strong self-identity. Geographically, Japan had
been isolated from the Asian Continent and they could develop their own self-identity.
Because of the geographical reason, Japan had never felt any external threat until the
nineteenth century, except for Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, while the nearest
neighboring state, Korea, had suffered from the frequent invasions of China and northern
nomadic tribes throughout history. Without security concerns and the interference of others,
Japan could maintain unity and homogeneity268 of its people, which have always remained as
their ideal despite long centuries of feudal divisions. As a result, "the Japanese do seem to
view the rest ofthe world, including even their close cultural and racial relatives in Korea and
China, with an especially strong 'we' and 'they' dichotomy."269 Even though Japan was
influenced by China and Korea in terms of language, literature, politics, and philosophy, they
have been culturally a very distinctive people, diverging sharply from the patterns of China
and Korea. Even today, Japan occupies a unique place in the world as a major industrialized
268
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geographically isolated from others.
269Edwin 0. Reischauer and Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese Today (Belknap: Harvard), p.
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and fully modernized nation that has a non-Western cultural background. 270 The success of
the Meiji Restoration and modernization especially was due to their strong self-identity which
resulted from long geographical isolation.
b. Military dominant society
Traditionally, the emperors could not have practical political power. In the
Nara period (710-794), the first Japanese ancient-state which was started from the completion
of a capital city, the emperor was mainly charged with Shinto rituals while civil bureaucracy
controlled administration. Kammu, who was unprecedentedly the most powerful emperor,
decided to give up Nara and built a new city in 794, Heian, but that decision seemed to be
made not on his own, but by the pressure of great priests. 271 Especially, the dominance of the
Fujiwara family from 858 to 1068 exerted a powerful hold over the emperor and set the
pattern of the control of government from behind a figurehead emperor. Thereafter, that
became general practice in Japan. Even after the restoration of the emperor to power in 1868,
Japan's political system has not allowed him to get power practically. Meanwhile, after the
success ofthe revolt in 1 185, Yoritomo became the undisputed military master of the land and
got the title of shogun, or generalissimo of the emperor's army. 272 From then on, Japan's
military rule continued until 1868.
On the other hand, the rise of local military power resulted from the limits that the
Shoen system faced since the ninth century. The Shoen system, which enabled privatization
of a large amount of land and exemption of tax under the loose control of law, eventually
weakened the government power as the sources of public revenue diminished. As the
authority and power ofthe central government declined in Japan, various local groups which
were in essence vigilante bands of warriors — known as samurai, or bushi ~ cooperated
270Edwin O. Reischauer and Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese Today, p. 31-32.
271Kim Hankyu, Jeon Yongman and Yoon Byoungnam, DongyangMunhwasa (Seoul:
Eulyumunhwasa, 1993), p. 421.
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together for mutual protection. 273 As time went on, Bushido, the "Way of the Warrior," which
placed great emphasis on the military virtues ofbravery, honor, self-discipline, and the stoical
acceptance of death, spread into the larger population almost for 1,000 years, forming a
military based mind of the Japanese.
Collectivism. One of the characteristics which resulted from the traditional military
dominant society of Japan can be considered to be collectivism. The tight organization and
long continuity ofthe feudal system based on military rule strengthened group identification,
and power was usually shared by paired officers or collegial groups because of the suspicions
and fear of other rising groups or individuals for authority. 274 Even in the process of rapid
change of the Meiji Restoration, "there was never any one dictatorial leader, nor did any
person ever attempt to gain such powers."275 Still, collectivism exists in that decision making
in Japan has depended on the principle of a needed consensus of about 80 % of participants,
not of a majority. 276
Importance ofstatus. Japanese beliefs and values of status were formed by the respect
for military leadership, unquestioning loyalty, and emphasis on group organization.
Wakabayashi explains that one of the reasons why the Japanese imperial institution has
survived and prospered into modern times is that imperially bestowed indicators of status
have remained strong for longer, while others, such as power or wealth, have counted for
relatively less in and ofthemselves. 277 In the Second World War, the absolute loyalty toward
the Emperor that Japanese soldiers showed was an example of the importance of social status
in modern Japan. Still, a hierarchial structure which respects the leaders, elders, and higher-
status person exists in Japanese society.
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c. The success ofthe Meiji Restoration
"The Meiji Restoration was the pivotal event in modern Japanese history; it is
the starting point for any discussion of major developments that followed in the Meiji period
(1868-1912) and beyond."278 Firstly, even though the Meiji Restoration may seem to have
been an almost inevitable development, it is undeniable that "no other country responded
quickly and successfully to the challenge of superior Western economic and military
technology."
279 Then what was motivation of the Meiji Restoration? And what factors made
it successful, which enabled Japan to be modernized and a leading power afterward?
The motivation of the Meiji Restoration can be examined broadly in terms of a strong
Japanese self-identity, 280 uniformity and justification. Even though China, Korea and Japan
shared the same cultural background, China had a strong view of its central position in Asia
as well as in the world. With frequent cultural contacts, Korea accepted the Chinese world
view. Actually, it was much more difficult for the two countries to adapt the Western concept
to their traditional cultures. However, the Japanese perception of strong self-identity, which
was differentiated from the Chinese world view, was better fitted to overturn their existing
beliefs and thoughts that were far behind Western countries. Second, their traditional
perception ofuniformity sharply conflicted with the local division of political system and class
division in the Tokugawa era. This created internal tensions in the nineteenth century that, by
opening cracks in society, made change easier than in the more monolithic and long-
established systems of China and Korea. 281 Third, Japan had the most effective justification
to eliminate feudal political and social division, the "restoration" of imperial rule. 282 For the
278Mark Borthwick, Pacific Century (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992), p. 127.
!79Edwin O. Reischauer and Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese Today, p. 85. China had a very
strong self identity too. However, while Chinese self identity was formed absolutely by their own
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Japanese, the emperor was the legitimate symbol ofunity in their beliefs which had continued
through their entire history. Accordingly, even though there existed reform-minded leaders
in China, Korea and Japan who realized the necessity of modernization by accepting Western
culture, only Japan could achieve that goal because of its strong self-identity that was
differentiated from others'
.
After the Meiji Restoration, there was no severe opposition or conflicts in the process
of modernization through accommodation of Western political, economic, and military
systems. This was mainly because of the state building283 in the Tokugawa era. "From Edo,
the shogun's government and bureaucracy administered the shogunate's domain and the
major cities, and controlled the functions and policies with countrywide implications, such as
sankin kotai (alternate attendance of lords in the capital), foreign trade, defense, and
minting."284 Even though the Tokugawa state suffered from fiscal viability in the nineteenth
century, it had the absolute power in that the bakufu had the power over the warrior
aristocracy, the court, the lords and their people, over region and trade, and over political
ideology. 285 Also, there appeared the concept of kogi or public authority, a clear national
locus of political power to which lords and their peasants were directly subordinate. The
formation of a "nation-state" in the Tokugawa era, in terms of central power as well as
institutional development, contributed to the continuous success of reform toward a matured
and modernized nation-state after the Meiji Restoration.
2. From the Meiji Restoration to the Second World War
a. Security policy in the Meiji era
Japan's open-door policy, which ultimately resulted from the pressure of
283
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Western powers and which was aimed at "expelling the barbarians,"286 gave it a great chance
to achieve their economic and political development. To catch up with the Westerners, Japan
placed a major emphasis on education. Many young students were sent abroad to learn more
advanced modern technology and political and economic systems. On returning, they assumed
the positions of leadership. "Economic and political development proceeded at a great pace,
considerably greater than that which marked the corresponding period of development in
Europe."287 Japan could take advantage ofthe experiences of Western powers, avoiding some
of their mistakes. Also, the doubled agricultural production in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century contributed to promoting their industrialization, because the surplus capital
was available for investment and economic expansion.
Surrounded by the threat of "imperialist" countries, however, Japan started to build
strong army and navy with the recognition that military strength was needed to maintain a its
security and independence. The national miliary force was manned through a conscription
system from 1872, and the high command was reorganized after the study of the French and
Prussian military systems. 288 Warships were built using the advanced Western technology,
especially against China. In the early 1880s, China began to expand and modernize its navy
partly in response to Japan's growing naval strength, Japan's establishment of the Prefecture
ofOkinawa in the Ryukyu Islands and its demand of the same trading and navigation rights
with China. 289
Security policy in the early Meiji era was directed outward, toward imperialism like
286Even though the slogan "expel the barbarians" was a main issue of the Meiji Restoration,
it could not practiced by the reformers as a national policy because the latter realized the needs of
Westerners to achieve modernization. Instead, the meaning of slogan was changed to "catching up
the Westerners" and extremists, who were against foreigners, were punished by law.
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the Western powers. 290 To promote its international stature and to secure its islands from
external threat, Japan looked first to Korea as a strategic target, which was important not only
geopolitically for the security of Japan as well as China, but also economically for securing
an additional food supply and market. Then, "In the 1870s and 1880s, Japan's Korea policy
resulted in an inevitable confrontation with China which asserted a historical claim of
suzerainty over Korea as a tributary state."291 Also, Japan's expansion toward the North was
confronted with Russia's interests over Manchuria and Korea. As a result, Japan had to fight
and won wars with China in 1894-1895 and with Russia in 1904-1905. Victories proved the
success ofmodernization after the Meiji Restoration and encouraged Japan to gain the status
of a significant miliary power. After victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan could get
initiatives in the Korean Peninsula and annexed Korea in 1910, thus establishing a bridgehead
of expansion toward the Asian Continent.
b. The rise ofexpansionism after World War I
After the First World War, Japan pursued a "trade-first" policy to cooperate
with the new international environment under Wilsonianism which claimed the peaceful
settlement of conflicts other than war. The European powers also re-entered into international
economic competition to revive their destructed industries. For Japan, the growing industry
required a larger amount of natural resources, which had been dependent on foreign states
such as Dutch East Idies and the United States. The explosively increased population needed
more farm products from Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan, because of decreased domestic
agricultural production after industrialization. 292 Coupled with the Washington Conference
for securing peace in the Pacific, Japan had no choice but to concentrate their efforts on the
economy. Also, there was an domestic effort of political parties toward the democratization
of politics, with a social movement that advocated a variety of democratic reforms, which
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resulted from internationalism and new liberalism.
However, the economic and domestic political situations in the 1 920s became worse.
With an enormous population growth, which reached 60 million after World War I, more than
double the figure at the beginning of the Meiji era, abundant cheap labor produced surplus
goods and at the same time required more food. This resulted in a growing dependence on
foreign markets and imports. The unbalanced economic structure between imports and
exports caused economic depression. Urbanization resulting from industrialization brought
about anxiety and the growth of proletarian unrest. Also, there was increased leadership
tension between military elites and political/economic elites, and democratization was
impossible under such an unstable social political environment. Sensitive to this instability,
"the governing elites stressed the importance of an ideological bond to hold society
together."293
The Great Depression in 1929 was a major cause of the rise of militarism in Japan.
Faced with an unprecedented economic depression after modernization, the Japanese felt that
Western economic powers had no problem, because France, Great Britain and Holland had
already established many colonies over the world, and the United States and Russia had vast
land with plenty of natural resources. However, Japan had neither colonies, except Korea, nor
enough natural resources. Japan also felt that they started too late and stopped too early.
Moreover, by succeeding in its effort to unify China, Chiang Kai-shek's "Northern
Expedition" would be a threat to the Japanese economic hold on the Shandong province. 294
Then, while they invaded Manchuria in 1931 with the accusation of the Mukden Incident,
Japan ceased the system of government by civilian parties from the time of Inukai's
assassination in 1932 until after World War II. 295 Actually, their only option for reviving the
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economy and thus stabilizing domestic unrest was to resume military expansion.
It was the military establishment itself, neither political groups like the Nazis and the
Fascists nor a charismatic and powerful leader like Hitler and Mussolini, that dominated
Japanese policies in the late 1930s and early 1940s. 296 The long Japanese tradition of a
military dominant society was revived again. Their characteristics of collectivism prevented
any dominant leader from rising to a power even during this period. Elementary education
was provided to all Japanese people, but students had to follow military styles such as
uniformed clothes, short-cut hair and an oath of loyalty to the Emperor. With the appearance
of a power vacuum in Southeast Asia when World War II broke out, then Prime Minister
Konoe announced the idea of a "New Order in Asia"in 1938, which was later renamed the
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," and merged all political parties into a single party,
the "Society for Assisting the Imperial Rule."
In summary, Japanese military expansionism originated from three factors: Japanese
security from the threat of other imperialist countries; recovering its economic situation; and
a bid to become a dominant regional power by forming an "East Asian political and economic
community." The "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was actually aimed not at a "co-
prosperity" but at a "unilateral prosperity." The method was not cooperation and
compromise, but military power and coerciveness. The consequence was destruction of entire
East Asia.
The brutal and frantic Japanese military expansion from the merger ofKorea and the
occupation ofManchuria to Japan's unconditional surrender became the major factor in China
and Korea forming anti-Japanese emotion, which exists even today. Japanese policy toward
Korea was to eliminate the roots ofKorean history and tradition. In the territory of China, the
Japanese 73 1 secret unit used live human bodies as samples in experiments of chemical and
biological warfare materials. Many young women of neighboring states were victimized as
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"military sexual slaves." These atrocities and inconceivable violations ofhuman rights have
still impeded China and Korea in forming positive identities. In particular, Japan's attitude
toward the history of its invasion of neighboring states, the massacre of civilians, and the
solution ofthe military sexual slavery problem has been untruthful and has hurt its neighbors'
national emotions, which has openly caused political conflicts in this region. 297 Actually,
Japan's explicit apology for its past history has been, and will be, the most important factor
in recovering trust with neighboring states.
3. Japan's Security Policy during the Cold-War Era
Its defeat in the Second World War brought Japan to a new "non-militaristic" world
that they had rarely experienced. The result of their past policies were too disastrous: "at
home, patriotic hysteria, military dictatorship, and a war that accomplished only destruction
and death; abroad, a legacy of distrust and suspicion, not only from the United States as a
result ofthe attack without warning on Pearl Harbor but also from the Asian peoples whose
lands they invaded and whom they then governed with much brutality."298 Realizing how
frantic their military expansionism was, the Japanese people voluntarily responded to the
disarmament under the control ofthe United States. The Peace Constitution which prohibited
Japan's rearmament was widely endorsed by the Japanese people who felt a strong aversion
to war, even though it was drafted under the influence of General Douglas MacArthur, then
Supreme Commander ofthe Allied Powers occupying Japan. 299 After the establishment of the
Constitution, Japan has pursued its security policy based on a non-military principle which
could be represented by the Yoshida Doctrine in the early 1950s. Faced with continued
pressure of rearmament from the United States, the doctrine survived in the form of a
"comprehensive security policy" in the 1980s. However, it must not be overlooked that Japan
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has gradually pursued a military buildup of its forces for self-defense, despite the prohibition
of armament in the Constitution, depending on the interpretation of the law. \/
a. Peace Constitution and "warpotential"
The most conspicuous feature of Japan's post-War security policy was the
adoption ofthe Japanese Constitution of 1946. In particular, Article 9, whose interpretation
has caused the most controversial debates among policy makers in and out of Japan, states:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as a means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the
300
state will not be recognized.
Despite the fact that the Constitution has become the basic framework for present security
policy reflecting the changed Japanese security posture after the defeat ofWorld War II, it
has lost consistency in translating the meaning of "war potential", which would decide the
total level of military strength that Japan possesses. When Japan was creating the Police
Reserve301 in 1950, the government's position was that it was not a violation oflaw because
the Police Reserve existed to maintain public security. But it was not convincing because the
Police Reserve was equipped with tanks and artillery whose capabilities were beyond securing
public order. 302 Tokutaro Kimura, director of the Security Board, explained in 1952 the war
potential was to fight with sufficient equipment as military unit. 303 In 1954, the Japanese
government suggested a new interpretation that "war potential was anything beyond the
300From the Japanese Constitution, Chapter 1 1 (Renunciation of War).
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minimum required for self-defense."304
Then, another problem became the question ofhow much the minimum is. In 1970,
the Japanese government determined the minimum of defense as "not to have offensive /
weapons which will pose a threat of aggression to other nations, such as long-range bombers
like B-52s, nuclear attack aircraft carriers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)."305
In 1978, however, "the phrase, 'pose a threat of aggression to other nation', was changed to
'cause mass destruction to territory of neighboring nations', which in effect dramatically
raised the upper ceiling of the weaponry permitted under the constitution."306 The Defense
White Paper in 1994 mentions that "the specific limit ofthe minimum level necessary of armed
strength for self-defense varies depending on the prevailing international situation, the
standard of military technology and various other conditions,"307 giving much flexibility to the
translation of "minimum." While there has been no consistency in interpreting the meaning
of "war potential" and "minimum necessary for self-defense" during the Cold War era, the
most apparent fact is that Japan's war potential has been increasing, even though gradually,
as they have varied the interpretation. Tetsuo Maeda makes cynical remarks about the
inconsistency of the interpretation ofwar potential:
Since this compromise [of the Constitution] did not specify just what the minimum
required for self-defense was, an inevitable conflict arose as years passed, and in the
1980s the inherent contradictions in Japan's defense posture became obvious to many.
Was the world's third largest military budget really the minimum required for self-
defense? This led to a loss of credibility for Japan in the international community, as
other countries were treated to the spectacle of a nation whose constitution pledged the
country not to maintain war potential continuing to renounce war while at the same time
increasing its defense budget year after year and maintaining Self-Defense Forces with
308
considerable war potential.
b. The Yoshda Doctrine and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
The U.S. occupation which aimed to demilitarize Japan could not last long
because ofthe burden of occupation and the changing international environment. Beginning
as early as 1947, certain American premises about the postwar world now seemed unjustified
because the expenses ofoccupation and relief, which ran up to one-half billion dollars a year, \J
constituted a heavy burden for their taxpayer. 309 Moreover, the prospects for a China that
would be friendly and democratic were broken as it became a communist country in 1949, and
the Soviet's expansionism threatened Europe as well as Asia. "By 1949, American authorities
realized, on the one hand, that the occupation was reaching a point of diminishing returns, v'
and, on the other hand, that continuing economic and political ties between the two countries
were a mutual necessity."310 Decisively, the Korean War in 1950 became the motivation for v
the United States "reconsidering" Japan. With the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles encouraged Japan to assume more responsibility for ^
their security by building up a force of three hundred fifty thousand men. 311 Taking advantage
ofthe Cold War development, however, Yoshida rejected this proposal and suggested lending \/
bases in Japan in exchange for an U.S. guarantee of Japan's defense. 312 After a compromise,
a security bargain was produced that "Japan would undertake gradual rearmament as its v
economic progress permitted and the United States agreed to defend Japan in the
meantime."313 As a result of the bargain, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded in
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1951 and came into effect on April 28, 1952 with official independence for Japan.
For Japan, facing those changing international security environments, there were two
broad alternatives for their defense. Scalapino indicates that: "One was Japanese pacifism,
which involved seeking universal agreements guaranteeing the sanctity of Japanese territory
and backing these with pledges of protection by the United Nations, and possibly by the
United States, separately. The alternative was to acknowledge the Japanese need for, and
right to, military defense, and to underwrite Japanese rearmament with American power."314
The Yoshida government, which decided to conclude the treaty, chose the second alternative,
that of a political, military, and economic alliance with the United States. 315 Truly, Japanese
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru shaped the basic structure of Japan's post-Occupation
security policy by establishing a doctrine that advocated a non-military role for Japan and
formed the core of its contemporary diplomatic identity. He aimed at three purposes:
First, political-economic cooperation with the United States would undergird Japan's
economic growth. Second, a small national defense expenditure would leave industry
free to commit itselfto productive industrial development. Third, Japan's own security
would be guaranteed by the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" in exchange for allowing the
Americans to situate bases in Japan. 316
c. The Japan - U.S. Security Treaty: Its consequences
The Japan-US. security treaty played a vital role in ensuring the security of
Japan during the Cold War era. However, there was a fundamental difference in the
perception ofthe security treaty between the two states. "Japan has taken a local or regional
and narrow view of Japan's military security, while the United States has always seen the
defense ofJapan in a global context."317 As Japan's economy grew, the United States began
to persuade it to reinforce the military level to counter the threat of the Soviet Union more
effectively. The Kennedy Administration wanted Japan to take over more of the security role
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of the United States in Northeast Asia in the early 1960s. The Nixon Doctrine in 1969
influenced the acceleration of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan of Japan in the 1970s318 and
called for Japan to make the Malacca Strait safe for the transport of oil. After the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, the United States made clear her unhappiness with Japan's
unwillingness to raise the level of defense spending. Then Defense Secretary Brown
encouraged the Japanese government to increase its spending, citing the Soviet invasion and
the recent build-up of Soviet forces on the Kurile islands. 319 Wisely enough, however, Japan
seems to have been successful in keeping the pace of Yoshida in responding to those U.S.
pressures. Even though there were inconsistencies of the interpretation of their Constitution,
the role and level of Japan's military seemed to be limited within the boundary of the
Constitution.
On the other hand, Japan had to pay the costs in the process of implementing the
security treaty with the United States. At the revision ofthe treaty of 195 1, Japan faced public
opinion which insisted on the end of subordination to the United States. Also, there was the
pressure of communist countries that considered the revision of the treaty to be a threat to
them. In fact, cooperation with an ally would force Japan to be faced with a threat of the
ally's enemy. Then, Japan aimed at greater independence from the United States while
revising the treaty which would be absolutely important for their economy as well as
security.
320 For instance, the fact that under the old treaty the United States also had the
power to help put down "domestic disturbances" was a clear infringement on Japanese
sovereignty, and Japan demanded this content be removed. With a seemingly more
independent policy, Japan wanted to not only soften the relations with China by encouraging
unofficial contacts and trade independently, but also, domestically, to appease the censure of
318
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its people about Japan's subordination. 321 Owing to the renewal of the treaty, however, the
Soviet Union withdrew its offer which was to return the southern two islands in return for a
peace treaty in 1956, and thereby causing the islands to be remained an unsolved problem. 322
Anyway, Japan has had to face domestic opposition of public opinion and criticism of U.S.
"enemy" countries every time the security treaty is revised.
Japan's security dependency on the United States sometimes made a fallacy of its
foreign policy with communist countries. For example, when the U.S. troops were reduced
in Asia as a result of the Nixon doctrine, Japan felt the need to reinforce its military. But it
failed to predict the benign aspect of the doctrine, improvement of the Sino-America
relationship, thus raising tension with China. When Japan decided to accelerate the Fourth
Defense Buildup Plan of Japan in the 1970s and issued the first Defense White Paper in
October 1970, 323 China made the most extreme criticism of its plan. The People's Daily
denounced that:
These two counterrevolutionary documents [the defense White Paper and Fourth
Defense Buildup Program] are a new challenge by reactionaries among the Japanese
people to the peoples ofthe nations of Asia and the Pacific. With words like "our goal
is peace" and "we will not become a military power," they hope to drown out violent
intentions with a veil ofextreme peace. They are trying to get the people to lower their
guard against Japanese militarism. 324
In addition, against the move ofJapan's military buildup, Chinese premier Zhou En Lai visited
North Korea in April 1 970 and issued a communique denouncing the revival of Japanese
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The new security environment in the early 1980s around the two super powers, the
United States and the Soviet Union, inevitably drove Japan to a new policy, a comprehensive
security policy. This was another cost for Japan, which decided to contribute economic aid
for international peace; but it was worth it for Japanese security and status in international
society. Japan's comprehensive security policy was motivated by two factors. First, Japan's
concern over security rose after the fall of Vietnam because the military superiority of the
United States over the Soviet Union waned, and because the U.S. military capability around
Japan could be stretched thinner in the event of a crisis elsewhere. 326 Second, Japan faced the
pressure ofthe United States for Japanese military expansion and defense burden-sharing in
the early 1980s. Then, the Japanese concept of"comprehensive security" (sogo anzen hosho)
was developed to satisfy these requirements. Arase explains that:
Comprehensive security called for the co-ordinate application of economic, political
and military measures at three levels: the global level; with selected groupings of
countries; and in national self-help efforts. Key security objectives identified at each
level were: at the global level, arms control, better North-South relations, and free
trade; at the intermediate level, maintenance of good relations with political allies and
key economic partners; and at the national self-help level military defense as well as
economic productivity and export competitiveness. 327
Of course, these were non-military efforts to sustain national security through the
improvement of relations with neighboring states and the contributions to international affairs.
From that point of view, the comprehensive security policy can be considered as another
version of the Yoshida doctrine. Japan could divert attention from the pressure of their
military expansion as well as the expected severe opposition of public opinion which still
prevented Japan from explicitly committing their SelfDefense Forces to anything but local
defense of the Japanese homeland. To broaden its contributions to Western security, Japan
began to portray economic assistance as a security contribution in such cases as the 1987-
325
Tetsuo Maeda, The Hidden Army, p. 146.
326
Yukio Satoh, The Evolution ofJapanese Security Policy, p. 4-5.
327
David Arase, "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy," p. 45.
132
1988 Kuwait oil tanker reflagging crisis. It also extended sizeable loans to South Korea and
increased official development assistance (ODA) to such front-line states as Thailand,
Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Jamaica. 328 There was also an improvement of relations with
neighboring states. Nakasone visited Korea in 1983 as the first Japanese Prime Minister to
go to South Korea, eighteen years after rapprochement, and in 1985 the USSR Foreign
Minister visited Tokyo. The Japanese comprehensive security policy was positively responded
to by its allies, especially the United States. Based on economic power, their financial
contribution to developing countries was helpful in resisting the expansion of communism,
which in return rewarded Japan with a stable international economic environment.
During the Cold War era, the most important benefit of the security treaty for Japan
has been considered to be their economic development. Japan has gotten by "on the cheap"
in defense for 40 years avoiding spending what other nations must spend on defense, by
keeping defense expenditures under one percent of GNP. 329 In addition, Japan contributed to
the end ofthe Cold War not only because the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan contained the
expansion ofcommunist states, especially into the Northeast Asian states, and thus maintained
the regional balance ofpower, but also because Japan's contributions and economic assistance
helped the maintenance ofworld peace and strengthened the front-line states' resistant power
against communism.
d. Capability ofmilitary technology
The National Defense Agency and the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense
Forces were created by the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces
Law on July 1, 1954. Facing U.S. pressure for a more concrete military commitment to the
security alliance, in 1958 the Defense Agency started to formulate defense buildup plans: the
1st Buildup Plan (1958-1960); the 2nd Buildup Plan (1962-1966); the 3rd Buildup Plan
(1967-1971); and the 4th Buildup Plan (1972-1976). As goals of these Plans were not
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accomplished, 330 in 1976 the National Defense Council and the cabinet decided to abandon
the formulation of them and adopted instead the National Defense Program Outline, which
did not specify a date for the buildup ofthe SDF. 331 Also, realizing that annual budgeting was
counterproductive, in 1979 a new system of "mid-term planning estimates" (Chuki Gyomu
Mitsumori or chugyo) was installed.
During the periods of first three Buildup Plans, Japanese investment in research and
development (R&D) for their greater autonomy was salient. With the U.S. technology
transfer ofHAWK (medium-range) and NIKE (long-range) missiles, Japan got an opportunity
to revive its defense industry. "The Mitsui Group organized a team of related firms: Toshiba
(electronics), Nippon Steel Works (materials), Dai Nippon Celluloid (propellent), Tokyo
Instruments (controls), and Mitsui and Company (data acquisition and coordination).
Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) organized a group that included Fuji Precision and
NEC."332 The Mitsui Group independently acquired a Swiss missile in order to study a system
more advanced than any of their own, and KHI became Japan's sole source for four
successive generations of antitank surface-to-surface guided missiles. "In 1957, when
Vietnam asked for a thousand technicians to help rebuild an old French colonial shipyard, the
industry claimed that export demand for Japanese merchant vessels was so great that all
technicians were needed at home."333 This had important meaning for the Japanese defense
industry because "the commercially driven, technologically sophisticated, and highly
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diversified industry was pioneering Japan's new technomilitary paradigm."334 Needless to say,
this military-related technology contributed to the development of civilian technology,
especially electronics during these periods. Then, this "spinning out" effect, which was further
followed during the next decade, brought about "spinning on" more advanced technologies
from the commercial sectors later.
In the fourth Buildup Plan, Japan tried to increase its autonomous defense capabilities
because ofthe influences ofNixon's Guam Doctrine and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.
In particular, Nakasone Yasuhiro, then director-general of the Defense Agency who was
outspoken on defense issues, insisted on a new U.S. -Japan relationship based on the principle
ofautonomous defense in the front line and the alliance in the rear and pursued his policy to
strengthen the autonomous structure of Japanese defense production. 335
However, his policy was confronted with domestic and foreign opposition, especially
after the rapprochement between the United States and China. Coupled with the oil crisis and
recession, the 1972 defense budget was slashed by 500 million yen, and over this period the
share of equipment purchases and capital investment in the defense budget declined from 29.2
percent to under 20 percent. In this period, moreover, there were active debates on the
kokusan (domestic production) ofPXL (next-generation antisubmarine patrol aircraft), which
was scheduled for development with their autonomous weapons technology. Confronted with
not only strong U.S. pressure to increase Japanese weapons imports to solve the balance of
the payment problem between them, but also the "Lockheed trials," Japan decided to procure
forty-five P-3C antisubmarine patrol airplanes in 1977, instead of producing them on its own.
Even though Japan spent nine years on not-so-productive debating, it should be noted
that the aircraft and electronic industries confidently predicted that "Japan was capable of
manufacturing a highly advanced ASW patrol airplane within seven to eight years of
334




launching the project."336 Also, Nakasone showed a facet of Japanese policy on the principle
of autonomous defense if there were changes in the security environment around Japan.
After 1976, when the National Defense Program Outline was created as Japan's first
explicit strategic doctrine in the post war era, Japan did not show any major new weapons
systems and its defense production decreased. However, Japanese defense R&D consistently
expanded and was further integrated with commercial R&D to the benefit of each. For
instance, "research on heat resistance and structural engineering laid the foundation for
Japan's heavy industrial boilers, nuclear power plants, and other high temperature applications
and made similar claims for each major aircraft and electronics project."337
In 1981 Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, formally suggested to Omura, the
Japan Defense Agency Director General, that Japan might transfer defense technology to the
United States. Much had changed in the U.S. perceptions of Japanese technological
capabilities. Actually, Japan has been succeeding in the development of its indigenous defense
technology based on its economic power. The Fighter Support Experimental (FS-X) program,
a program for Japan's next generation of fighter support aircraft to replace the existing
Mitsubishi F-l, is an example. When Japan tried to develop its indigenous fighter in 1985, the
United States opposed it primarily for strategic and military-political reasons. 338 With its
limited defense funds, the program would be less effective; the new fighter would not be fully
interoperable with U.S. fighters if Japan develops it with only its indigenous technology.
Strategically, a Japanese autonomous defense capability would bolster a more independent
security policy, less amendable to U.S. influence. Moreover, Japan's neighboring states
became uneasy over a more capable and independent Japanese defense industry. After severe
confrontation for two years, in 1987 Japan agreed to the cooperative development of the FS-
X based on a GD F-16C fighter. Despite years of haggling and stacks of signed agreements,
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the program has evolved away from the original Pentagon concept of a minimally modified
F- 16 to a virtually all-new Japanese-developed fighter broadly based on the F-16. 339 It is
critical in that the "FS-X is providing Japanese industry with an entree into the highly
exclusive world club of developers of advanced fighter aircraft weapon systems, one of the
most potent conventional weapons in existence." 340 Mark Lorell describes Japan's capability
to produce their new fighter:
In outward appearance, the FS-X still closely resembles the F-16, ... But appearances
can be deceptive. Over 95 percent of F-16 engineering drawings are being changed ...
The FS-X wing is an all-new Japanese design that is 25 percent larger in area than the
F-16 wing. Its structure and materials are based on a Japanese-developed occured CFC
process. The horizontal stabilizer is also a newly designed composite structure, about
20 percent larger than the F-16 tail plane. Japanese-developed stealth technology is
being applied to the airframe. The center fuselage is 10 inches larger and has new
structures and materials. The nose and canopy are changed, as is the landing gear.
There is a Japanese-developed "glass" cockpit with three liquid-crystal flatpanel
displays and numerous other new items. In addition to the four primary indigenous
Japanese avionics systems, at least 40 or more important subsystems and major
components are Japanese developed. Virtually all of the FS-X avionics will be
Japanese-developed component systems or modified versions of F- 1 6 systems. The FS-
X will be armed with many indigenous munitions, including air-to-air and antiship
missiles.
In summary, the security policy ofJapan during the Cold War era can be characterized
by three facts. First, the Japan-US. security alliance was the heart of Japan's security.
Represented by the Yoshida doctrine, Japan has stayed back of the United States benefiting
from the economic development without serious security costs. Second, Japan increased its
potential military capability based on its high technology and economic power. Third, Japan
failed to improve its security relations with neighboring states. As long as it maintains the
alliance with the United States, Japan cannot link its economic relations with China to security
matters. Without a clear resolution for past history, Japan could not get any security relations
with South Korea.






4. Japan's Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era
The demolition ofthe former Soviet Union forced Japan as well as the United States
to set a new security framework in the post-Cold War era, suggesting the following three
questions. First, what are the potential threats to their national security? Second, what should
the role of Japan be in regional and global security affairs? Third, what kind of new
relationship with the United States should be established, especially in terms of the latter'
s
military commitment in Japan? As an answer to all these questions, the Japan-US. joint
declaration on a security alliance toward the 21st century has important meanings. First, their
move toward reinforcing security relations is intended to prevent any regional conflicts that
would threaten their national interests in the Asia-Pacific region, necessarily including the
threat of China. Second, with the constraints of the U.S. budget, Japan can assume a much
more active military role reinforcing their military cooperation. Third, even though the post-
Cold War environment weakens the justification of stationing U.S. forces in Japan in terms
of the disappearance of the major threat, security interests from their alliance still exist.
a. Japan 's threat assessment
"In the Asia-Pacific region, the picture of antagonism is complicated and
countries' security perceptions are diverse, and there exist unsettled issues, such as those
concerning the Korean Peninsula, the Spratly Islands and Japan's Northern Territories."342
The fact that this region is still confronted with the remnants of the Cold War, and that
regional states have built and modernized their military capabilities, contribute to making the
regional security environment worse. Most of all, despite the declining Russian military power
in the Far East, the highest priority for Japanese defense planners seems to have been Russia
before the Japan-U.S. joint declaration on the security alliance in 1996. Japan has kept an eye
on the fact that Russia has huge stockpiles of rationalized and modernized war capabilities,
and that it, suffering from a tight fiscal condition, made clear its policy to actively export
weapons for foreign currency, and has already sold SU-27 fighters to China and Kilo-class
342
Defense Agency, Defense ofJapan 1994, p. 5.
138
submarines to Iran. 343 Coupled with the disputes over the return of four northern islands,
which has impeded a formal peace treaty between the two states, Japan has continued to
carefully monitor the movement of Russian policy.
Since the Japan-US. joint declaration on the security alliance, however, Japan's
security policy seems to focus on China rather than Russia as a main potential threat. Despite
the ongoing economic reform and the removal ofmore than one million troops since 1985,
its nuclear bomb tests, its hard line policy toward Taiwan, and the Spratly Island issue have
made these regional states feel uneasy. China also has enhanced its relations with Russia and
gradually modernized its military, concluding a five-year military cooperation agreement in
1993. 344 In particular, related to the Spratly Island issue, it has been trying to enhance naval
and air forces with a special emphasis, 345 which might threaten Japan's sea lines of
communication.
North Korea's nuclear development program and the test firing of a new type of
missile, the Nodong 1, with an estimated range of 1,000 kilometers, also can be considered
as another threat to Japan's security. "Nuclear development in North Korea raised the long-
taboo question ofJapan developing nuclear weapons,"346 and the success of the development
of the Nodong 1 missile prompted sudden and active consideration of a new anti-missile
system, which is a combined missile defense and satellite detection system.
In summary, Japan's threat perception in the post-Cold War era is based on the fact
that there still exists the danger that various antagonistic relations peculiar to regions may
come to the surface and escalate into armed conflict, while the possibility of a world-scale war
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has become remote. 347 The ongoing regional conflicts, such as the Gulf War, the Bosnian
War, and conflicts in the Middle East, have illustrated that there is no relation between the
end of the Cold War and regional peace. On the contrary, those kinds of conflicts might
increase because of the diminished influence of the superpowers. Especially, when it comes
to the unstable security environment ofNortheast Asia, Japan strongly feels the need not only
to maintain a security alliance with the United States even in the post-Cold War era, but also
to prepare their "proper" self defense capability for future regional instability. "While the
possibility of a limited conflict breaking out in Japan's neighborhood cannot be dismissed, the
military balance between the superpowers and the existence of the Japan-US. security
arrangements are expected to continue to play a major role in maintaining international
stability and in preventing full-scale aggression against Japan"348 On the other hand, however,
any possibility ofU.S. military reduction in this region, like the "East Asia Strategic Initiative"
in 1990 which suggested a three-phase gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces, would be a major
factor for Japan to try to reinforce their self defense capability.
b. Active security posture
Japan's active security posture in the post-Cold War has been due to the
lessons learned from the GulfWar. First, the post-Cold War era would not be free of armed
conflicts. Second, a nation cannot attain international stature by economic means alone. 349
With the existing public abhorrence to a military role and the post-war "low politics," the
Japanese response on August 31, 1990 to the demands350 of the United States that requested
347
Defense Agency, Defense ofJapan 1994, p. 7.
348
See "National Defense Program Outline" in Defense ofJapan J994.
349
Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, The U.S. -Japan Security Relationship after the
Cold War (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), p. 15.
350The demands included: directly contribute to the defense of the region through the
dispatch of personnel and equipment, including minesweepers and transport planes; provide
monetary support for the multinational forces; provide aid to neighboring countries in the region
affected by the crisis; reveal plans for buying major weapons systems from the U.S.; and increase
financial support for stationing U.S. troops in Japan. See Courtney Purrington and A. K., "Tokyo's
Policy Responses During the Gulf Crisis," Asian Survey, vol. 31, no. 4, April 1991, p. 308-309.
140
more active participation of Japan to the Gulf Crisis was too passive to satisfy the United
States as well as Western allies. Japan's $1 billion aid package was criticized in the U.S. for
being designed to maximize corporate profits and minimize the risk of Japanese lives. There
was a severe confrontation between the two. 351 On September 12, the House of
Representatives passed an amendment to the defense authorization bill calling for the annual
withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Japan beginning in five years if the Japan did not agree to
pay the full cost of deploying U.S. troops there. Japan announced that it would tell U.S.
forces to "please go home " Facing a storm of international criticism and the danger of
permanent damage to relations with the United States, however, Japan decided to contribute
$12 billion more — before the war $3 billion and during the war $9 billion — to pay the costs
of Operation "Desert Storm" and dispatch four small wooden minesweepers after the end of
the Gulf Crisis.352 However, their passive posture in the crisis, coupled with the situation of
"no risk of Japanese lives," contributed little to Japanese credit.
Japan's recognition of the post-Cold War environment, which requires their active
participation and role in international security affairs, resulted in the dispatch of SelfDefense
Forces personnel abroad for U.N. peacekeeping operations. After severe controversy over
the Constitutional problem, the "Bill Concerning Cooperation for United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations" and the "Bill to Amend Part of the Law
Concerning the Dispatch ofJapan Disaster ReliefTeam" were enacted at the 123 rd Ordinary
Session of the Diet in June 1992. The PKO bill states that no more than 2,000 Japanese
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troops can be sent overseas in a PKO force, and even those troops can perform only
noncombat functions that are strictly defined: supervise the disarming or withdrawal of
troops; monitor compliance with cease-fire arrangements; patrol buffer zones; collect,
maintain, dispose of, or check on the movement of weapons; assist in cease-fire-line
demarcation; and help in prisoner exchanges. While this implies Japan's "contribution" to
world peace, however, it also means that for the first time since 1945 Japan can send troops
abroad, thus provoking widely differing views abroad. The United States and many Western
countries welcomed it as a sign of Japanese efforts to contribute to the new international
order, while some neighboring Asian countries such as China, South Korea and North Korea
expressed concern that this was the beginning of an inevitable resurgence of Japanese military
might. 353
Most of all, the new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), which was
completed on November 28, 1995, showed the changed defense posture toward the security
ofJapan. Even though the basic principle of "to possess an adequate defense capability" was
the same as the existing one made in 1976, the most distinct change in the new NDPO was
the change in the purpose ofthat principle: from "to prevent aggression" to "to secure peace
and security around Japan."354 Also, while it denied the right of collective defense because the
latter would require more than the limit of the minimum defense capability, the new NDPO
recognized Japan's military contribution to international peace through the participation in
the PKO, anti-terrorism activity, and relief activity for a large scale disaster, which reflected
and guided the more active security posture of Japan in post Cold-War.
On the other hand, U.S. policy toward East Asia in the post-Cold War era is premised
on a more active security role by Japan. The changes in U.S. security strategy in the report
of April 1990, the "U.S. East Asia Strategy Initiative," which included a shift from a global
containment strategy primarily directed to the Cold War era Soviet threat to a focus on
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selective engagement in critical regions of the world, increased doubts over the U.S. military
commitment in this region. 355 Even though a further reduction of U.S. forces in Northeast
Asia was suspended by the doubt over a nuclear development program by North Korea, Japan
could not help seeking a new security relationship with the United States. As a result of the
series of examinations of the security environment through the "United States Security
Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region" in 1994 and Japan's new "National Defense
Program Outline" in 1995, the "Japan-US. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st
Century" was concluded in April 1996 in Tokyo to suggest a future security relationship
between the two states.
c. The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance
On April 17, 1996, the U.S. President Bill Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto announced the "Japan-US. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the
21st Century."356 In this declaration, the two summiteers agreed that a continued U.S. military
presence based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the
United States is essential not only for the defense of Japan but also for preserving peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and that the most effective framework: for the defense of
Japan is close defense cooperation, which is based on a combination of appropriate defense
capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.
Clinton promised the maintenance of the current U.S. force structure of about 100,000
forward deployed military personnel in Asia, including approximately the current level in
Japan. Hashimoto confirmed that Japan would continue appropriate contributions for the
maintenance ofU.S. forces in Japan. Noting the importance of interoperability in all facets of
cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and U.S. forces, they also decided to
enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, including bilateral
cooperative research and development of equipment, such as the support fighter.
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As "the most significant summit talk since the end of the Cold War" as U.S. Defense
Secretary William Perry said, the Japan-U.S. joint declaration has three important meanings.
First, the boundary of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between them was
changed from Far East Asia including the area around Japan, north of the Philippines, and
South Korea and Taiwan357 to the Asia-Pacific region adding Southeast Asia, New Zealand
and the Pacific Islands. 358 It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the new boundary
includes the Spratly Islands, which has faced territorial disputes among China and some of the
Southeast Asian states. Second, Japan can expand their security role in the Asia-Pacific region
as bilateral defense cooperation between them increases. Clinton and Hashimoto confirmed
the launch of a joint study to revise the 1978 bilateral defense cooperation guidelines in order
to develop plans for cooperating with each other militarily in case of security emergencies in
this region. "The study, with an eye to crafting plans for joint military operations during
crises, is expected to look into what logistical support Japan could provide in such areas as
naval blockades, escorting warships, mine-sweeping operations in international waters,
intelligence-gathering activities, and supplying goods and services."359 Also, Hashimoto has
expressed the government's willingness to consider U.S. proposals to legislate some clarity
into how it might assist the U.S. in regional conflicts, a longtime political taboo for previous
administrations. 360 Therefore, regardless of whatever the outcomes of study and legislation
might be, coupled with the increased possibility of Japan to get involved in regional conflicts
with the United States, they will ultimately contribute to expanding Japan's security role in
the future. Finally, Japan can get a basis to legitimize its military buildup as its security role
is increased. In an address to the Diet on April 18, 1996, Clinton praised Japan's PKO
activities in Cambodia, Rwanda, and the Golan Heights, which had caused severe arguments
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about the translation of the constitution in Japan, as a kind of "leadership," and requested
more commitments. 361 To implement the Joint Declaration and the Acquisition and Cross-
Serving Agreement (ASCA), the majority of opinion is converging on the inevitability of a
constitutional revision, rather than further interpretation of it. 362 Even if Japan decides to
make a revision of its constitution, it does not seem to be faced with any serious opposition
from international society, except some neighboring states.
The new security relations between Japan and the United States will necessarily be a
basis for expanding the security role of Japan. According to Takahiko Ueda, Ako Washio and
Mari Koseki, staff writers of The Japan Times, Japan's responsibility for security
arrangements has now increased due to the bilateral commitment in enhanced defense
coordination which is intended to prepare for regional issues such as the Korean Peninsula,
Taiwan and the Spratly islands. 363 Of course, there is no explicit explanation about Japan's
expanding future military role in the Japan-US. Joint Declaration. With the given flexibility
ofthe text, however, their mutual cooperation in the fields of logistical support, exchange of
military technology and intelligence, and research and development of equipment seems to
pave the way by which Japan can increase its military power to a degree. Especially in terms
of logistical support, the two countries concluded the Acquisition and Cross-Serving
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Agreement (ACSA) to improve Japan's logistical support for U.S. forces, including fuel and
weapons parts, during peacetime joint exercises, United Nations-led peacekeeping operations
and international relief activities. 364 Then, to support the ACSA, Japan would increase its
military capabilities even though not for combat operation but for logistical support, and there
would be an increasing possibility for Japan to get involved in international conflicts
regardless of Japan's willingness.
Japan's neighboring states, especially China and South Korea, have expressed their
concern about the Joint Security Declaration. Even though there was no mention of China as
a destabilizing factor in the text of the joint declaration, China has felt the US-led efforts to
contain it. China's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Shen Guofang, expressed public concern on
April 18, 1996 for the first time since the end of the Cold War that "The Japan-U.S. treaty
on the guarantee of security is a bilateral arrangement left over from history," given the
reduction ofthe Russian naval presence in the Pacific. 365 Also, in a specific warning to Tokyo,
he cautioned the Japanese not to embark on a defense buildup, reflecting China's fears of
Japanese militarism rooted in World War II. Also, in South Korea, the mass media raised
voices concerned about Japan's move toward rearmament, reporting that Japan will possibly
use the declaration as an opportunity to build its military up to the level of countering China
independently. 366 Two days before the declaration, Clinton and Perry visited South Korea, and
Perry explained the good will ofthat declaration to Lee Yang-ho, the South Korean Defense
Minister, to relieve the opposite atmosphere in South Korea.
5. Summary: Prospects for the Future Security Policy
Japan's security policy will be directed toward increasing its political role in
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international affairs. Olsen indicates in terms of economic power, "Japanese national pride is
resurgent in a generally positive way that is propelling the Japanese to seek political influence
matching their economic power," which is more likely to increase in the 1990s and beyond. 367
Scalapino says, "Virtually every commentator and politician asserts that Japan must assume
a greater responsibility for world order. Yet there is a continuing uncertainty as to how that
role is to be played, and what price should be paid."368 Also, the United States, currently
under the Clinton Administration, supports Japan's permanent membership in the UN Security
Council. In addition to these requests and predictions for a greater role for Japan, Japan
learned a lesson from the Gulf War: with only an economic contribution, they cannot get
along with international society. Commensurately with economic stature, Japan will
participate in international affairs and take responsibility more actively than before.
Japan's expanding political role will necessarily require its military buildup for its
"self-defense" and the "contribution" to world peace. Most of all, Japan's dependency on
natural resources which started from its modernization period after the Meiji Restoration is
a major factor that would expand its boundary for self defense to protect the sea lines of
communication. Coupled with her growing economic capacity, the safety and stability of the
regions that export raw materials to Japan, or which import manufactured products from
Japan will become more and more important for her national interests. 369 Also, the safety of
the Sea Lines of Communication, such as the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca and the
South China Sea, is the security of her economic life. As Japan's economy expands, the
security boundary that they have to defend will expand respectively for its survival and
prosperity. Also, Japan's expanding political role, coupled with its upcoming membership in
the UN Security Council, will require a greater military role for international security
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activities, such as peacekeeping operations. Therefore, even though it is not up to the level
of "nationalists" claims,370 Japan's security role and military build up would be reinforced
while assuming some U.S. security roles and participating in the UN peacekeeping activities.
Considering its high level oftechnology and economic power, Japan will rise as a new military
power with the most modernized military equipment in a certain security environment, such
as U.S. withdrawal or regional conflicts that may directly harm its national interest. 371
Table 4. Military Budget and Forces in 1994372(Bgt: U.S. current billion $, Forces: million)
State GDP Military Budget Mil. Bgt./GDP Regular Forces
Japan 4,602.0 42.1 0.92 0.24
China 515.0 6.7 1.3 2.93
South Korea 377.0 14.0 3.7 0.63
North Korea 20.4 2.3 11.3 1.13
While Japan is one of the largest economies in the world, it has been considered as
only a middle-ranked military power with minimal force projection capability due to its
constitution which bars dispatching its forces to other countries. 373 Despite constitutional
370The parties to a debate on national security can be distinguished by "mainstream,"
"nationalist," and "pacifist" in terms of political philosophies. Nationalists consider the post-Cold
War as a non-polar world, and insist that Japan must be ready to defend itself without relying on the
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from using force against other nations. Their reactions to the GulfWar were radical. They objected to
Japan's effort to gain respect from other states through financial contributions to the war. They
believed that the monetary contribution in place of military participation was foolish and they would
have preferred that Japanese troops go into combat with UN forces. See Francis Fukuyama and
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restrictions, however, Japan's military can no longer be ignored in terms of military
expenditures, as well as its technological level. As table 4 shows, while Japan's regular
military forces are about one twelfth that of China and a third of South Korea, its military
budget has been about three times that ofKorea and seven times China's official budget. The
portion of equipment acquisition, including weapons, aircraft and vessels, is about 20-25 %
of the total military budget, 374 which is more than the total military budget of China. Also,
Japan's equipment is the most modernized, based on its technology. Then, in terms of military
budget and its use, Japan has strong potential to rise as a military power in the near future.
That is the reason why all the neighboring states, including Southeast Asian countries, are
concerned about Japan's rearmament.
Based on its economic power, Japan already has a potent technology-intensive military
capability and is expanding its military options: 64 major surface combatants with four groups
each consisting of eight destroyers configured for blue water service; 1 5 attack submarines;
85 long-range patrol aircraft; 95 anti-submarine helicopters. 375 Japan is acquiring four
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), at least four Aegis-equipped ships of the
Kongo class which are comparable to US Aegis cruisers. By the end of this century, Japan
will have a new FSX attack fighter aircraft and a theater missile defense (TMD) system. In
addition, now Japan is considering acquiring satellite monitoring capabilities. David Arase
makes cynical remarks with regard to Japan's future military capability that "what remains to
1986), p. 344.
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be developed are amphibious capabilities "376
C. SECURITY POLICY OF CHINA
China's security policy, despite the revolutionary characteristics based on Marxist-
Leninist theory, has been defensive rather than offensive. Economic failure under Mao
Zedong was the major reason why China could not develop its incipient position after the
establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into a "transnational" leadership like
the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. The economic reform under Deng Xiaoping has
contributed to more international relations based on national interests rather than transnational
relations for communist revolution. Coupled with the end ofthe Cold War, China's economic
development seems to suggest less of a possibility of its position as a leader of the third world
countries and of its strategy of communist revolution.
The future direction of China's security policy will be closely related to Chinese
nationalism, which has been aimed at anti-hegemonism and recovering its national status
throughout its recent history. China's security policy has traditionally been influenced by its
nationalism. Contrary to most other countries' nationalism, which was motivated by their
national independence from colonial imperialists, Chinese nationalism can be characterized
by two factors: anti-imperialism and recovery of national status. While other states'
nationalism was weakened after their independence and withdrawal of imperialists, Chinese
nationalism has survived and will continue until they become satisfied with their national
status, which would necessarily mean the status as a hegemonic power in this region.
While China is rising as a new regional power in terms of economic development and
military strength, it is in an awkward dilemma: the more economic development opens its
market, the less legitimacy its regime has. Coupled with the end of the Cold War, which
decreased its legitimacy, their modernization based on capitalism will necessarily lead to the
introduction of democratic principles or, if not, less despotism. It may cause domestic
instability and result in the split of China into several independent states, such as inner
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Mongolia, Tibet, Taiwan and others. One solution for this dilemma can be to appeal to its
nationalism, which will help in unifying its national power and legitimizing its regime. In
addition to the issues of Taiwan and the Spratly Islands, the rise of Japan as a new regional
dominant power will inevitably be a basis for Chinese neo-nationalism.
1. Characteristics of Pre-Modern China
a. Sinocentrism and response to Western powers
Based on its own philosophy and belief system throughout its long history,
China had a Sinocentric world view, which considered itself as the center of the world and
considered others to be on the periphery. Historically, the Chinese developed their culture,
philosophy and political system, and disseminated them to most East Asian countries.
Accepting the Chinese leading culture, the neighboring states maintained Sinocentric relations
sometimes voluntarily and sometimes for their survival. A key principle of Sinocentrism was
related with its hierarchical nature, derived from the beliefs of distinction between civilized
China and "barbarian" neighbors. "The tribute system was said to be a manifestation of this
world view and resulted in China not appreciating the concept of alliances."377 That is to say,
China was at the top of a pyramid-type hierarchical structure and others accepted the status
quo. Therefore, there was no concept like the balance of power.
Facing the requests of "opening the door" from Western powers, their failure at
modernization, like the Japanese Meiji Restoration, can be examined in terms oftwo factors.
The first factor was Sinocentrism. Chinese national pride and sense of superiority toward
Western culture caused them to be resistant to their requests. It was never conceivable for
their Emperor, the top of the top of their hierarchical structure as a "son of heaven," to
negotiate with the representatives of other "barbarian" countries. On the contrary, the Chinese
requested a tribute from the Westerners for opening their foreign relations. Their attitudes,
of course, influenced other states such as Japan and Korea, although Japan realized much
earlier the inevitability of an "open-door" policy. On the other hand, John Wills indicates the
wariness of China to contact foreigners, especially in the late Qing Dynast, that open-door
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policy might increase "the fragility oftheir systems of authority in late imperial times: a 'status
quo' despotism's superficiality of bureaucratic controls and the heavy reliance on cultural
orthodoxy in maintaining a vast and variegated empire "378 As another factor for the failure
of modernization, the Chinese economic system was ultimately different from the Western
states. While the latter demanded commercial trade, the former maintained a self-sufficient
economic system based on agriculture. Their different economic structures were not
interchangeable, and thus failed to make a basis for China to open its door. Even though there
was trade in restricted areas, like Canton in South China since the 18th century, Chinese
exports such as tea and silk were traditional production which required intensive labor and
home handicraft, and this made it difficult for China to accept the Western style economic
system easily.
b. Chinese nationalism
When we define the term nationalism as "the desire of a people to be unified
as an independent, sovereign state for the betterment of their lives,"379 Chinese nationalism
in the early 20th century fits with that definition, because there was a strong nature of "anti-
imperialism" toward a sovereign state: the Boxer Uprising of 1900; the anti-American boycott
of 1905; and Sun Yat-sen's nationalism. 380 However, their nationalism did not end with the
withdrawal of the Western powers. Instead, it was another start of nationalism that drove
them to catch up with the West. Selig Harrison asserts about Asian nationalism that
"independence heightens nationalist consciousness by bringing Asian countries face to face
378
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with global inequities and awakens an ever-growing desire for greater strength and adequacy
in relation to the West."381 Nationalism thus becomes a visceral compulsion and is likely to
assess and reassess itself for at least as long as Asia continues to feel a sense of subordination
in world affairs. 382 China is an example. With the past "shameful period" and national division,
the People's Republic of China pursued its domestic and foreign policy strongly based on
nationalism, striving to legitimize its regime and keep its national identity. As their
revolutionary struggle against Japan declined with the end of the War, Chinese nationalism
survived to catch up with the West including Japan during the Cold War era.
2. Communist Revolutionary Policy under Mao Zedong
Because of the characteristics of despotism that communist countries have, Chinese
security policy during the Cold War era has been influenced by the two leading figures, Mao
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In this context, this chapter reviews Chinese security policy,
dividing it into two durations.
Chinese security policy under Mao was closely related to the Chinese nationalistic
movement during the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Mao's
revolutionary theories were directed toward anti-imperialism, and its motivation was to
recover its national status as a leading country in international society. In an essay in 1949,
"On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," Mao spelled out his ideas of Chinese national
policy in two basic categories. The first was a "people's democratic dictatorship" wherein the
working class which would lead should be formed by building a "domestic united front"
including the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie, as well as
the working class. Second, an international alliance with the Soviet Union, the countries in
the Soviet bloc, and the world proletariat should be established for communist revolution. 383
Basically, Mao's ideas were to pursue communist revolution, as "no longer a child or a lad
381
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in his teens but an adult."384
The Chinese concept of security policy has been strongly related to anti-hegemonism
during Mao's period. The "theory of three worlds" that suggested the Chinese world view
based on anti-hegemonism has become the dominant theoretical basis for its security policy.
About the theory of three worlds, Mao stated in 1947 that:
the United States and the Soviet Union forms the first world, Japan, Europe, Canada
and intermediate zone are the second world, and China is the third world. The third
world has vast population. Except Japan, Asia is the third world, and Africa and Latin
America also are the third world. 38
By this theory, the first world is the direct threat to China because it has imperialistic
characteristics and expansionism. The second world consists of developed countries which
have the experience of colonial rule or invasion by the first world. The third world consists
ofdeveloping countries with the same experience of the second world in the past. To resist
the imperialism of the first world, the third world should align with the second world.
Even though there were several changes ofthe theory, the main concept of all theories
were converging to anti-hegemonism or anti-imperialism. Considering the relations with the
Soviet Union, the two camps theory from 1949 to the middle of 1950s, which divided the
world into the capitalist side and the socialist side, was directed against the imperialism of the
United States. After the relations with the Soviet Union worsened in the early 1960s, China
described the Soviet Union as an imperialist country and developed the "intermediate zone
theory"386 which suggested the need of alignment with all countries between the two camps.
One year after the death ofMao, the People's Daily reported in 1977 on the ongoing validity
384
Jonathan D. Spence, The Search forModern China, p. 514.
385See Baek Jong-Chun, Gukga Bangwiron (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1985), p. 314.
386
There are three kinds of intermediate zones. The first intermediate zone consists of
developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The second intermediate zone consists of
nonhegemonial developed countries such as Western European countries and Canada. The third
intermediate zone consists of Eastern European socialist countries. The theory suggested that the first
intermediate zone countries should improve the relations with the second intermediate countries to
counter the threat of the United States, and should expand the force to the third intermediate
countries to counter the threat of the Soviet Union.
154
of the three world theory as a way to properly adapt Marxism-Leninism to a new situation. 387
Even though the theoretical concept became weakened by economic development in Deng's
era, anti-hegemonism has still been continued as a main frame of Chinese security policy.
China's main goal of reinforcing international relations with socialist countries,
especially with the Soviet Union, in the 1950s was not only to counter the threats of anti-
communist countries. It was also directed to reestablishing its prestige that had dwindled
during the past decades under Yuan Shikai and the warlord leaders, and Kuomindang rule.
"In the 1950s, China's relationship with the Soviet Union laid the foundation for the new
China to survive and grow. An estimated 10,000 Chinese studied in the Soviet Union; and the
modernization of military weapons, the beginning ofChina's nuclear capabilities, and the early
transformation ofthe Chinese economy all took place with Soviet assistance."388 Also, China
promoted solidarity with socialist countries: an economic and cultural agreement with the
Mongolian People's Republic in 1952; a formal aid agreement with North Korea in the same
year; and further close ties with the insurgents in Vietnam, India and Burma.
While the transnational relations under the name of socialism raised the status of China
as a leading socialist country with the Soviet Union, the communist hard line policy based on
the two camps theory inevitably worsened the relations with the capitalist side. In particular,
"The Korean War further complicated China's international status by fixing the United States
in a position of hostility, which in turn ensured that Taiwan would remain outside the control
of the PRC and the PRC outside the United Nations."389 In 1954, there was the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) agreement which was to build an international alliance
for stopping further communist revolts in Southeast Asia. The United States also signed a
mutual-defense treaty with Taiwan in 1954.
Mao's communist revolutionary policy was constrained by domestic factors: economic
failure and political instability. Economic development was required for legitimacy of its
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regime as well as for supporting the international communist revolution as a leading socialist
country. Coupled with the isolation of China from the capitalist side, however, the ideological
stiffness impeded Chinese industry in adopting a new developed technology. Political reforms
to refresh its revolutionary capability destroyed the traditional beliefs and ethics, and increased
the domestic social disorder. Radical rural reform was practiced through rent reduction and
land redistribution until 1953. Three Anti campaigns were directed at the Resist America and
Aid Korea, domestic counter-rvolutionaries, and anti-corruption since 1950. Five Anti
campaigns launched in 1952 were directed against the bourgeois. After the failure of the
agricultural sector during the First Five Year Plan from 1953 to 1957, a cutoff of Soviet aid
and a poor harvest in 1957 triggered the Great Leap Forward (GLF) in 1958, whose purpose
was to develop rural-based industrialization using traditional technology to produce inputs
and mechanization for agricultural production in decentralized communes. 390
Also, there was Cultural revolution which was a brutal measure to eliminate bourgeois
influence, 391 cadre corruption, and other misconceptions. 392 However, these measures failed
because of the lack of economic skills of Mao, the limits of the socialist economic system,
and, as a result of those, inefficiency. Actually, Mao was an efficient nationalist, but not an
economist, thus creating structural economic problems that still exist today.
While the political and economic problems in China can be considered as the main
factors for China's defensive posture during the Cold War era, the Chinese concept of
strategy based on "flexibility" suggests another clue for such a defensive attitude. The
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flexibility of Chinese security doctrine resulted from Mao Zedong's personal thoughts, which
later became Maoism. Based on the idea that theory without practice is useless and
dangerous, Mao emphasized policy experimentation, flexibility and useful knowledge. 393 He
was influenced by successful guerrilla warfare whose tactics required much flexibility
according to the battle environment and emphasized harmony, which was related to the
traditional Chinese concept of yin and yang. Gerald Segal indicates that "The absence of any
unified ideological view of how much Party control was required stems from the needs of
military flexibility."
394
Also, "in his early writing Mao spoke of the need not to counterpose
military and politics, and Zhou Enlai made clear that no 'rigid instructions' should be given
to the military as 'concrete circumstances' change." 395
Providing the guiding principles ofChina's military strategy, the concept of "People's
war" shows the strategic defense based on flexibility. The concept is comprised of three
stages:
The first stage covers the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic
defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation
and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our
strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. 396
It can be summarized as "a defensive military strategy relying on mass mobilization, 'trading
space for time' and 'luring the enemy deep', then drowning him in a sea of people'."397 This
concept reflected Mao's experience with guerrilla warfare during the struggles with the
Kuomindang government and excluded the needs of engagement with the enemy outside the
gates. While it enabled China to take advantage of its vast area and "enough" human
resources, China's defensiveness was due to their respectively weak capability in terms of
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modern technology, transportation, and economic power needed to engage long-term
warfare. Even after the development of the nuclear weapon in 1964, China announced the
continued effectiveness ofthe People's war with some corrections such as the modernization
of the weapon system.
Of course, the People's war did not mean China should not engage outside the gate
in any case. Xu Xiangquan, then Chinese Defense Minister, said in 1978 that "Engaging the
enemy outside the gates has never been a good method of fighting, but the enemy should not
be allowed to run rampant "398 The Korean War and Vietnam War participation showed
examples of this. During these two wars, China never deployed its military fully to avoid
direct confrontation with the United States. But, by engaging with the enemy outside, China
deterred the wars to be carried into Chinese territory. Despite such limited forward policy,
the Chinese People's war was defensive when we consider Mao's stance that:
Others may come and attack us but we shall not fight outside our borders. We do not
fight outside our borders ... but ifyou should come and attack us we will deal with you.
It depends on whether you attack on a small scale or a large scale. If it is on a small
scale we will fight on the border. If it is on a large scale then I am in favor of yielding
some ground. China is no small country. If there is nothing in it for them I don't think
they will come ... If they invade our territory then I think it would be more to our
advantage ... they would be easy to fight because they would fall into the people's
encirclement.
399
Ifwe can consider the People's war as a military doctrine, "a united front doctrine"
can be considered to be a more strategic concept to counter a hegemon power. Its basic
concept came from Sun Zi, who urged the best policy of first attacking the enemy's strategy,
then disrupting his alliances, then attacking his forces and finally the enemy people. 400 Mao
developed this idea into the unified front doctrine during the struggle with Kuomindang and
Japan. At that time, Mao strategically allied with the Kuomindang to disrupt Japan, and then
fought with his ally and won. Then, during the Cold War era, this became the strategic
398






concept of Chinese security policy, especially to contain either the Soviet Union or the United
States. In the 1950s, China's alliance with the Soviet Union was to counter the threat of the
United States. Also, after the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969, the rapprochement with
the United States was another kind of unified front against the threat of the Soviet Union.
After the alliance with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China depended
heavily on the Soviet Union not only for technical assistance to develop its own industry,
communications networks, and power supplies, but also military reorganization to develop
a modernized professional army. With the Soviet Union's lead and developing well-armed
conventional forces, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) became a regular force rather than
a guerrilla unit.
401 The Chinese also believed that the Soviet Union was the only shield against
the threat of possible nuclear attack by the United States. However, when the United States
decided to deploy Matador missiles in Taiwan, Mao was anxious to develop an atomic bomb
for two reasons: first, to reduce what might become a dangerous overreliance on the Soviet
Union; second, to strengthen its military weakness compared to the other two powers. In
1957, China could get "a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its
manufacture" with a secret agreement on "the new technology for national defense." After
this time, China speeded up development of a nuclear-weapons and a missile program, and
in 1964 China succeeded in becoming a new nuclear power. This had two meanings for the
Chinese security policy. First, China could have some ability to "deter" the Soviet Union as
well as the United States. 402 While the People's war policy was somewhat passive, its new
deferential power gave China a more active security policy of "retaliation." Second, as Mao
taught that "political power grows out of the barrel of the gun," China could enhance its
political influence in both Asian and world affairs.
401
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3. Economic Reform and Modernization under Deng Xiaoping
With Deng's ascendancy and his proclamation of the "open door" doctrine in 1978,
the PRC began a rapid expansion of political involvement and economic interdependence with
the global system. 403 Deng's security policy was represented by three goals: economic
development, the striving for hegemonism and safeguarding world peace, and the unification
of the PRC with Hong Kong and possibly Taiwan. 404 Of the three goals, economic
development through "opening their door" was foremost. He mentioned that "Any country
that closed its door to the outside world cannot achieve progress. We underwent this bitter
experience and so did our forefathers... China closed the country to international intercourse
for more than three centuries from the middle of the Ming Dynasty to the Opium War, or for
nearly two centuries from emperors Kangxi and Qianlong. Hence the country became
impoverished, backward, and ignorant."405 Deng's stance against imperialists was much
weaker than Mao's, reflecting a then existing "unified front" with the United States.
However, Chinese nationalism was still alive in that even economic development was aimed
at overcoming their backwardness and thus gaining their prestige in international society.
Actually, Oksenberg insists that since the mid-1980s "a patient and moderate nationalism was
rooted in confidence that China can regain its former greatness through economic growth,
based on the import of foreign technology and ideas."406
From 1978 to 1982, China's pro-US policy was mainly due to Deng's modernization
program which required access of Western high technology and funds. If China decided to
keep the neutral stance between the United States and the Soviet Union, then neither would
promise the huge Western technological and economic support it needed for modernization,
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nor help it to be quickly accepted out of its previous isolation from the world community as
an important member, as it strongly desired in the late 1970s. 407 But if the United States
recognized China's status or its strategic importance, China could exploit its status for more
economic and technological assistance. 408 During the first two years, there was much
improvement between China and the United States. Bilateral trade rapidly increased from
US$1.1 billion in 1978 to US$2.3 billion in 1979 and US$4.8 billion in 1980. The number of
Chinese scholars and students entering the United States jumped from only 500 in 1978 to
4,300 in 1980. The Chinese unified front policy seemed to be successful. However, their front
did not last long because of a series of Sino-U.S. conflicts on the Taiwan issue. The Taiwan
issue was a litmus test so that China could estimate the real U.S. intention toward China.
However, ongoing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan409 made China rethink their unified front policy.
In terms of Deng's policy toward Taiwan, which was "peaceful co-existence" of "one
country, two systems," the U.S. behavior was translated into that they did not consider China
an important partner in containing the Soviet Union. More importantly, China felt that the
United States considered the Chinese as needing the Americans more, instead of vice versa
as Beijing liked to see. 410 Then, Chinese policy toward the United States could not seem to
achieve Deng's overall strategy of status enhancement nor economic benefits and thus shifted
to an independent foreign policy since 1982. 411
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1994, p. 10. By stressing the Soviet threat and China's consequent strategic importance, China could




In 1978, instead of canceling the sale of 60 F-4s, the United States proposed to sell 48 F-
5E and enable continuation of the co-production arrangement. In January 1980, there was an
announcement that new military equipment valued at $280 million would be sold to Taiwan. On June
1 980, Carter authorized U.S. aircraft manufactures to discuss possible sales of a more advanced




411Deng accused that the United States thought that China was seeking its favor and some
Americans thought that if the U.S. Government took a hard line against the Soviet Union, China
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Independent foreign policy assumed no strategic alignment or alliance with either
superpower. But China continued to distance itself from the United States, dropping its call
for the united front and continuing to improve its relations with Moscow. "The essential
purpose of the independent foreign policy was to maintain and enhance China's status or
leverage over the United States for the ultimate object of comprehensive status enhancement
through modernization"412 The independent foreign policy had two implications. First, even
though China changed its policy option, the basic purpose, to strengthen its status through
modernization, has not changed. It was just a tactical revision from the U.S. card to the
Soviet card. Second, while the united front policy targeted a certain non-united state, thus
apparently confrontational, the independent policy pursued a much less confrontational line.
China sought better economic relations with its Asian neighbors, and in 1992 it made a five-
point proposal on Asian Pacific security order, which was a sign of its interest in a regional
security arrangement.
4. The Rise of Chinese Neo-Nationalism
Chinese nationalism until the end of the Cold War was peculiar in that it aimed to
recover their lost national status, differentiated from others that existed mainly to get their
national independence. One ofAnthony D. Smith's definitions fits in Chinese nationalism; "a
movement with political goals for the attainment or maintenance of the status of 'nation', and
all that it implies, entailing one or more organizations and activities designed to achieve those
goals"413 While their nationalism has survived until today, even though there were ups and
downs, the end ofthe Cold War casted two urgent political questions, in addition to the task
of recovery of national status: legitimacy of regime and national identity.
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Most of all, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union
was the greatest shock to China in terms of the political legitimacy and the psychological
identity ofthe Great Empire. Deng's assessment of the future in April 1990 showed the rise
ofnew Chinese nationalism; "Under the present international situation all enemy attention will
be concentrated on China. They will use every pretext to cause trouble, to create difficulties
and pressures for us...The next three-five years will be extremely difficult for our Party and
our country"414 From the viewpoint of China, the defeat of the Soviet Union, a suzerain state
of communism, seemed to be the "bourgeois liberalization" coming to them as a threat to
destabilizing the country. Coupled with the damage to ideological and political legitimacy, the
Chinese crisis consciousness became a basis for new nationalism.
On the other hand, China's inferiority of its economy and military to the U.S. and
Japan can be seen as another factor for nationalism. The new concept ofwar, with the most
modernized weapons systems in the GulfWar based on advanced technology and economy
of the two countries, made China realize her relatively backward status, which hurt their
national pride. Overholt indicates the delicate sense of China against Japan that;
Ever since the Meiji Restoration, China's adjustment to the West's intrusion has been
consistently inferior to that ofJapan. China was militarily humiliated by the British and
others in the nineteenth century; Japan was not. China was humiliated diplomatically
by Japan's Twenty One Demands in 1915 and militarily by the establishment of
Manchukuo in 1931 and the full-scale Japanese invasion in 1937. Economically,
following World War II Japan outstripped everybody, including especially China - a
case of the loser climbing over the winner. Now there is a sense that China can hold
more than its own in competition with Japan, if Chinese leaders maintain the
momentum of reform. 415
China is now standing on the crossroad between economic development and
legitimacy of its regime. Yang Ping, editor ofa magazine called Strategy & Management, says
that "Before, it used to be that Marxism-Leninism secured national interests. Not any more.
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Now there must be something to keep people inspired."416 That would be new nationalism,
which has risen not from the bottom, but from the top. As the Great Leap Forward did, that
aims at unifying people to legitimize their weakened political line and to recover their status
of Great Nation. Nayan Chanda and Kari Huus mention about Chinese new nationalism that
"Its main goal may be to hold the country together during its rapid, turbulent
transformation."417 China's current resolute policy toward Taiwan, Tibet, and the Spratly
Islands can be seen as a measure to strengthen their national identity and recover their
political initiative in East Asia. Also, the nuclear bomb test in 1995, despite the protests of
world opinion, can be translated in the same context.
5. Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era
The most outstanding change of security environment to China in the post-Cold War
era has been the disappearance of, at least nowadays, any threat from the north, coupled with
Russia's cooperative approach toward it. Also, there was an improvement in relations with
the south. Japan has given a high priority to improving their ties with China. There was
rapprochement between China and South Korea in 1992, as a result of Chinese policy
focusing on "peace and development" since the early 1980s, as well as the South Korean
Government "northern diplomacy" during the late 1980s. It would be hasty ifwe estimate
the regional security environment with only these "diplomatic" stories. There are two Chinese
views of the U.S. forces in Northeast Asia: pro and con. As long as Japan is tethered to the
US security umbrella, Japanese assertiveness and militarism will be kept in check; the US only
serves to inhibit China's own desire to expand its influence as the dominant regional power. 418
In any case, China still gets a rival of either the United States or Japan, which impedes its
security interests. Moreover, current moves such as Japan's expanding security role, Taiwan's
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possible move toward independence and reinforcing air power, and the issue of Chinese
human rights and piracy have made China seek another exit.
Even though it is not at the level of a united front, a new relationship is forming
between Beijing and Moscow. They cemented close ties through not only exchanges ofboth
summits and ministerial-level officials and explosively increased economic trade, but also
defense realm. David Shambaugh describes their tie as follows:
More than 30 bilateral accords have been signed since 1991. Total two-way trade,
negligible just a few years ago, totaled $7.6 billion in 1993. In an ironic twist, China
has become a creditor to Russia, extending several large loans and commodity credits.
Russia's debt to China stood at $1.07bn in 1993. A significant indicator of growing
contacts is in the defense realm. Confidence-building measures are being put in place.
Troops are being reduced on both sides of the frontier and negotiations are proceeding
to demarcate the entire border (the eastern sector has been mostly agreed). A 'hotline'
has been established between Russia's Far Eastern Military District and the
Commander ofthe Shenyang Military Region. ... A non-aggression treaty is apparently
negotiated.
419
Chinese military procurement from Russia can never be ignored. During Boris Yeltsin's 1992
visit to Beijing, deals were finalized for the purchase of 72 Su-27 fighters, four long-range
Ilyushin transports, 18 S-300 guided missile anti-aircraft systems with 100 anti-aircraft
missiles, 70 Type-72 battle tanks, and three conventional Kilo-class submarines. 420 Moreover,
Beijing and Moscow concluded a five-year military cooperation agreement for the transfer
of military technologies in 1993, and Russian experts have returned to China to upgrade
production lines in PLA factories and to assist with both nuclear and ballistic missile
technology. 421 By this agreement, various co-production arrangements have already begun,
such as the MIG-3 1. Even though Chinese procurement occupies a large portion of their deal
to rninimize their costs for military modernization, as its economy grows, China will gradually
focus on the development and production of its weapons.
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The close Sino-Russian ties in the post-Cold War era seem to be rooted in a change
of Chinese security perceptions in the post-Cold War era. First, with the demise of the
Soviets' threat, China's security concerns shifted from the north to the south. Even though
Japan's military development is not an immediate threat for China, its potential power in
terms of military technology, expenditure, and "basic force" (70% of its military personnel are
officers and sergeants) can allow a rapid expansion in war time. 422 Second, China realized the
needs of military modernization, especially after the Gulf War, which would require three
basic tasks: first, conventional combat capability to deal with local wars; second, deterrence
power against major aggression, using strategic nuclear force; third, narrowing the gap in
weapons R&D between China and developed countries. 423 These security perceptions made
China turn its eyes on Russia, which needed capital instead of superfluous weapons.
This move toward Russia does not seem to develop up to the level of a new unified
front, because their relations are based on their own national interests, not on ideological
motivation. Compared to the situation of a unified front with the Soviet Union in the 1950s,
the situation ofRussia's military technology transfer to China is similar in that Russia is the
only country which can help Chinese military modernization. But current economic relations
are quite different from the situation of 1950s. China's economic interdependency on
capitalist countries has increased and has become critical for further Chinese economic
reform. China's new unified front with Russia will raise tension with Western capitalists, and
even neighboring states, and inflict harm on its economic interests, thus impeding its overall
modernization. Then, while pursuing economic relations with the capitalist countries, China
will continue the modernization of its military under the cooperation with Russia.
6. Prospects for Future Chinese Security Policy
The future of Chinese nationalism will be an important factor in determining the
stability of the security environment in Northeast Asia. If they proceed toward regional
422Weixing Hu, "China's Security Strategy in a Changing World," Pacific Focus, vol. 8, no.




hegemony for their past glory, it will be a strong threat to the regional states, as well as the
United States. Coupled with the near future security environment — the reduction of U.S.
forces and the rising Chinese economy — if Japan increases its military for her self-defense,
then China, which has been shocked by high-tech military equipment in the Gulf War, will
necessarily accelerate much more its military buildup to contain the possible threat of Japan's
military. In fact, "the long-term concern of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which
is responsible for the defense policy of China, is based on fears that Japan may, once more,
become a great military power, while the United States will gradually withdraw from the
Pacific following the evacuation of their large and efficient naval and air bases in the
Philippines."424 If Japan tries to be a military power in this region, it will conflict with the
Chinese neo-nationalism, which will be reluctant to allow the expanding political and military
roles of Japan. This might be inevitable in the near future, thus leading to a rivalry between
the countries for regional dominance. Mark Borthwick indicates that China's current behavior
with respect to the Korean peninsula, Indochina, and India seems "not only to protect China's
security interests but also to legitimize a major political role in regions around its periphery.
Similarly, China's expressed concerns about Japan's growing military and political role in the
region appear to reflect not just direct security concerns, but the fear that Japan will come to
occupy a dominant place in the region at the expense of China's status and role."425
The influence ofthe Japan-US. joint declaration on Chinese security policy does not
seem to be welcomed. Even before the declaration, Beijing no longer viewed their bilateral
alliances and security cooperation agreements in Asia as necessary without a Soviet threat.
On the contrary, the reinforced alliance without the Soviet threat means that it is aimed at
China as a threat. Much has yet to be seen. However, a series of Japan's moves toward a
greater security role will be a threat to China without any understandable and cooperative
diplomatic measures. According to the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Japanese government decided
424
Clare Hollingworth, "PLA Fears Japan," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, December
1994/January 1995, p. 29.
425Mark Borthwick, Pacific Century, p. 456.
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to expand the boundary to which the SDF can support U.S. troops logistically up to the
Middle East. 426 Ozawa Ichiro, the chief of the unified opposition party, mentioned in an
interview with the Asahi Shimbun that the Japanese SDF can participate in a multinational
force if there is an international consensus. 427 These Japanese moves toward a more active
security role based on the joint declaration will become a cause to strengthen Chinese neo-
nationalism.
The Chinese response to the joint declaration of Japan and the United States does not
mean any immediate change of their security policy. Rather, China will stick to the
independent security policy because of its urgent needs for economic reform and military
modernization. While Chinese economic success will apparently be a benign phenomenon for
regional stability, it also suggests another concern about the increasing Chinese military
capability based on economic power. Like Samuel Huntington's view that "rapid economic
growth is associated with an expansionist foreign policy,"428 Chinese economic success may
lead them to a bid as a regional hegemon backed by its neo-nationalism. There are few doubts
that China will be a dominant regional power in the near future. When a power vacuum
occurs in Northeast Asia, China will be a strong force to fill the vacuum and to recover its
title as a "glorious nation."
D. SECURITY POLICY OF KOREA
1. Lessons Learned from History
"In the age of imperialist expansion Korea became inevitably a vortex of great-power
rivalry: a bone of contention between China and Japan; then a focus of Russian interest in an
ice-free port; and, for Japan, 'a dagger pointed at the heart' and, later, a bridge to the
*26ChoongangIlbo, May 19, 1996.
A21ChoongangIlbo, June 8, 1996.
428Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival, vol. 33, no. 1,
January-February 1991, p. 12. Quoted from Denny Roy, p. 52.
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continent."429 Because of its geopolitical importance, China, Japan and Russia struggled to
get a political initiative through formal relations with Korea for their strategic advantage.
However, Korea was reluctant to accept Western culture for reasons similar to that of China.
Being aware ofthe fate that had befallen China as a consequence of continuing clashes with
Western nations, such as the Opium War of 1839-1842 and the Arrow War of 1856-1858,
the Choson government rejected Western demands for trade in the belief that this would
prevent such disasters from overtaking Korea. 430 In particular, three times of repelling the
U.S. and French commercial ships and warships from 1866 to 1871 contributed to hardening
of Choson' s isolationist policy.
The failure of modernization reform at the end of Choson Dynasty can be examined
in terms of factionalism divided into pro-China and pro-Japan. While most Korean reformists
were influenced by the modernization of Japan, the government tended to get political and
military support from China. The reformist movements backed by Japan, such as the Coup
d'Etat of 1884 (Kapsin Chongbyori) failed because of the opposition of the government and
interdiction of Chinese military troops. The Choson government wanted to lean toward
Chinese influence, but China could give nothing to it when it came to modernization.
Moreover, because of the defeat of the Sino-Japan War, China had to renounce all rights in
the Korean peninsula. After the Kabo Reform (Kabo Kyongjang) from 1 894 to 1 896, the first
modernization reform under the lead of Japan, there were also confrontations between pro-
Japan and pro-Russian groups. As a result of that factional disunity, the Choson Dynasty
failed to gather national capacity to establish a new modernized society.
Contrasted with Japan and China, Korean pre-modern history had been characterized
by incessant invasions from China and northern nomadic tribes, and twice from Japan. In
modern times, a series of disastrous historical records, such as a 36-year of colonial period
and the Korean War, has strongly formed a Korean mind-set that such history should never
429John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia The Modern
Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 461.
430
Carter J. Eckert, Ki-baik Lee, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner, Korea Old and
New a History (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990), p. 194.
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be repeated. Koreans knew well that they had to get national power to compete with other
countries, and that kind of mind-set has become a basis for their brilliant economic
achievements. Coupled with the confrontation with North Korea after 1953, South Korea has
maintained the strong consciousness of its security.
2. Korea-U.S. Security Alliance and "National Self Defense" Policy
Even though major U.S. interests were focused on Japan rather than Korea after the
Second World War,431 through the Korean War the United States realized the importance of
the peninsula as a forefront to counter the expansion of communism. The Korea-US. Mutual
Assistance Agreement was signed in October, 1953 agreeing that the United States would
support South Korea militarily if the latter is attacked by a hostile country. 432 By the
agreement, the United States has supported economic and military aid and has stationed its
military for a global containment strategy against the Communist threat and deterrence against
the threat from North Korea. As a result, it became a unusually successful alliance up to now,
as well as during the Cold War era.
However, sometimes changes of U.S. security policy influenced the stability of the
peninsula negatively, and it made Korea try to get a more self-reliant defense capability as
their economy grew. In the early 1960s, the Kennedy Administration announced the "Flexible
Response Strategy" to counter the new communist strategy which focused on indirect
infiltration to the third world countries by riot, terror, and radical demonstration. But, they
excluded Korea from the list of the third world countries and started to reduce military aid.
Also, there was a political conflict between the Korean Government under then President
Park Chung Hee and Kennedy. The Kennedy Administration would not recognize Park's
431The United States did not participate in the Korean War to protect Korean independence
and freedom so much as to protect global U.S. interests, as represented by Japan. See Edward A.
Olsen, U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 1985), p. 5.
432The agreement recognized that "an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the
Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one
of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous
to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes." See Article 3.
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regime as a democratic government because Park took power by the coup in 1961. Faced
with the Vietnam War, the United States tried to withdraw some of its army from Korea to
support Vietnam. Actually, the agreement of dispatching the Korean army to Vietnam was
a watershed for their relationship. There were three reasons for that decision by Korea: first,
to prevent the withdrawal ofU.S. forces in Korea, thus to prevent a power vacuum; second,
to gain real war experience, thus to prepare for more effective defense power; third, to
modernize its military with more U.S. aid. After the participation of Korea in the Vietnam
War, their relations were much more reinforced "by bleeding blood together in the same
battlefield."
The Nixon Doctrine in 1971, which forced U.S. friendly states to play a greater role
in their own defense, was a signal for new U.S. isolationism. During 1971-1972, 320,000 U.S.
troops were withdrawn from Asia and one division from Korea. To fill the vacuum, then,
Korea started to increase its military level with the slogan of "self-reliant defense." In 1973,
Park's government enacted the Special Law on the Defense Industry and supported defense
industries through tax reductions, exemptions, and financial support. Also, the first Force
Improvement Plan was carried out since 1974, and the following year a defense tax was
created to back this plan.
The Carter Administration's decision in 1976 to withdraw the entire U.S. army from
Korea was due to two factors: first, after the Nixon Doctrine, U.S. strategic concept was
changed from "2.5 war" to "1.5 war"433 ; second, Carter related human rights situations in
Korea for the withdrawal of its army. Actually, the first factor influenced just one division's
withdrawal, but the second factor justified entire withdrawal. Of course, this decision caused
severe opposition from not only Korea, but also U.S. allies. A series of incidents, however,
caused this decision to be suspended in 1979: first, an underground tunnel which North Korea
had dug was found in 1978, thus increasing tension in the Korean peninsula; second,
according to a U.S. intelligence agency, the military level ofNorth Korea was two or three
l33
2.5 war consists of: 1 of the Soviet Union, 1 of China and 0.5 of the third world. See
Baek, Jong-Chun, National Defense Affairs (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1985), p. 490.
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times more than that of South Korea; third, Korea tried to develop a nuclear weapon to fill
the vacuum after U.S. withdrawal.
The Reagan Administration's slogans, "pax-Americana" and "build a strong America,"
were favorable to the Koreans, at least in terms of their security. After the inauguration,
Reagan seemed to consider the Korean peninsula as an important strategic point in that his
first foreign guest was Chun, then Korean president. Also, in the thirteenth ROK-U.S.
Security Consultative Meeting between defense ministers in 1981, the United States promised
to reinforce its military in Korea, instead of reducing, and to help Korea procure modernized
weapons.
The first change ofU.S. security strategy in the post-Cold War era was shown in the
report of April 1990, the "U.S. East Asia Strategy Initiative," which included a shift from a
global containment strategy primarily directed at the Cold War era Soviet threat to a focus
on selective engagement in critical regions. 434 Even though further reduction of U.S. forces
in Northeast Asia was suspended by the doubts over a nuclear development program ofNorth
Korea, South Korea doubted the reliability offuture U.S. military commitments in this region.
In June 1993, Secretary ofDefense Aspin's military and civilian advisers recommended that
the United States adopt a 'win-hold-win' strategy,435 which was considered as another
reduction program by the South Korean Government. Although the strategy was replaced by
the 'win-win' doctrine,436 what South Korea and Japan realized throughout history was the
changeability of U.S. policy according to its national interests.
434
Department of Defense, A Strategic Frameworkfor the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to
Congress, 27 July 1992.
435
This change anticipated that if the United States were confronted with two major regional
conflicts simultaneously it would 'hold' the second conflict's adversary by employing air power and
a limited number of ground forces. After prevailing in the first conflict, the United States forces
would be redeployed to reinforce the ally under siege in the second theater until the conflict was
terminated on favorable terms. See William T. Tow, "Changing U.S. Force Levels and Regional
Security," p. 17.
436
The win-win doctrine does not mean that the United States fights two regional conflicts at
the same time, but it means nearly simultaneously.
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Table 5. Major Activities and Achievements of the Force Improvement Plan437
Classification 1st FI (1974-1981) 2nd FI (1982-1986) 3rd FI (1987-1994)
Investment spending 31.2 30.5 33.3
( % of total defense
)
• Replacement of • Development of • Mass production
old equipment self-propelled of tanks, armored
• Construction of artillery, Korean- vehicles, self-
military bases in the designed tanks and propelled artillery
Major activities front area armored vehicles • Licensed
• Construction of • Construction of production of
high-speed boats major combatant helicopters,
• Purchase of F-4 • Licenced submarines, F-16
aircraft production of F-5
fighters
fighters
The Force Improvement (FI) plan, which was initiated in 1974 and continued until
1994, was aimed at building South Korea's self-reliant defense capability. During this period,
32.6% of the entire period's total defense spending was invested in building military
capability. As table 1 shows, in the third phase of the FI, the Korean Fighter Program (KFP)
which will acquire 120 F-16s is proceeding,438 thus showing a much improved defense
capability in terms of its technology and excellence of equipment. Of course, in the long term,
these programs will continue to achieve a more independent, self-reliant defense capability,
in some part replacing a portion of U.S. military commitments.
™Defense White Paper 1995-1996, The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of
Korea, p. 122-123.
43
l4 Strategic Frameworkfor the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress, Foreword by the
Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, p. 24.
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3. Improvement of Foreign Relations
a. Relations with Japan
Normalization of relations with Japan was mainly due to two factors: the
president's tendency and the need for economic development. 439 With an urgent need for
economic development, Japan which began to reemerge as an important international
economic force since the late 1950s could be considered as a capital supplier for Korea's
economic development. Also, ROK-Japan trade had already been growing since the 1950s
despite the lack of formal diplomatic relations. Then, the two countries signed a draft treaty
in February 1965,440 among severe protests and demonstrations by students and political
opponents. The benefits of normalization for South Korean economic growth were enormous,
enabling lots of capital to finance its new development plan, especially when the Kennedy
Administration reduced economic aid.
Even though there was much improvement in the economic fields during the Cold War
era, they failed to form security relations or even security talks. The exchange visits of both
summits, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone in 1983 and South Korean President Chun in
1984, brought about the establishment of a "Forum for the 21st Century," which was
designed to improve bilateral diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties between the two
countries, excluding security fields. Coupled with undesirable past historical issues such as
the Japanese textbook problem in 1982 and absurd remarks by high Japanese officials, there
439
See Carter J. Eckert, Ki-baik Lee, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner, p. 391-
393.
440The treaty called for: immediate establishment of diplomatic and consular relations;
nullification of all treaties and agreements concluded between the two nations on and prior to August
22, 1910 when Japan annexed Korea as a colony; reaffirmation of the Government of the Republic of
Korea as the only lawful government of Korea, as specified in the 1948 resolution of the UN General
Assembly; cooperation between the two countries for the promotion ofcommon welfare and interests
in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter; and further negotiations on trade,
navigation, commerce, civil aviation, and other matters at the earliest practical date. See, Lawrence
Ziring and C. I. Eugene Kim, The Asian Political Dictionary (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1985), p.
342. Also, Japan was required to pay $300 million in goods and services over a 10-year period as a
means of settling South Korea's property claims. In addition, Japan promised $200 million in low
interest loans.
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existed a strong anti-Japanese atmosphere in South Korea. Even in the post-Cold War era,
security relations or cooperation between them, especially in terms of the military, seems to
be very difficult because of the "basic trust" problem, mainly resulting from the past history.
Of course, there was some improvement recently: the dialogue between working-level
officials to promote their military relationship in 1994; and the exchange visits of Japan's
chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff and the ROK vice minister of national defense in 1995;
the exchange of a Letter on the Prevention of Accidents between Korean and Japanese
Military Airplanes in 1995. 441 Also, South Korea formally proposed the Northeast Asian
security dialogue in 1994, which necessarily required security relations with Japan in any
form. 442 Even though their desirable security relations would be inevitable in the future in this
context, however, it would never be easy work because of the lack of trust between them.
b. Northern Diplomacy
South Korea's northern diplomacy was the main policy of President Rho since
1987, which was aimed at the improvement of relations with China and the Soviet Union.
From the fact that it was the first attempt toward communist countries, northern diplomacy
became a milestone offuture Korean diplomacy. Ongoing economic development during the
1980s and rising international status through the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics gave
South Korea a motivation to play as a more independent actor on the international stage. The
transition period toward the end of the Cold War was also on its side. Gorbachev tried to
improve relations with South Korea, not only to get a loan from the latter, but also to
stimulate Japan into supporting the Soviet's economic development program. China needed
South Korea as a trading partner for its economic development more than North Korea,
whose economic growth was severely declining. As a result, Seoul and Moscow announced
formal diplomatic relations in 1990, and Seoul and Beijing did the same in 1992.
The influence ofrapprochement with the two powerful communist countries brought
^Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 1995-1996, The Republic of Korea,
p. 122-123.
442Go Dae-won, "Talnangjeon Diu Hanilanbohyubryugchejei Banghyanggoa Jedohwa
Bangan," Jeonryagyeongu, vol. 5, no. 2, 1995, p. 105.
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about in South Korea progress toward friendly military relations with them to a degree, but
it was much improved compared to the past. The Memorandum of Understanding on Military
Exchange for 1994-1995 was agreed upon in 1993, and there was a meeting between defense
ministers of the two countries in Seoul in 1995. Also, in September 1995, the Russian
government decided to repeal its military alliance treaty with North Korea, formally called the
Treaty ofAmity, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. 443 On the other hand, South Korea and
China set up defense attache offices in each other's embassies in 1993 and 1994, respectively,
and there was agreement at the senior working-level officials meeting in 1995 to expand their
military exchanges, gradually including exchange visits by high-ranking military officials.
Needless to say, these movements were conducive to the stability of the Korean peninsula as
well as Northeast Asia, and would be reinforced to build confidence among them.
4. Prospects for Future Security Policy
In terms of military capability, South Korea will aim to increase its naval and air
forces, casting offthe current army-oriented military structure. In a meeting between Korean
Defense Minister Lee and U.S. Secretary ofDefense Perry on April 15, 1996, South Korea
expressed its opinion that the U.S. request for South Korea to build up an army-oriented
military would not be desirable because it would result in South Korea's dependency on Japan
in supporting U.S. strategy in the Asia Pacific region. 444 Now, South Korea already has the
capability to build submarines with its domestic technology, and it has a plan to build a
10,000-ton level of aircraft carrier. The development of naval capability seems to prepare it
for a future strategic environment, which would accompany new naval powers such as Japan
and China. 445
443Kim Yu-nam, "A Review of Seoul-Moscow Relations," Korea Focus, vol. 3, no. 6, 1995.
The treaty was concluded in September 1961.
444Choognang Ilbo, April 16, 1996.
^On 28 October, 1996 President Kim indicated in the launching ceremony of a 3,000 ton-
level ofnew Korean destroyer that there are conflicts between states over the sea territory and EEZ
announcement and security environment of sea area around Korean peninsula is very instable. He
accentuated the role of Korean navy to protect national interests and economic activities. See
Choongang Ilbo, 29 October, 1994.
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Korean reunification will be a watershed of their security policy from the boundary
of the peninsula to the Asia Pacific region. It seems to be a matter of time when we consider
North Korea's current political and economic situation and the strong "one-people" mind of
the Koreans. However, the route to reunification has been, and will be, tough and sometimes
dangerous for the stability of this region. As long as the threat of North Korea continues,
South Korea will try to maintain relative military superiority to the former under the close
security cooperation with the United States. On that point, the U.S. decision to continue its
military presence would contribute to the stability of this region. On the other hand, however,
the U.S. decision to share a greater military role with Japan will become a burden for South
Korea which has not maintained any security relations with Japan. South Korea is paying
attention to Japan's expanding military capability, and its future security policy will possibly
keep pace with Japan's military level rather than North Korea's.
The reduction in forward deployed American military after the reunification ofKorea
will be "an impetus for the development of a new, unified Korea's regional power projection
capability in order to protect the country's trade routes and promote its territorial claim
against Japan with respect to the Tokto/Takeshima islands."446 Without any arms control
arrangement and security guarantee, Japan's expanding security role in this region will be an
apparent threat to reunified Korea. Even though Korea will try to avoid unnecessary
confrontation with China, the conspicuous reduction of the U.S. involvement to Korean
peninsula will force Korea to prepare its military against the potential threat of China and
Russia.
E. SUMMARY: PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY
1. Conflictive Security Interests
Historically, the Northeast Asian states' security policies have conflicted with each
other. Before the end of the Second World War, Japan's dominant economic, military and
446
Sheldon W. Simon, Alternative Vision ofSecurity in Northeast Asia, A paper for the
SEAS Northeast Asia Symposium, May 15-17, 1996, p. 22.
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political power was accomplished by the victimization of neighboring states in the name of
imperialism. During the Cold War era, the two sides that had differentiated ideologies fought
an invisible war with each other for four decades. One state's dominance of military power
became a threat to others: China's nuclear bomb test became a threat to Japan and South
Korea; Japan's military modernization brought about security concerns of China and the two
Koreas. Even after the end of the Cold War, this confrontational security structure still
continues to be focused on the Korean peninsula. Coupled with the current move by Japan
and the United States to strengthen their security alliance, Japan will rise as an undeniable
political and military power in the near future. Backed by neo-nationalism, China will try to
recover political influence in this region as it had in its long history. As for South Korea which
has suffered from external threats throughout history, either case is not acceptable. As long
as they fail to find any common ground, thus failing to build trust, this confrontational
structure will not disappear.
The major factor of security conflicts has been due to the negative identities among
them. First of all, the Japanese attitude toward past history is the biggest obstacle in
recovering the trust and positive identities of its neighbors. Compared to the way that German
and Japanese leaders have taken responsibility for their nation's actions during World War
JJ, international criticism of Japan is largely based on what was observed when the Japanese
Diet struggled with a proposed resolution calling for Japan to apologize for its past
misdeeds. 447 The United Nations Human Rights Commission accused the Japanese of
"extraordinary inhumanity" during the invasion and colonial period, and demanded that the
government accept legal responsibility for the system, compensate the victims, apologize
publicly to the victims, disclose all documents and materials related to the crimes, amend
education materials to include the history of the abuses, and identify and punish those who
were responsible.
448 However, Japan Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto vowed to take legal
M7Nam Si-uk, "Future of Korea-Japan Relations," Korea Focus, vol. 3, no. 6, November-
December, 1995, p. 27.
u
*The Japan Times, Editorial, February 10, 1996.
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steps to fight the report's recommendations. 449 Coupled with Japanese high officials' frequent
reckless remarks justifying their past invasion, diplomatic conflicts have continued, thus
worsening distrust between Japan and the other countries.
Second, the ideological confrontation is another historical obstacle in forming positive
identities. Korea was a victim of communism and Japan has also been cautious about its
revolutionary expansionism. The Chinese attitude toward their ideological line should be
apparent. As long as they stick to communism, thus basing the legitimacy of their regime on
the communist revolution, the current confrontation structure will continue forming another
version of the Cold War. China have to at least make its security policy clear in terms of its
level of military, participation in arms reduction talks, and apparent attitude toward its
ideological line. However, the entangled problems between the United States and Japan, such
as the Taiwan issue, human rights issue, trade conflicts, and some historical issues with Japan,
seem to be the most difficult problems in making China's security policy more modernized.
2. Future Regional Balance of Power
The military withdrawal after the Korea reunification will cause a power vacuum in
Northeast Asia. The problem is not just a change of military power of a strong state. As
Denny Roy indicates, "a regional power or security vacuum is not the outcome of the decline
of a hegemon."450 Rather it depends on the miscalculation and misunderstanding of the
remaining states toward the others' policies. With negative identities of each other, there will
be an arms race to cope with others' military capabilities. There also will be a new type of
alliance to counter any threat that each state estimates. Let's assume possible scenarios.
• Maintenance of current balance of power structure.
As examined earlier, the current US-Japan-unified Korea vs. China structure will
necessarily cause the reduction of the U.S. military and the increasing security role of Japan.
Japan's rearmament will bring about security concerns of reunified Korea and China, thus
leading the latter to more military buildup. In particular, reunified Korea, which has had
U9
The Japan Times, Editorial, February 10, 1996.
450Denny Roy, "Assessing the Asia-Pacific 'Power Vacuum,"' p. 45.
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strong doubts about Japan's security policy, will be reluctant to be "unnecessarily" confronted
with China. Ifthe United States continues its strong commitment, it will cause another Cold
War between the US and China in this region.
• U.S. -Japan vs. China-reunified Korea.
Iftrust in Japan cannot be recovered, Korea may choose China as its security partner.
As long as the U.S. commitment continues, the China-Korea alliance seems to be impossible.
However, if Japan should be a strong military power and the US becomes a off-shore
balancer, reunified Korea will prefer the alignment with China to that with Japan. China will
want Korea to be on its side because of the latter' s geopolitical importance and will try to
improve political and economic relations with Korea. Reunified Korea will not want any
confrontation with China. Then, Korea will be at least neutral, not on the U.S.-Japan side. In
this case, there will be a rivalry between Japan and China.
• Japan-reunified Korea vs. China.
If China sticks to communism and takes a hard-line policy toward its neighbors, Japan
and reunified Korea will align together. However, this assumption seems to be weak. For
Korea, a security alignment with Japan watching Japan's rearmament will be the last thing
that it wants to do. Moreover, in this case, Korea will have to face the threat of China with
an "untrustful" friend. Then, the security cooperation between them will be instable and
inefficient.
All scenarios based on the future possible balance ofpower structures suggest another
regional confrontation mainly between Japan and China. As a regional balancer, reunified
Korea will tend to avoid any direct confrontation with China because of its geopolitical
position. Based on its domestic political environment, the United States will be either an off-
shore balancer or a not-so-active participant. Without any positive identity and shared security
interests, the security policies of Japan and China after the Korea reunification do not seem
to have much room for cooperation with each other.
Instead of those balance of power structures, then, how about collective security as
a means for regional stability after the Korea reunification? Only if Japan, reunified Korea,
China and the United States can put together their different security interests for the common
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goal of regional stability, collective security can be the best option for them. While there are
many obstacles, the current economic relations and multilateral security approaches suggest
a possibility of collective security in this region. As long as the United Sates can take the role
of balancer, buiding a collective security structure may be the only solution for the future
security dilemma in this region.
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V. APPLICABILITY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO NORTHEAST ASIA
Can collective security be a means for regional stability in Northeast Asia after the
Korean reunification? Whereas the current balance of power structure is based on the power
competition among regional states, the future collective security structure, if possible, should
be based on common security interests and positive identity for its success, as we examined
earlier. Without such necessary requirements, collective security will be less effective than a
balance ofpower structure, like the case ofthe Locarno Pact. In terms of mass miscalculation
of power, if it fails, the result of collective security may be more disastrous than in the balance
of power system. In this context, the premature application of collective security to this
region will not be desirable. Most of all, forming a positive identity and shared security
interests will be the most important task of the Northeast Asian states for regional stability,
as well as the establishment of collective security.
Still, there are many obstacles in establishing a collective security system in this
region. "Northeast Asia countries are still divided by different ideological beliefs and they do
not have a sense of urgency for establishing a multilateral framework of political
cooperation"451 Too much disparity in the economy, democratization and modernization
causes the regional states to be competitive rather than harmonious. Historical background
and traditional cultural beliefs impede them in forming positive identities and in sharing
common security interests. Most of all, as long as the current confrontational structure around
the Korean peninsula continues and they fail to recover trust, collective security in Northeast
Asia will be an illusion. This does not mean that the Korean reunification will bring peace in
this region without any painstaking efforts toward "co-prosperity." As much as they have
conflicted with each other throughout history, they should exert themselves in order to build
confidence.
Some of the current flows of security environment suggest a possibility, although
451
James T H Tang, Multilateralism in Northeast Asian International Security: An Illusion
or Realistic Hope? North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, Working Paper Number 26, April
1993, p. 12.
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weak, toward collective security: multilateralism and economic interdependency. Multilateral
security approaches to regional security matters, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
can be a basis for confidence building and will create much more positive identity among the
Northeast Asian states than ever before. Growing economic interdependency and economic
institutional activities will not only strengthen the incentives for cooperation for common
economic interests, but will also provide the opportunities to practice institutional interaction.
The economic organizations, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), have contributed to economic
development ofthe regional states, increasing more cooperation in the economic field. To a
degree, the economic interdependency tends to improve security relations. The normalization
between South Korea and China in 1992 can be an outstanding example of the improved
security relations, from enemies to economic partners, for their mutual economic interests.
Even though these benign factors seem to be far from the requirements for collective security
at this time, they can be considered, at least, as the first step toward more cooperative
approaches to regional security and economic matters.
This chapter examines the applicability of collective security to Northeast Asia as a
future security measure for regional stability. The first section will review the currently rising
multilateralism and regionalism toward security and economic matters in this region as Asian
views of collective security. The second section will consider the limitations of collective
security in this region in terms of historical and cultural background. Finally, the third section
will suggest steps toward a regional collective security system as preparatory and establishing
phases.
A. ASIAN VIEWS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
While there have been many proposals for new cooperative security measures in the
Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War, a specific collective security system has not yet been
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suggested. 452 Instead, most ofthe views are converging to a multilateral security framework.
In fact, the states of the Asia-Pacific region began to activate multilateral dialogues for
regional security and economic cooperation in the post-Cold War era through the ARF, the
APEC and other non-governmental organizations. On the other hand, Northeast Asia failed
to create such a multilateral organization at its regional level. Truly, the Northeast Asian
security environment at the current time does not seem to have much room for cooperation
among regional states.
This section reviews multilateral security approaches and economic cooperation of the
Northeast Asian states. However, because Northeast Asia has been involved in the Asia-
Pacific sphere in terms of multilateralism, I will examine them in the boundary of the Asia-
Pacific region, not of Northeast Asia.
1. Multilateralism toward Collective Security
Regarding future Northeast Asian security, many scholars suggest multilateral
approaches to regional security affairs. Evans insists that the current bilateral security
agreement will not be fitted to the new security environment, and that multilateral security
cooperation will contribute to regional stability. 453 Sheldon Simon stresses the importance of
the development of multilateral regional security "to offset threats perceived to emanate from
one another by adopting policies of reassurance, transparency, and confidence-building."454
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Georgia Institute of Technology suggests a collective security regime for Northeast Asia
under the current security environment. According to its argument: the United States will be very
much a player, but not necessarily the key player; the collective security regime will bind Japan most
positively to the rest ofNortheast Asia, not as a developing military giant; with the creation of a
multilateral verification organization, a nuclear free zone for Northeast Asia will be expanded from
Korean peninsula up to some part of China. As examined earlier in this thesis, however, collective
security will not work without a positive identity and shared security interests. In this context,
collective security cannot be created under the current security environment in Northeast Asia. See
Developing A Collective Security Regime For Northeast Asia (Atlanta: Georgia Institute of
Technology, 1992).
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See Paul M. Evans, "The Prospects for Multilateral Security Co-operation in the
Asia/Pacific Region," The Journal ofStrategic Studies, vol. 18. His insistence is not for the
Northeast Asia region, but for the Asia/Pacific region including the former.
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Patrick Cronin asserts the need for a multilateral security framework to reduce the costs of
inaction which outweigh the potential benefits and to contribute to the mediation of
conflicting threat perception, to overcoming confrontational bilateralism, and to efficiency and
opportunities through exchanges of information. 455 These views seem to be new approaches
to the current and future regional security affairs based on cooperation among regional states,
not on power competition. In this context, multilateral security approaches can be considered
as a step toward collective security.
The multilateral security approaches, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, however,
has a limit as an ultimate security measure for regional stability. The multilateral security
framework itself implies two facts. First, there exists security tension or conflicts among a
group of states. Second, states share some security interests in improving their relations and
appeasing the conflicts through multilateral cooperation. While it means that states share
security interests to a degree, the multilateral cooperation does not necessarily mean that
positive identities are formed. On the contrary, the purpose of multilateral approaches seems
to be aimed at the improvement of their relations and forming positive identities. Therefore,
multilateral approaches to regional security affairs can be considered as endeavors to create
and promote a conciliatory atmosphere, not as a security system that can manage power, like
a balance of power or a collective security system.
In addition, the multilateral security framework cannot have any capability to control
each state's behavior. It is a kind of a balance of power structure toward "cooperation"
among states. Because of the lack of positive identities, however, states will count their
security on their alliance systems rather than such a multilateral framework.
Even though multilateralism cannot be an ultimate security measure for a future
security system in this region, it can contribute to the formation of a basis for the future
collective security. Multilateral security approaches differ from the past approaches to
Northeast Asian security affairs under the balance of power structure. First of all, the former
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Patrick M. Cronin, "Opportunities for a Multilateral Framework," ed. Ronald N.
Montaperto, Cooperative Engagement and Economic Security in the Asia-Pacific Region
(Washington, DC,: National Defense University Press, 1993), p. 170-172.
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requires multilateral cooperation of all participants, while the latter is based on bilateral
security relations. Also, unlike a balance of power structure, multilateral security approaches
require proper organizations to facilitate the opportunities for members' interactions and
engagements. In terms of the regional states' will to cooperate with each other, the current
multilateralism, even though not so fruitful yet, is a benign phenomenon for regional stability.
If states can promote their positive identity and shared interests through multilateral
cooperation, it will be able to create the atmosphere for the establishment of collective
security.
2. Multilateral Security Approaches of the Northeast Asian States
Though there has been no multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia, the
regional states have been somewhat actively involved in other frameworks such as the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific
(CSCAP). The ARF was created in 1993 as a formal inter-governmental forum, "at which
representatives from 18 countries within the Asia/Pacific region would gather to discuss
regional political and security issues."456 In the ARF meetings in Bangkok in July 1994,
Brunei in 1995, and Indonesia in 1996, even though there was no substantial consensus or
agreement on security issues including CBMs, it opened a new way to lead regional states to
security cooperation based on dialogue. As a non-governmental effort to promote multilateral
security cooperation, the concept for CSCAP was developed in 1992 and formally announced
in 1993 by ten founding institutes, which aimed "to create a more structured regional process
that is open to all countries and territories in the region."457 The United States, Japan and
South Korea participate in the ARF and the CSCAP, while China participates only in the
ARF.
The changed security policy of the United States in the post-Cold War influenced
security multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States had been reluctant to
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Satoshi Morimoto, "A Security Framework for the Asia/Pacific Region," p. 224.
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Paul M. Evans, "The Prospects for Multilateral Security Co-operation in the Asia/Pacific
Region," p. 205.
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enter into regional security dialogues in Asia in the Cold War era. There were three aspects
that changed the U.S. stance after the end of the Cold War. First, the regional security
concerns were growing because of the uncertainties aroused by the U.S. military withdrawal
from its bases in the Philippines. Second, as the Asia-Pacific region has become more
important for the U.S. economic interests, the United States has recognized the importance
of the security of this region. Third, the post-Cold War order requires cooperation among
states separate from ideology, religion, culture and race. As a result, the United States became
a supporter of multilateralism for regional security dialogues to appease the regional security
concerns and "to shape a positive and cooperative security environment in the Asia-Pacific
region."458 In particular, it expects the ARF to "play a role in conveying governments'
intentions, easing tensions, constraining arms races and cultivating habits of consultation and
cooperation on security issues."459 The United States has a special interest in a sub-regional
security dialogue for Northeast Asia separate from the ARF. With the recognition that
"Historically, Northeast Asia is the area where great power interests have clashed most
sharply," the United States is trying to establish such a forum, participating in a series of
government/academic conferences on security issues with Japan, South Korea, China and
Russia. 460
Of course, the United States does not see multilateral security dialogues as a way to
supplant the current bilateral security alliances and forward military presence, but rather as
a way to supplement them. As the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance in April
1996 showed, the nucleus of the U.S. security policy toward Northeast Asia lies with the
bilateral alliance with Japan and South Korea, rather than on multilateral security approaches.
In fact, it would be impossible to replace current security relations with a multilateral security
framework, because the latter is just a kind of confidence building measure, not a security
458The White House, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement,







"Japanese support of multilateral approaches to regional security issues is primarily
aimed at cementing the current balance ofpower in the Asia/Pacific region, which is favorable
to Japan, by cultivating the norm of policy transparency."461 Their multilateralism can be
understood in terms of the U.S. stance: a supplement to the US role, not a way to supplant
it.
462 As long as Japan depends its major security on the alliance with the United States, no
other multilateral security mechanism can replace the bilateral security alliance. Instead,
Japan's multilateral approaches to regional security affairs seems to improve relations with
others, building mutual understanding and maintaining stability among regional countries. 463
Inevitably, this requires bilateral approaches at the same time.
Japan has tried to improve security relations with South Korea and China through
bilateral dialogues and military exchanges. There were talks between the Japanese director
general of the Defense Agency and South Korea's defense Minister in 1990, and exchange
visits between Japan's chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and South Korea's vice minister
of national defense were made in 1995. In the same year, by exchanging a Letter on the
Prevention ofAccidents between Korean and Japanese Military Airplanes, the two countries
made a big contribution to their military confidence building. 464 After the suspension of
exchanges since the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, basic agreement was reached at the
Sino-Japanese Foreign Ministerial Conference in 1993 with regard to the necessity of
promoting dialogue over security matters. In a 1994 dialogue, basic agreement was reached
to promote exchanges between defense authorities of the two countries in the future for the
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purpose of expediting mutual understanding. 465 Also, Japan sent a message of cooperation for
a Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) to China in 1995,466 because, as a long term plan, Japan
wanted a military transfer and joint military training for co-activity in a PKO in order to get
transparency ofthe expanding Chinese military and to build confidence between them. These
bilateral approaches to recover confidence with neighboring states will contribute to the
future multilateral security dialogues in Northeast Asia.
While Japan's current multilateral approaches have limits within the security alliance
with the United States, Japan has actively suggested multilateral security cooperation as a
future regional security framework in the post-Cold War era. Terumasa Nakanishi, a
professor of international politics at Kyoto University, mentions that, "In the long run, it is
necessary that Japan (and neighbors) make efforts to create an alternative security framework
by building up mutual dialogue as viability of any bilateral defense arrangement would not last
forever."
467
In summit talks with Bush in July 1992, Miyazawa, then Japanese Prime Minister,
suggested establishing a mechanism for multilateral security cooperation and political
dialogues which would be aimed at recovering trust in the Asia-Pacific region. 468 Also, one
research institution under the Liberal Democratic Party presented the need for creation of a
"council for security cooperation in Asia-Pacific region to maintain peace and to prevent
regional conflicts" in its report in 1992. 469 While focusing on recovering trust with regional
states, Japan will increase its opportunities to lead such multilateral security talks and will
46S
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expand its political and security role in this region.
Chinese views of multilateralism have been ambivalent: neither obstructionist nor
static. Paul Evans explains Chinese reluctance toward multilateralism in terms of three points:
first, Chinese diplomatic tradition has been rooted in a combination of moral unilateralism or
bilateralism through the tribute system; second, China does not want to be constrained by
multilateral entanglements which restrict freedom of action; third, a multilateral process will
internationalize the Taiwan issue, which Beijing sees strictly as a matter of domestic
concern.
470
Also, China does not want the United States to lead multilateral security talks on
their own, reducing its political influence to regional states. Coupled with the bitter
experiences of devastation and semi-colonialism at the hand of Japan and major Western
powers in the past, China has become cautious about dealing with them.
Nevertheless, the post-Cold War environment made China somewhat positive toward
multilateral security approaches, which could make it possible to maintain regional stability
for a favored economic condition, not being excluded from regional states. Qian Qichen,
China's Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated in 1994:
China is favor of a variety of channels and levels of bilateral or multilateral dialogues
on issues of Asia-Pacific security... China appreciates the efforts of the ASEAN to
promote a multilateral security dialogue in the region and will take an active part in
ARF activities. In the meantime, we would like to see more bilateral security with the
countries concerned.
471
In fact, China has participated in regional security talks, such as the ARF and the APEC. With
the "Five Principles of Coexistence,"472 China seems to have no reason to refuse multilateral
security dialogues at this time.
Keeping pace with the U.S. policy of multilateral security cooperation, South Korea's
multilateral approach to security has been actively participating in regional security dialogue
470




According to the second principle, "Disputes should be settled peacefully and more
confidence building measures should be developed..." The third principle states, "Cooperation should
be based on common interests and not on the basis of a common social system, ideology or values."
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of various forms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Further, South Korea formally proposed the
Northeast Asian Security Dialogue in 1994, including North Korea, to push forward security
dialogue and cooperation in this region. From the point that the Security Council is primarily
responsible for settling international disputes, the election of South Korea as a nonpermanent
member of that institution in 1995 could be considered as successful diplomacy toward
multilateralism. In terms of military cooperation, South Korea has participated in U.N.
Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia, Western Sahara, Angola, and the Indo-Pakistan region.
Also, since 1 990, it participated in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, which is a
comprehensive combined maritime maneuver exercise conducted biennially since 1971 under
the leadership of the U.S. Pacific Command.
Coupled with the confidence of northern diplomacy, South Korea's option for
multilateralism is due to the uncertainties over the future security environment in the post-
Cold War. Most of all, the upcoming U.S. military reductions and Japan's rising military
power are apparent negative factors for its security in the future. Under these uncertainties
of the future security environment, South Korea will more strongly seek multilateral
approaches to its security while maintaining the current bilateral arrangement.
3. Economic Interdependency
What is the influence ofeconomic interdependency on political relations? While there
are two major confronting views in political economy theories, under the current economic
environment based on free trade and an open-market system, which has proven more
beneficial to developing countries as well as to developed countries than in the controlled and
closed market system, there are growing views that economic interdependency tends to
intensify political relations.
473 Klaus Knorr insists, "The new world economic order was also
473 The liberals argue that "trade and economic intercourse are a source of peaceful relations
among nations because the mutual benefits of trade and expanding interdependence among national
economies will tend to foster cooperative relations." On the other hand, the mercantilists
(nationalists) regard economic relations as basically conflicting, because economic activities are
subordinate to the goal of state building and the interests of the state. These two confronting views
are based on liberalism and mercantilism respectively. See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of
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perceived as a potent source of political benefit. ... a system producing continuous, massive,
and pervasive improvements in the material foundations of human life would make possible
a politically peaceful and stable world in which nations would be capable of solving disputes
by judicious bargaining and compromise."474
Table 6. Trade Volume among Northeast Asian States475 (Millions ofUS dollars)
State Wear 1970 1980 1985 1990 1994
China - Japan 867 9,201 21,269 17,645 47,809
China - S. Korea 43 21 669 11,694
China - N. Korea 677 484 491 624
Japan - S. Korea 1,047 8,433 11,303 29,242 37,885
Japan - N. Korea 57 579 435 465 485
Economic interdependency in terms of trade volume has increased among Northeast
Asian states. 476 Except for the case ofNorth Korea, as table 6 shows, the volume of trade
International Relations (Princeton University, 1987), p. 30, 34.
474
Klaus Knorr, "Economic Interdependency and National Security," ed. Klaus Knorr and
Frank N. Trager, Economic Issues and National Security (Kansas: Allen Press, 1977), p. 2.
indirection ofTrade 1970 - 1994, Yearbook. The number is the amount of import and
export, and can be somewhat different form year to year and country by country because of the
differences of measuring standards.
476
R. Rosecrance and four other scholars insist that "interdependence can be defined as the
direct and positive linkage of the interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects
the position of others and in the same direction. Interdependence, then, is measured both by the flow
of goods between states and the equalization of factor prices among states." That is, economic
interdependency means relations in which one state's economic benefit necessarily causes another's
economic gain at the same time. Therefore, the more the volume of trade between the states and the
more equalized factor prices such as of capital or labor, then the more economic interdependency
there is. However, I will estimate economic interdependency in terms of the volume of trade
excluding the equalization of factor prices, because the latter can be applied to a much higher level of
economic interdependency like the states in EC. Actually, the present economic relationship among
Northeast Asian countries is just at an elementary level because China opened only a part of its
market and North Korea still remains closed. Therefore, it would be hasty if we consider the
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among Northeast Asian states has been increasing. Above all, trade between China and South
Korea in the post-Cold War era is impressive. Coupled with the weakening ideological
confrontation ~ of course, not between South Korea and North Korea ~ the increasing
economic imperatives will further strengthen the economic interdependency among Northeast
Asian states in the future.
There are two major implications of the economic interdependency among regional
states in terms ofthe applicability of collective security. First, it forms economic regionalism
and creates the identity of "Asia-Pacific," which is differentiated from other regional
economic organizations such as the European Union (EU). Even though Northeast Asia does
not have its own economic organization, the regional states can get identities as members of
the Asia-Pacific community. Of course, this does not mean that such economic identity can
necessarily be developed into the improvement of security relations. However, as in the case
ofthe rapprochement between China and South Korea in 1992, and even the normalization
between Russia and South Korea in 1990, the imperatives of economic benefits sometimes
can prevail over political situations if the security conflicts are not very high. The economic
activities and benefits from the "Asia-Pacific community" will contribute to the improvement
of political relations and lead the regional states, including the Northeast Asian states, to
cooperative security approaches to regional affairs. The economic cooperation will, even
though at an elementary level, form a much more positive identity than before.
Second, economic interdependency provides the regional states the opportunities to
practice institutional activities. "Growing economic integration in the Pacific makes APEC,
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group, an important, new post-Cold War
institution."
477 To achieve their common goal, the members ofAPEC have working groups
influence of factor prices, which shows too much of a gap from country to country in Northeast Asia,
such as the prices of commodities, capital, and labor among Northeast Asian countries. See R
Rosecrance, A. Alexandroff, W. Koehler, J. Kroll, S. Laqueur, and J. Stocker, "Whither
Interdependence?" International Organization, vol. 31, no. 3, Summer 1977, p. 425.
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in transportation, telecommunications, tourism, energy, marine resource conservation,
fisheries, and human resource development. Considering the lack of institutional interactions
among the Northeast Asian states, economic activities in the APEC will be a basis for regional
states to form the beliefs that cooperation through an institution can be more beneficial to
them.
In summary, even though Northeast Asia has none of its own multilateral security
framework or economic organizations, the Northeast Asian states have participated in those
within the boundary of the Asia-Pacific region. The post-Cold War world order requires the
regional states to strengthen the multilateral approaches to security and economic affairs, and
Northeast Asian states now share the necessity of regional cooperation for their common
security and economic goals. Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region suggests three
implications to Northeast Asian states regarding regional collective security in the future.
First, the Northeast Asian states' multilateral approaches to security affairs imply that their
security interests are converging to a single goal toward regional stability. Still, security
interests are diverse and conflictive because of the power competition under the remnants of
the Cold War situation. However, their multilateral security approaches can be seen as
evidence for the same view of the importance of regional stability. Second, their active
posture toward multilateral cooperation will contribute to the improvement of political
relationships and the formation of positive identities. Even though there are a lot of conflictive
issues related to territory, trade, military and even past history, they strongly feel the need for
cooperation. More opportunities for dialogues will lead them to greater mutual
understanding. Third, their experience with institutional activities through the ARF and the
APEC will be the basis for the institutionalization of collective security in the future. They will
tend to be respective of international law, the norm and rules of the organizations, and the
sovereignty of others. Also, the benefits from the ARF and the APEC will strengthen their
beliefs in the institutions and further the institutionalization of collective security.
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B. LIMITATIONS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY
This section examines the limitations in applying collective security to Northeast Asia
based on the five variables that were needed for the success of collective security. First,
historical background suggests the lack of shared security interests and the absence of a
positive identity among regional states. Second, traditional Asian culture is characterized by
the lack of institutional functions in their international relations. Compared to Europe, the less
developed democratic political system in this region may be a factor in impeding the
workability of an institution in a collective security system.
1. Historical Background
Current enmities among Japan, China, and South Korea are rooted in historical
experiences. Japan's military expansionism to the neighboring states in the early twentieth
century left bitter memories in the Chinese and the Korean people's minds. Today, Japan's
ambiguous attitudes toward its history, coupled with the military sexual slavery issue, remain
as the main factors in impeding the formation of positive identities between Japan and the
other two countries. Communist China also had been an apparent threat to South Korea and
Japan through the Cold War era. China's military intervention in the Korean War in 1951
made Korean reunification impossible at that time, and its communist line policy and the
alliance with North Korea has conflicted with South Korea and Japan.
The normalization oftheir foreign relations shows the difficulty ofharmony and trust
among them. After the Second World War, Japan signed a peace treaty with the Nationalist
Chinese government in Taiwan in 1952. However, Japan and South Korea did not reach an
agreement on a peace treaty until 1965, fourteen years after discussions begun in 195 1.478
Also, Nakasone was the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Korea in 1983, eighteen years
after the treaty, and the following year Korean President Chun traveled to Tokyo and met
with Emperor Hirohito. The process of improving relations between Japan and China has
proceeded even more slowly because of ideological problems. After the Sino-U.S.
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rapprochement in the early 1970s, a Sino-Japanese Treaty ofPeace and Friendship was signed
in 1978. Also, no agreement formally ending the Korean War between South Korea and
China has yet been consummated, and it was not until the early 1980s that the two countries
allowed any direct contact between each's citizens. 479 They achieved rapprochement in 1992,
as an outcome of South Korea's Northern Policy and China's economic reform.
Most of all, Japan's apparent attitude toward its history has been the major obstacle
in recovering trust from Korea and China, and thus in forming positive identities with each
other. High Japanese officials' statements that justified and beautified their past history has
annoyed the peoples of China and Korea quite often. In 1986, "Minister of Education
Masayuki Fujio stated publicly that the 'rape' ofNanjing did not violate international law,"
and Nakasone dismissed him amid a storm of protest after he refused to resign. 480 In 1988,
National Land Agency Director Seisuke Okuno contended that "Japan had not intended to
invade China," and Takeshita "expressed uncertainty about Japanese responsibility for
aggression in World War II."481 Japan tried to glorify the past war in high school history
textbooks, changing the term of "invasion" to "military advance," and deleting the terms of
"rape," "violated" and "biological warfare detachment."482 Now, the Japanese Government
forces schools "to display the Flinomaru (Sun Flag) and students to sing "Kimigayo" as the
national anthem "483 Also, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's visit to the Yasukuni
Shrine in Tokyo on July 1996 set off a renewed international controversy about their attitude
toward history. 484
479
R. Mark Bean, Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia, p. 78.
480




Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification ofWar in Japanese Education," International Security,
vol. 18, no. 3, Winter 1993/94, p. 126,127
483
Ibid.,p. 132.
484The Yasukuni Shrine is a symbol and sanctuary of Japanese militarism because it is
dedicated to the souls of more than 2.5 million war dead, including executed war criminals such as
197
As a result, 89 % of South Korean people and 77 % of Chinese people still feel that
the Japanese did not regret their past faults, while 55 % of Japanese think they already
regretted them. 485 Particularly, in this context, the South Korean people think that future
cooperation between South Korea and China will be more possible than that between South
Korea and Japan, and that between China and Japan (Table 7). Without a sincere Japanese
apology and regret, anti-Japanese mind in China and Korea will continue and impede
improving the current identities.
Table 7. South Korean View of the 21st Century Cooperation486 (Percent)
Field S. Korea - China China - Japan S. Korea - Japan
Economy 87.3 73.2 58.0
Foreign/Security 77.9 59.2 48.0
Culture 82.2 66.3 54.4
Japanese ambiguous attitude toward Japan's history seems to be related to their social
characteristics. Their strong "we" and "they" dichotomy tends to justify the past military
expansion by the pretext of that "we did as they did" Their peculiar self-identity, or their
special pride that they were chosen people by God (Kami), has made them reluctant to admit
their past faults. Their collectivism, which means decentralized responsibility or divided
power, has blurred the subject who should be the main body for apology, or who should be
blamed. As a result, while Japanese feel that they already have expressed regret and
apologized, other victimized countries are not satisfied with Japan's attitude. Their loyalty in
a hierarchical structure, which was based on a military-dominant society throughout history,
former Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo. Therefore, Hashimoto's official tribute at the shrine may
be interpreted as an attempt to justify and legitimize the history of Japan's militaristic imperialism.
See Korea Foundation, Korea Focus, vol. 4, no. 4, July-August 1996, p. 133.
A%$ChoongangIlbo, October 23, 1996.
W6Choongang Ilbo, October 23, 1996.
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also has impeded the state to make a public apology, and has resulted in ongoing high
officials' absurd remarks and beautified text books. Considering those social characteristics
formed throughout a long Japanese history, it would be difficult for them to make any clear
apology for their past historical faults in the near future.
China's opaque security policy also is an obstacle in forming positive identities among
Northeast Asian states. There have been a series ofprovocative postures in China in the post-
Cold War era. First, coupled with the growing neo-nationalism, China's communist-line
policy seems to be directed toward anti-hegemonism in Asia. "Chinese leaders have flirted
with a proposal by Iran for a China-Iran-India alliance against U.S. 'hegemonism' in Asia,"
by participating in the foreign ministers' meeting in Teheran in 1994. 487 Second, China would
be willing to sign a comprehensive test-ban treaty later 1996, but "still want the right to
conduct so-called 'peaceful' explosions after such a ban."488 In fact, "Beijing has quietly sat
on the fence on the question ofNorth Korea's nuclear ambitions."489 Third, China's attitudes
toward Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and Tibet have stiil shown its ongoing "hard-line policy."
Fourth, even though it is opening its market, Chinese economic choice was a "socialist market
economy,"neither socialism nor capitalism. Despite its economic development, the domestic
political and economic situation seems to be instable: authoritarian rule, violations ofhuman
rights, pirating, and anti-religion law. Regarding a harsh verdict on Wang Dan, a former
student leader, the New York Times mentioned that "China's Communist Party leadership
may have silenced the last of its prominent critics at home and ushered in an era of
authoritarianism that leaves only commerce to occupy the Chinese."490 As a result, despite the
growing economic relations among the Northeast Asian states, Japan and Korea still keep an
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eye on such moves by China based on neo-nationalism.
In summary, the historical background ofNortheast Asia suggests the lack of positive
identities among regional states. China and Korea still have the bitter memory of Japan's
militarism. Korea and Japan have fought the invisible war with China during the Cold War
era. Despite some of the benign phenomena in the post-Cold War era such as economic
interdependency and normalization offoreign relations, there has been no real advance toward
recovering their lost trust. Coupled with the conflictive security interests throughout modern
history, which were reviewed in chapter IV, the negative identities among the Northeast Asian
sates are the main reasons why the Northeast Asian states cannot cooperate with each other
for regional security stability and further collective security.
2. Traditional Asian Beliefs and Culture
Collective security requires democratic principles for maintaining its institutions and
for the interactions among member states within the institutions. The NATO Treaty shows
three main principles based on democracy: equality of member states, legal principle, and
publicized policy. In fact, "In Western liberal democracies it is a fundamental tenet that
government involves highly differentiated functional institutions (executives or cabinets,
parliaments, and the judiciary), with specified terms of references and responsibilities, codified
in some form of constitutional law."491 However, in Asian politics and cultural traditions of
decision making, "there is little habit of the rule of law, highly personalized notions of power
and legitimacy, ... and a strong predilection to the resolution of differences in private rather
than in public fora
"492 Above all, China is a far less developed country than Japan and South
Korea in terms of modern democracy and free economy. Compared to Japan and South
Korea, it has a much stronger hierarchic social structure under communist rule. As a result,
one dominant figure, such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, holds no office and is
491Desmond Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region," Security Studies, vol. 3,




responsible to no institutions, but he is indisputably the "paramount leader."493 In this context,
China will be the most difficult and reluctant partner in establishing institutions for collective
security.
Neher indicates that "Asian democracy is characterized by respect for authority and
hierarchy."494 Their political culture is heavily imbued with Confucianist principles. While
Confucianism emphasizes harmony, stability and consensus, it favors authoritarian rule and
the duties ofthe lower to the higher: the ruled to the ruler, the son to the father, the pupil to
the teacher, and even the wife to the husband. One dominant feature of such societies is
"personalism" which puts emphasis on leaders rather than on laws. 495 When a leader
dominates over laws or people with his absolute authority in a state, it would be impossible
to make the state's policy publicized and to keep legal principle in international society. While
Japan and Korea have become more democratic countries, China still maintains a highly
authoritarian regime. Without any competing political party, the people's will has nothing to
do with the political decision making, thus contributing to the uncertainty of Chinese politics.
Yang Ping, editor of Strategy & Management, mentions that:
If you ask me as a person, I would say I would like democracy. But if you go to the
Chinese countryside and have a look and see the poverty ofhow people live, then you
see that democracy wouldn't be appropriate or in the national interest. The people there
aren't capable of exercising democracy.496
The difficulty of China's democratization, in terms of its historical background and
political characteristics, suggests the difficulty of institutionalization of collective security.
Even though China can recover trust with other regional states by renouncing its ideological
line, China may remain as a highly dictatorial and authoritarian regime in the fear of
493Desmond Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region," p. 55.
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democratization which can bring about disintegration of China. Such a regime tends to
intensify "nationalism" to unify and justify its legitimacy. In this case, China will oppose the
establishment of collective security because of two reasons. First, China's participation in a
collective security system will force China to be democratic. There will be a lot of pressure
for democratic principles such as freedom of press, freedom of speech, respect for human
rights, and opening its society. In one aspect, it will cause severe chaos or "pollution" in the
Chinese domestic political environment.
Second, the Chinese sinocentric world view also may be an obstacle in establishing
institutions for collective security. International relations among Northeast Asian states in the
premodern era were hierarchical, not equal. Until the nineteenth century, the advanced
Chinese culture, philosophy, religion, art, and scholarship were disseminated to Korea and
Japan. By the Chinese view, China was a center and Japan and Korea were the periphery. Of
course, that kind of relationship does not exist in the current political environment. However,
in that context, China may be reluctant to participate in any institution under the condition of
equal status with the past peripheral countries. Considering current Chinese neo-nationalism
which is aimed at the recovery of its past glory, China may strengthen its foreign relations
based on bilateral relations rather than multilateral ones.
C. STEPS TOWARD A REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM
Steps toward collective security in Northeast Asia will never be easy. However, as
table 8 shows, there can be four steps toward a Northeast Asian collective security system.
First of all, the Northeast Asian states should terminate historical enmities and recover trust
with each other. Northeast Asian states have quite negative identities because of historical
experience throughout modern history. Japan should make its attitude toward past history
apparent, and China also should make its ideological lines clear. Without the settlement of
historical and ideological matters, it would be difficult for them to improve their identities.
Second, CBMs should be reinforced through multilateral security approaches and economic
interactions using current Asia-Pacific institutions such as the ARF and the APEC. Third,
there should be a Northeast Asian institution for security cooperation which facilitates direct
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cooperation among the Northeast Asian states. Based on positive identities through the first
and second phase, this will serve to converge their diverse and conflictive security interests
toward a single goal of regional stability. Finally, the Northeast Asian institution can be
expanded to a collective security system like NATO. This will be a watershed from a balance
of power system to a collective security system for regional stability. As a current power
balancer, the U.S. role will be critical for establishing collective security and maintaining
stability during this work.

















3rd Establishment of a Northeast
Asian Institution







Establishment of a collective security
system
From the first step to third step, there should be flexibility in building confidence and
establishing a Northeast Asian institution for security cooperation. That is, it does not mean
that a complete termination of enmities, the first step, can necessarily cause multilateral
security approaches, the second step. Rather, those two steps are somewhat complementary.
Also, the third step, establishment of a Northeast Asian Institution, can contribute to
confidence building among them. In this context, this thesis does not argue that the orders of
the three steps are absolute. According to the nature of the political or security environment,
any of the three steps can be practiced earlier than the other steps. Or, they can be practiced
together at the same time.
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1. Confidence Building: Termination of Historical Enmity
Despite the importance oftrust ~ in other words, we can say a basis for cooperation:
positive identities and shared security interests — in collective security, it is very difficult for
Northeast Asian states to form trust because of their historical and cultural problems.
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) should be practiced. Evans suggests multilateral
dialogues as CBMs, which would discuss instruments for increasing transparency in defense
doctrine, military capacities and intentions, and conflict prevention. 497 At the same time,
however, the transparency of Japan's attitude toward history and Chinese foreign policy
should be concluded for such dialogues among regional states. Without the settlement of
historical and ideological matters, those series of dialogues as CBMs would not be a basis for
improving their identities. Also, each Northeast Asian state also should be willing to welcome
the others' new policies and attitudes.
Japan should apologize for its past history and make its attitude for the history
apparent. Japan should keep Germany's example in mind. Even though both Germany and
Japan played the role of aggressor during World War II, "50 years after the war, the two
countries engender strikingly different responses from other countries in terms of their
trustworthiness."498 Germany considered reparations to victimized countries as a moral
obligation and enacted the Law on Federal Reparations in 1956 to facilitate the payment.
"The sincere reparation policy of Germany has served as momentum for regaining the trust
of its neighbors and, at the same time, played a considerable internal role in changing the
German people's way ofthinking," forming a common feeling among the German people that
an autocratic regime like Nazi Germany can never again be tolerated. 499 As we have already
examined, the improvement ofthe Franco-German relationship, an apparent achievement in
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NATO, was possible because ofGerman endeavors to recover the trust from other neighbors.
Compared to Germany, Japan has taken quite different attitudes. It was beginning in
1995, on the 50th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II, that Japan announced its
reparation plan at a cost of 100 billion yen over the next decade. Japan has tried to distort the
history of its aggressive war and deny culpability in the issue of its sex slaves. "Japan has still
not compensated the woman victims, nor has it taught its younger generations the true history
of Japan's legacy of aggression and atrocity." 500 Under these circumstances, it would be
impossible for China and Korea to form a trust in Japan.
In terms of current economic power and expanding security role, Japan will seek to
be a major political power. The neighboring states are well aware of it as an inevitable reality.
To a degree, they expect Japan's constructive role, especially in the field of economic
cooperation. What they are anxious about is not simply Japan's expanding security and
political role, but its intention. In this respect, Japan has to recover trust by resolving the
historical problems, such as its attitude toward history, a sincere apology, reparation and so
on.
China should make its policy transparent to the neighboring states. Many scholars
indicate that China has an aspiration to be a regional hegemon power. In fact, by 2010 China
will have Asia's largest economy and will be a strong power with considerable military
capabilities. What others are concerned about is, however, not simply its military buildup, but
the direction ofChina's policy. Even though China is opening its market, China's communist
line has never been given up. Standing on a crossroad of modernization and an ideological
line, China seems to take an ongoing hard-line policy based on neo-nationalism. Current
economic development will bring about "pollution" of ideology and weaken the legitimacy
of its regime. "One way of unifying the people and maintaining the party leadership is
nationalism." 501 "Some sort of real or imagined enemy is necessary in order for nationalism
500Kim Kyong-min, "Why Is Japan Distrusted?" p. 130, 131.
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to be effective."502 China's continuing nuclear tests, escalation of the Taiwan issue in 1995,
and a hard-line policy toward the Spratly Islands can be understood as policies based on
Chinese neo-nationalism to unify its people and to legitimize its regime. Coupled with the
characteristics of China, an absolutely closed society, China's "nationalistic" moves increase
the others' concerns about the future uncertainty of China's policy. Without transparency of
China's ideological line, Japan and Korea cannot improve their identities toward China.
In addition to Japan's clear apology for its history and China's apparent policy toward
its ideological line, each country should strengthen education to the next generation focusing
on the need for friendship and cooperation among regional states, rather than enmity and
competition. Di Hua states that such education will be the best way to recover trust and to
make them cooperate for co-prosperity in Northeast Asia in the nature. 503 For Japan, instead
ofbeautification of its past history, Japan should teach the younger generation the excellence
ofChinese and Korean history. Korea should focus on the developmental relations with Japan
and China in the future. China should focus on cooperation with Japan and Korea rather than
on justifying its ideology. Education of the next generation will be the most meaningful
investment for future relations among them. When they are grown up, the identities of the
Northeast Asian states will become much more positive than at any time in the past.
In fact, it would be very difficult to expect Japan and China to take such
"revolutionary" policies. As long as the Northeast Asian states feel that the others will keep
the status quo, they will not change their attitudes. For example, as long as China thinks that
Japan continues beautification of past wars, it would be difficult to expect China to educate
its next generation to be more cooperative with Japan than competitive. Therefore, there
should be more basic measures to facilitate the changes of policies toward history and
ideology. In some part, the confidence building measures, such as multilateral approaches to
security and economic cooperation, can contribute to the change of Japan's and China's
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to build confidence:
• Establishment of a joint research team for accurate history
• Exchange of conferences concerning history, culture, ideology, and security
affairs
• Correction of distorted history in text books, and reinforcement of education
for the next generation focusing on mutual cooperation
• Publication of historical issues
• Japan's apparent apology and reparation: China's clear ideological line
• Political consensus for historical and ideological issues among the Northeast
Asian states through joint declaration or treaty
2. Confidence Building: Multilateral Approaches
Multilateral approaches toward security and economic cooperation should be
reinforced to build confidence. Considering the current negative identities among regional
states, it seems to be natural that the outcomes ofARF or CSCEA are not very productive.
When they get improved identities through resolving historical enmities, multilateral security
dialogues will provide tangible outcomes to them. Conversely, this confidence building will
also be a basis for the settlement of historical enmities with more understanding among them.
In this context, termination of historical enmities and multilateral approaches are not
independent steps, but complimentary ones.
The Northeast Asian states should engage themselves in the current multilateral
security frameworks, such as the ARF, the CSCEA and even the APEC, more actively.
Through such institutional interactions, they can form a strong confidence that each state
respects international law and norms within the institutions. Coupled with the decreasing
historical enmities and mutual understanding through other CBMs, the Northeast Asian states
will also be able to reach an agreement on regional security issues, such as a non-aggression
pact or transparency of their policies. Of course, within the Asia-Pacific level of institutions,
it would be difficult for all member states to make a conclusion on specific issues because of
diverse and even conflictive security interests among them. For example, even though the
Asia-Pacific countries can deal with the Spratly Islands issue in the ARF, it would not be
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efficient and productive. Rather, it would be more desirable that the ASEAN states and China
open talks in a sub-regional level. This is the reason why a Northeast Asian security
framework is required in the third step.
The Northeast Asian states should strengthen economic relations each other,
especially between China and the other states. As examined earlier in this chapter, economic
interdependency tends to improve political relations as well as mutual understanding. One of
the characteristics of the current market economy is the movement of people and workers
over the borders between countries as joint corporations increase. This phenomenon will
contribute to people's understanding of each other's culture and society, thus increasing
interactions which will provide the means of containing and preventing the escalation of any
economic conflicts as well as political conflicts. 504 Coupled with the improving political and
economic relations between China and South Korea, Japan's more investment to China will
be able to promote mutual understanding and more positive identities. 505
Joint military exercises can improve security relations among the Northeast Asian
states. So far, there has been no joint military exercise between the Cold War enemies. Ifthe
United States includes China and Russia in a joint military exercise, such as the Rim of the
Pacific, it will contribute to increasing trust between them. While a military training without
them can be "containment," a joint military exercise with China and Russia will be "security
cooperation." As long as their identities are negative, such joint military exercise may be
difficult. Even if so, they can activate military exchanges such as port visits, exchange of high-
level military officers and military training. In fact, military exchanges among the Northeast
Asian states have increased in the post-Cold War era and have contributed to confidence
building.
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These multilateral approaches will contribute to the settlement of possible future
regional conflicts, such as fishery area problems or trade problems. Edward Olsen states that
a small regional crisis or conflict can be one of the best opportunities to recover trust among
the Northeast Asian states. 506 For example, when there is a fishery area problem, tension will
be increased between countries. Despite the escalation, if states can settle the problem,
identity of each other will be improved. Faced with that kind of a small conflict, multilateral
security talks and economic interdependency will provide more opportunities to settle the
matter with cooperation than if there are no such "windows for contacts."
Such confidence building measures will contribute to the improvement of identities
among the Northeast Asian states. This will be the process to change their understanding of
others from competitors or threat of the Cold War to partners toward future co-prosperity.
However, the CBMs cannot be an ultimate means for securing regional stability. Even
multilateral security dialogues, such as the ARF, cannot be a security system that manages
power among regional states. Rather they are a measure to supplement defects of the current
balance of power system. That is the reason why an institution should be established in
Northeast Asia. If the CBMs contribute to improvement of identities, an institution for
Northeast Asia security cooperation will contribute to form shared security interests and
facilitate more cooperation.
3. Institutionalization
Even if the Northeast Asian states create positive identities through CBMs,
institutionalization of collective security cannot be achieved right after the confidence
building. With only a positive identity, collective security may not be successful. Most of all,
the Northeast Asian states should have common security interests in establishing a collective
security system. Before institutionalization of collective security, regional states should
establish a Northeast Asian institution for security cooperation. This will contribute to
converging their diverse security interests into a single goal toward regional stability. Also,
the institution will be a headquarters for establishing a collective security system.
506
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a. The role ofthe US:from a balancer to a participant
The role of the United States is critical in establishing a collective security
system in Northeast Asia. Historically, the Northeast Asian states have had no experience
with multilateral military or security cooperation. Even though they form a basis for security
cooperation by improving their security relations, how to operate the system will be a
practical problem. The United States can be an effective adviser as well as a participant. Of
course, the United States can be an off-shore balancer or an isolationist. However,
considering the fact that the importance of security stability in this region will be closely
related to their national interests as the volume of trade and the importance of sea routes
increases, it would be more probable that the United States will participate in a collective
security system of any type.
First, the US should reinforce multilateral security cooperation through the ARF, or
if possible, APEC. Defense Secretary William Perry accentuated the importance of
multilateral security initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region to prevent an arms race and to build
a cooperative security environment. 507 In the first ARF in July 1994, eighteen countries
including China, Japan and South Korea participated, and they discussed the exchange of
information including military data, the submission of them to the U.N. arms register, and
peacekeeping activities. 508 Even though the United States has pursued such multilateral
approaches as a supplement to the current bilateral security treaties, it will contribute to
building confidence among the Northeast Asian states for future security cooperation.
Second, the United States should improve and strengthen its relations with China. The
United States should not give an impression of containment to China. This does not mean
"yielding," but "understanding." As China's traditional security policy shows, the Chinese
have a strong national pride. By its traditional Confucian values, material gains such as
economic interests are far less important for the Chinese than spiritual values, such as pride
507Korea Research Institute for Strategy, "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-




and authority of a "great nation." One of the major reasons for China's intervention in the
Korean War was the Chinese hostility about the U.S. interposing the Seventh Fleet between
Formosa and mainland China. 509 The reason for the Chinese independent policy since 1982
was that China felt its pride was hurt from the ongoing U.S. arms sale to Taiwan. If China
feels containment from the United States or the U.S.-Japan alliance, their nationalism will rise
against "hegemonism" and keep national pride.
Hadar indicates that, "Hard-line U.S. policies based on the assumption that China
poses a strategic, economic, and cultural threat could create a tragic, self-fulfilling prophecy,"
and instead of adopting a confrontational policy, they should intensify economic relations
which have a liberalizing influence that increases the likelihood of additional economic and
political reforms. 510 Expanding U.S. trade and investment ties with China and the rest of the
emerging economies of Asia would not only benefit American economic interests, but help
in the long run to increase their mutual understanding and cooperation and to transform
mainland China into a free-market democratic country. 511
Third, the United States should reconsider its role preparing for the future, from a
protector to a conciliator. "Foreign policy editor Charles William Maynes suggests, in the
post-Cold War era it is inevitable that strong regional powers will begin exercising authority
in their spheres of influence."512 Also, Hadar argues that:
While the United States should continue to offer its services as an "honest broker" to
help resolve various regional disputes diplomatically and be prepared (taking into
consideration its own interests) to provide nations in the area with military equipment
to defend themselves, it should begin to end its military commitments in the region and
thereby create incentives for the main players to protect their own national interests and
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to form regional security arrangements. 513
As this thesis argued in chapter 4, as the remnants of the Cold War end in the future, the role
ofthe United States will be changed in terms of duty and justification. If the United States has
to prepare for a future security environment in which their role would be decreased in military
involvement, they will have to give the regional states more opportunities to deal with
security matters actively. Current moves such as the return of command rights in peacetime
to the Korean Army, the division of roles and missions between the United States and Japan
can be understood as that kind of measure, though the latter case has caused a security
concern in other countries. Also, the new U.S. role as a conciliator will not only promote the
relationship with China by reducing tension if not pessimistic, but will also contribute to
promoting the relationships among the Northeast Asian states. A policy of aiming for a
greater regional self-reliance or cooperative security system does not mean an end to the U.S.
role, but a transformation of its role from a balancer to a participant.
Most of all, the U.S. participation in regional collective security will justify its military
presence in Northeast Asia. The United States will not want its political influence to be
reduced in Northeast Asia by the reduction or withdrawal of its military after the Korean
reunification. To maintain its political influence, such as prevention of nuclear expansion,
military presence in this region will be required to a degree. Also, military presence will secure
its sea lines of communication and free economic trade. In this context, the creation of a
collective security system and its participation in the system will give the United States
justification for its military presence in Northeast Asia. Consequently, collective security will
be more beneficial to regional states and the United States than the extension of the current
balance ofpower structure after the Korean reunification. Also, this seems to be the time for





b. Establishment ofan institutionfor security cooperation
A Northeast Asian security framework should be created by the Northeast
Asian states and the United States. Current multilateral security frameworks, such as the ARF
and the APEC, are not proper to produce any tangible outcomes because of the diverse
security interests among divergent members. The ARF consists of ASEAN states, the
European Community members, Northeast Asian states, the United States, Canada, Australia
and India. While the ARF can facilitate security dialogues among its member states, "there
is no consensus on what it should really focus on in the future, and hence it will be very
difficult to proceed further." 514 If Northeast Asian states form positive identities, it will be
more desirable to establish an institution for Northeast Asian security cooperation which is
separate from the ARF or the APEC. Conversely, the Northeast Asian institution can also
have an effect to improve their identities too.
The Northeast Asian security framework will serve to converge their diverse and
conflictive security interests into a unified goal toward regional stability. With improved
identities, states can focus on regional security issues such as territorial problems,
disarmament, or nuclear issues. When it comes to territorial matters such as Diaoyu Island
(the Senkaku) and Tokto Island (Takeshima), there may be a little room for compromise or
settlement of those issues. However, even though there will be severe debates or conflicts,
their dialogues within the Northeast Asian security framework will be more conducive to
regional stability than no dialogues or no such framework. Also, there can be a consensus for
disarmament as long as they feel free from the doubts over each other's bid for ideology,
militarism, and hegemonism. There can be an agreement to maintain a certain level of military
in each state which will not be a threat to the others. The regional states can make an
"institution for information" that will facilitate information and make member states' policies
transparent. Even though the Northeast Asian security framework cannot solve all security
issues among member states, it will strongly provide opportunities for them to improve
mutual understanding as security partners and no longer threats, and to adjust their conflictive
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security interests.
The Northeast Asian security framework can be established before Korean
reunification, because whenever regional states recover trust they can create such an
institution to prevent conflicts. Jo Myong-hyon insists that some of outcomes expected from
the institution are: 515
• Stabilizing regional security through political cooperation among the United
States, Japan, China, Russia, and the two Koreas
• Co-prosperity and coexistence through economic cooperation, disarmament
• Securing the Korean peninsula by leading North Korea to opening and
participation in international society
• Securing regional stability from power changes such as the
withdrawal/reduction of the U.S. military or reduction ofRussian influence
• Containment of Japan's rearmament and hegemonic rivalry.
• Prevention of nuclear expansion to Northeast Asia
As a Northeast Asian multilateral security approach mechanism, it will give the Northeast
Asian states more confidence to expand it into a regional collective security system.
c. Institutionalization ofcollective security
Institutionalization of collective security will be possible when states recover
positive identities fully and share common security interests. In terms of positive identities,
it seems to be difficult to form a collective security system before Korean reunification unless
there occurs a big change in North Korea's policy. Instead, the current balance of power
system will be maintained until Korean reunification, while the Northeast Asian security
framework facilitates cooperation, improving relations among regional states. In some
aspects, the first and the second steps may contribute to Korean reunification by defusing the
threat ofNorth Korea or conciliating the two Koreas.
Institutionalization of collective security will bring about the change in the security
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system in Northeast Asia from the balance of power system to a collective security
arrangement. The current bilateral security arrangements will be useless and refused by
regional states because they will not consider each other as an enemy or threat. Instead of
defending their territories from others' threat, they will concentrate their efforts on regional
stability and world peace. To promote efficiency, the Northeast Asian security framework can
be expanded into a collective security system. There should be proper institutions that take
different roles and functions such as political consultation, economic cooperation, cultural
exchanges and military cooperation. Treaties will be made based on international law. In this
context, NATO can be a model for building a framework for Northeast Asian collective
security.
A Northeast Asian collective security system will benefit member states. As NATO
improved identities between France and Germany, the Northeast Asian collective security can
contribute to the promotion of positive identities with more contacts and interactions among
member states. Institutions will also make information available to member states and provide
transparency of each state's policy. Most of all, Northeast Asian collective security will give
its member states economic benefits because of their decreased efforts on military buildup
than ever before. Such incentives and benefits will strengthen cooperation ofmember states
and institutional capability. Of course, the interactions between states' cooperation and
benefits from the system will strengthen the member states' identities and institutional
functions.
D. SUMMARY
Can collective security be a means for regional stability in Northeast Asia? The answer
of this thesis is "yes, if the five conditions are satisfied by the security environment in
Northeast Asia." The problem is that Northeast Asia does not satisfy the five conditions at
present. Historical enmities among Northeast Asian states are too high to improve security
relations. Security policies among them have been conflictive throughout modern history. The
difficulty of China's democratization suggests the difficulty of institutionalization of collective
security, which requires democratic principles. Northeast Asian states have no experience
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with collective security or security cooperation through institutions. Such a security
environment is the reason why the future security structure under balance of power will be
so instable. And, this is the reason why Northeast Asia requires collective security in the
future despite such difficulties.
To establish a collective security system, this chapter suggested four steps. First, the
Northeast Asian states should form positive identities through confidence building. Historical
issues should be settled by Japan's apology and apparent attitude. Ideological issues should
be settled by China's transparent and moderate foreign and domestic policies. This will
provide the basis for recovering trust among the Northeast Asian states. Second, CBMs
should be strengthened through multilateral security dialogues, economic cooperation,
education to the next generations, joint military exercise and military exchanges. The CBMs
will promote mutual understanding and improve their relations. Third, a Northeast Asian
institution for security cooperation should be established. It will not only facilitate forming
shared security interests among regional states, but it will also be a basis for
institutionalization of a collective security system. Finally, the institutionalization of collective
security can be modeled by NATO and will benefit regional states in terms of less costs for
their security stability. Of course, in the process of confidence building and establishing a
Northeast Asian security framework, order is not important because they tend to be
complimentary.
The role ofthe United States will be critical in establishing a collective security system
and maintaining regional stability until then. The United States should not contain China by
strengthening current bilateral security alliances after the Korean reunification. It should
change its role from a protector to a participant, and from a balancer to a conciliator. As far
as the U.S. interests are concerned, it would be better for the United States not to be an off-
shore balancer or an isolationist. Instead, the United States can take a role to guide regional
states in establishing a new cooperative security system.
In the future when the Northeast Asian remnant of the Cold War ends, a collective
security system can be applied as a means for security stability in this region more than any
other kind ofmeasure because ofthe following four reasons. First, even though the formation
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of trust among Northeast Asian states seems to be difficult, the current CBMs, such as
increasing economic relations and the multilateral security dialogues, have shown signs of a
cooperative atmosphere rather than a competitive one. Second, the national interests of each
state will tend to converge on security and economy rather than on military dominance or
ideological revolution. Third, collective security will more beneficial than balance of power
If the Northeast Asian states create a collective security system, the system will provide more
benefits such as reduced interaction costs, less defense costs, stable economic environment,
and available information. This will tend to strengthen their commitment to the system and




A. NATURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
Balance of power itself has limits as a system for power management. As Hans
Morgenthau admits, the difficulty ofpower calculation can lead states to a misjudgement. The
tendency of states toward preponderance in a balance of power system may result in a power
competition between powerful countries. Most of all, even though realists insist on the
inevitability of the balance of power in an anarchic international environment, its better
outcome might count on cooperation of states for peace rather than competition for power.
If balance of power is not an inevitable one in international relations, and if cooperation
among states is possible, there can be a more cooperative security system other than power
competition.
As an alternative concept to balance of power, collective security has been criticized
because of its overly ideal concept in a real world. The trust problem in a collective security
system can be examined in terms of states' cooperation. Like in a prisoner's dilemma game,
states will not cooperate. However, if information is available to the prisoners and the game
is repeated again and again in the future, the prisoners can cooperate. Coupled with the
changes in the international system, cooperation in the field of politics, economy and security
among states tends to be reinforced especially in the post-Cold War era. If states can
cooperate with each other for common security interests, collective security can work not as
an ideal concept, but as a real one.
Of the five conditions for the success of collective security, positive identities and
shared mutual security interests among member states are critical. They become a basis for
cooperation and strengthen institutional capability in a collective security system. When we
consider the fact that a state's behavior is dependent on its self-interest, the more shared
interests there are, the more cooperation there will be; therefore, there will be a greater
possibility for a collective security system to be successful. The shared self-interests among
states are influenced by the identity that each state builds in a system. As far as security
matters are concerned, the definition of others as a friend or enemy, or as "positive" or
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"negative," is important for sharing their security interests.
Collective security requires proper institutions to control states' behavior, adjust their
self-interests, and facilitate their cooperation. An institution cannot be an authority to govern
its member states. Instead, institutional capability depends on its incentives to attract states'
cooperation, providing the opportunities for states to adjust and conciliate with each other's
different interests, policies, and strategies. As long as the system was beneficial, the member
states will follow rules and norms based on international law. This voluntary behavior will
strengthen institutional capability in a collective security system. As one of the most important
functions, institutions should have information to provide transparency to the public. By the
dissemination of information, a collective security system can not only make the policy of
each state transparent, but also can get much stronger public support and strengthen trust
among the states.
Collective security requires the reiteration of interaction between actors and the
system. As long as the purpose of each state in a collective security system is security interest,
a collective security system should reward its members with less transaction costs, security
stability and economic benefits. The more gains that the system provides, the more
cooperation the member states will commit. Such interactions between the cooperation of
actors and benefits from the system will make the collective security system more stable as
they are reiterated.
B. APPLICABILITY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
There will be two options for the future security system in Northeast Asia: balance of
power and collective security. The balance of power structure, as this thesis examined, will
not be desirable for the future security environment. Even though the balance of power is
maintained under improved political relations and positive identities among regional states,
it will also not be desirable because the balance of power structure itself implies the existing
hostility and confrontation between "our interests" and "their interests". Instead of a balance
ofpower, a collective security system will be able to not only prevent such a confrontational
future security environment, but will also benefit regional states in terms of peace and co-
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prosperity.
In applying collective security to Northeast Asia, the most urgent task for the
Northeast Asian states is to form positive identities with each other. Still, negative identities
among the Northeast Asian states will be the most problematic obstacle in establishing a
regional collective security system. Japan does not seem to take an ultimate measure to settle
historical matters with Korea and China. China will stick to socialism and maintain an
authoritarian regime. As long as the Northeast Asian states watch each other with doubts over
each other's hegemonic ambition, they will not be able to form positive identities. Their
distrust and even hatred will impede them from sharing a common security goal toward
regional stability. This is the reason why the CBMs should be strengthened not only to
establish a collective security system, but also to improve their security relations. In fact, even
though security cooperation among the Northeast Asian states seems to be difficult, it will
never be an impossible task. Dietrich Fischer indicates that:
Cooperation does not always have to begin with the most difficult and controversial
issues, such as arms control. It may be much easier to reach some initial agreement in
areas that are noncontroversial, where there is a very obvious joint interest, even if they
may be less significant in themselves. But a series of easy agreements may pave the
way for successful negotiations has been created. ... Such mutually beneficial relations
and close people-to-people contacts have removed much of the fear and the danger of
war"
516
By initiating easy tasks first, such as joint research of historical matters or military exchanges,
the Northeast Asian states will be able to improve their identities and promote cooperation.
National interest is a critical factor in determining states' behaviors. Even though
security policies among the Northeast Asian states have been conflictive with each other,
interests of each state from a collective security system suggest the strongest possibility of
collective security in Northeast Asia. The United States can justify its military presence in this
region and protect its national interests, such as free economic activities, security of sea lines
of communication, and political influence. Also, the United States will be able to improve
political and security relationships with China. Japan will be able to get a security guarantee
516
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of the United States if there is a threat from China and secure its territory and sea lines of
communication without high costs. China and reunified Korea will be satisfied with less
concerns about Japan's rearmament. Most of all, the Northeast Asian states will be able to
prevent further nuclear expansion and hegemonism in this region. Also, they get economic
benefits from economic cooperation with less defense costs, free economic trade and
technology transfers. In this context, a Northeast Asian security framework can take the role
to converge their diverse security interests to such common and harmonious security interests.
Ifthe Northeast Asian states can form positive identities and share common security
interests, collective security will become closer to being a reality. For regional stability, a
collective security system can be the most desirable measure because it will be able to prevent
misunderstanding or conflicts. The cooperative security system will give regional states
opportunities for mutual benefits from security, trade, and regional co-prosperity, reinforcing
the trust among them. It will require a long time and painstaking efforts for the Northeast
Asian states to establish a collective security system. This suggests that the Northeast Asian
states begin confidence building now.
C. FUTURE POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN STATES
This thesis examined the conditions for the success of collective security and the
applicability of collective security to Northeast Asia as a means for regional stability after
Korean reunification. The current bilateral security arrangements will not fit in with the future
security environment in Northeast Asia. The conspicuous reduction of the role of the United
States in terms of military involvement will cause a change of power dynamics with the
rearmament ofJapan and Chinese nationalism geared toward regional hegemony, which will
possibly result in a new confrontational structure in this region.
This thesis suggested the possibility of collective security in Northeast Asia in terms
of the possibility of the improvement of identities and the formation of shared security
interests. In this context, the Northeast Asian states should strengthen the CBMs such as
multilateral security approaches, economic relations, military exchanges, education for the
next generation, and joint military training. Coupled with the changes in the international
222
system toward cooperation, frequent contacts among regional states will be conducive to
promote mutual understanding. To facilitate contacts and cooperation, an institution for
Northeast Asia security cooperation should be established. Without positive identities, the
institution will not able to work practically because their security interests will be conflictive.
However, if they can form positive identities and establish such an institution, there will be
tangible outcomes from their cooperation. Then they will also be able to form shared security
interests and create a collective security system using the institution.
If a collective security system can be an alternative to a balance ofpower structure in
the future, and if it would be desirable, there would be no reason why states cannot cooperate
with each other. Toward future collective security, there are some policy implications for
regional states.
First, the United States should change its role from a protector to a participant, and
from a balancer to a conciliator. It should prevent Japan from being an "excessive" military
power in the face ofreduction ofthe U.S. security role. It should be careful not to show itself
to China as a "hegemon power" in this region. At the same time, the United States can be an
intermediator to conciliate Japan and China, adjusting their conflictive security interests and
appeasing their concerns about each other's bid for regional domination. Also, the United
States can take a role in guiding regional states to establish a new cooperative security system
using its many experiences with international institutions.
Second, Japan and China should realize that the main reasons for negative identities
among regional states are related to their historical and ideological problems. They should
show apparent attitudes and policies toward their past history and ideology to neighboring
states. In fact, this is one of the most difficult tasks. In particular, it would be unthinkable
today for China to give up its communist ideology completely and adopt a democratic
political system. However, China should at least make their security policy transparent and
publicized. On the other hand, the regional states should strengthen the CBMs and improve
their security relations. Even though it takes a long time, education of the next generation will
contribute to promoting positive identities among regional states. Military exchanges and joint
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military training will also "serve as a device to begin to break down secrecy." 517 Korea, the
most victimized country in Asia throughout modern history, should pursue more progressive
diplomacy with neighboring states. In some part, Korea can be a balancer between Japan and
China and utilize the future security environment for its national interests. For historical
matters, Korea has to keep in mind the saying that a one-step recession may bring about a
two-step advance in the future.
Most of all, the United Sates, Japan, China, and Korea should realize the importance
and necessity of security cooperation for the future security stability in Northeast Asia. As the
Western European countries could form a collective identity and share security interests to
counter the threat of the Soviet Union, they should make a consensus for more constructive
and cooperative security cooperation to prepare for the upcoming security environment. Even
though they do not reach an agreement on collective security, their endeavors toward
collective security will contribute to a more stable security environment in this region . In fact,
as constructivists assert, in the future, friendly anarchy will be better than hostile anarchy.
Consequently, the future security system in Northeast Asia should be changed from
the current balance of power structure to a collective security system. This is because a
collective security system will be not only an ideal but also a desirable security means for
regional stability in Northeast Asia after Korean reunification. Of course, this does not mean
that current bilateral security arrangements are not important. As long as the Northeast Asian
states have negative identities, collective security cannot be applied as an alternative security
mechanism to the balance of power structure in this region. However, as long as collective
security is more desirable than balance of power in terms of maintaining regional stability, it
would be better for the Northeast Asian states to gather their efforts toward more cooperative
security framework.
In the future, when the security environment changes, a new security system in
Northeast Asia should be a cooperative one, no longer a competitive or confrontational one
like the current balance of power structure. The growing multilateralism and cooperative
517Sheldon W. Simon, Alternative Visions ofSecurity in Northeast Asia, p. 25.
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atmosphere in the security and economic spheres strongly suggest the possibility of a
cooperative security system in Northeast Asia. In this context, Northeast Asia today seems
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